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INTRODUCTION
Our Constitution establishes a federal structure but says
relatively little about what such a structure entails. Virtually every
political actor in our system has had something to say about filling
in the gaps in this structure: Presidents and Congresses have both
extended and voluntarily limited their own power; state govern-
ments have protested national actions on some occasions and, on
others, urged Congress to act; social movements outside the
government have pressed for reform at all institutional levels.
Throughout our history, the judiciary has operated alongside these
other actors to help define and implement our federal balance.
Because the text and history of the Constitution yield few clear
answers to federalism questions, the courts have had to work
through these issues primarily as a matter of doctrine-that is,
judge-made rules that elaborate upon and implement the Constitu-
tion's requirements.
This judicial function has always been controversial. In the early
nineteenth century, for example, South Carolina nullifiers rejected
the Supreme Court's claim to authoritatively resolve federalism
disputes and instead insisted on political settlement of such
questions through negotiations between the national government
and the states.' In our own era, prominent commentators and even
some Supreme Court justices maintain that the Court should stay
out of disputes about the boundary between state and national
power, leaving that line to be drawn by the national political
branches.2 The issue has become particularly salient over the last
decade, as the Rehnquist Court's "Federalist Revival" has reinvigo-
1. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 80 (1999).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[Wlith supposed conflicts of sovereign political interests implicated by the Commerce
Clause[] the Constitution remits them to politics."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) ("State sovereign interests ... are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power."); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1980) (arguing that courts should declare federalism disputes nonjusticiable).
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rated the notion ofjudicially-enforced limits on national power after
nearly a half-century of dormancy.
This Article undertakes to explore and defend the enterprise of
making federalism doctrine. I make three distinct claims. The first
is that fidelity to the Constitution requires us to have federalism
doctrine. The Constitution is vague on the specific contours of our
federalism, and there is considerable evidence that the Founders
left many details to be worked out over time. But those uncertain-
ties cannot mask the widely shared commitment at the Founding to
some sort of balance between national and state authority. On any
of the most plausible accounts of constitutional obligation-not
just on an originalist account-that commitment commands our
respect today. As Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge have written,
"[c]onstitutional law must make some sense of federalism."3
My second claim is that courts legitimately can-and should
-develop innovative doctrinal solutions to the problem of maintain-
ing the federal balance, whether or not those doctrines can be
grounded directly in the text and history of the Constitution. Much
of the federalism debate has centered on textual and historical
sources.4 But it seems fair to say that although those sources of law
have been highly relevant to the Court's enterprise, neither text nor
history has dictated many of the resulting doctrines. Consider, for
example, the rule that the federal government may not "comman-
deer" state legislatures or executive officers.5 Nothing in the
constitutional text mandates such a rule.6 Although the relevant
history supports the notion that the Framers intended the new
national government to act directly on individuals rather than
through state governmental institutions, that history is hardly so
3. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A
Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1995).
4. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (debating the
Qualifications Clauses in Article I, §§ 2 and 3 in textual and historical terms); Randy E.
Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001); Gary
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993) (textually and historically
analyzing the Necessary and Proper Clause).
5. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 161, 175-76 (1992).
6. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (acknowledging as much).
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clear as to be dispositive.7 The more persuasive justifications for
this and other rules, in my view, rest on their functional roles in
protecting state autonomy.' In any event, the important point is
that the Court has been operating in a context where text and
history suggest important directions but do not mandate particular
doctrinal formulations. Instead, the Court has constructed doctrine
to meet the needs of the federal system as it sees them. Federalism
doctrine has been made, not found.
Many of the Rehnquist Court's critics, both on the bench and in
the academy, have taken the failure of text and history to compel
particular federalism doctrines as proof that the enterprise is
illegitimate.9 This is a curious reaction-although perhaps not a
surprising one-given that many of the same people favor judicial
creativity in other contexts. 10 My own view is that doctrinal
creativity is essential if the Constitution's mandate of a federal
balance is to be maintained in a world where many of the Founders'
presuppositions about the structure of society and government
have profoundly changed. Text and history tell us that our Constitu-
tion established a creative tension between national and state
governments. I will argue, however, that those same sources can tell
us relatively little about how that tension should be maintained in
7. See id. at 918 ("The constitutional practice we have examined ... tends to negate the
existence of the congressional power asserted here, but is not conclusive."). See generally Evan
H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers
to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1042-50 (1995) (concluding that the
historical record suggests the Framers intended to permit commandeering of state executive
officers and that the record is too sparse to support a rule against commandeering state
legislatures); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957,
1971-2007 (1993) (finding historical support for a rule barring commandeering of state
legislatures, but not for one barring commandeering state officers).
8. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV.
633, 682 (1993) (rejecting the historical arguments against commandeering, but approving
New York's rule on "prudential" grounds).
9. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights"
in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1286-96 (1999) (attacking the textual and
historical bases for the anti-commandeering doctrine).
10. Compare, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault
on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367,368-72 (2002) [hereinafter Law, In the
Name of Federalism] (comparing the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence to Lochner),
with Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional Rights and
Remedies, 55 MD. L. REV. 292 (1996) (urging recognition of a substantive due process right to
physician-assisted suicide).
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today's world. And although adaptation of the original structure to
present circumstances is not exclusively, or even primarily, a task
for courts, I contend that they must nonetheless play an important
role.
The third claim is really a cluster of arguments about how courts
should go about shaping federalism doctrine. My approach is
influenced by the "institutional turn" in constitutional scholarship.
This movement has insisted that "debates over legal interpretation
cannot be sensibly resolved without attention to [the institutional]
capacities" of the institutions doing the interpreting." To some
extent, this institutional turn occurred long ago with respect to
federalism. At least since the New Deal, debate has focused not only
on what the allocation of authority between the states and the
nation should be, but also on institutional questions about the
extent to which courts should participate in drawing the line.'2
Recent scholarship on comparative institutional choice does suggest
ways to sharpen this inquiry, lending a bit more rigor to longstand-
ing generalizations about the "political safeguards of federalism."
I want to resist, however, the notion that comparative institu-
tional choice can resolve basic questions about whether courts
should decide federalism cases at all. One of the distinctive
characteristics of courts as institutions is that they lack certain
kinds of control over their own agendas; they are not free, in other
words, to decline to decide disputes otherwise within their jurisdic-
tion simply because they think some other sort of institution might
do the job better. Moreover, the sorts of factors that drive compara-
tive institutional analysis may well play out quite differently in
different sorts of federalism cases, so that the question of choice
should be treated as multifarious rather than unitary. My claim,
then, is that institutional analysis may be employed best at the
stage of interpretive choice, that is, in shaping the particular
doctrines that courts adopt in various different federalism contexts.
The generic question, "Should courts decide federalism cases?" is
11. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 885, 886 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Interpretation].
12. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543,
572-78 (1954) [hereinafter Wechsler, Political Safeguards].
1738 [Vol. 46:1733
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one that courts cannot legitimately ask, and one that has no single
answer.
Part I of this Article explores the use of judicial doctrine as a tool
for resolving disputes about federalism. The basic point is that
doctrine and the Constitution are not the same; hence, the use of
doctrine requires justification beyond the traditional arguments
about judicial authority to interpret the Constitution itself. I offer
a rudimentary model of how courts may act to maintain the federal
balance, first by identifying the direction from which the principal
threat to that balance comes at any given point in our history, and
second by formulating doctrines designed as compensating adjust-
ments in the direction of equilibrium. This basic model frames much
of the discussion that follows.
Part II argues that fidelity to the Constitution obliges courts to
play this role of doctrinal innovation. I suggest, however, that
although the constitutional text and history support that obligation,
these sources generally do not go so far as to mandate particular
sorts of federalism doctrines. This is true because the original
Constitution left many of these matters open, and because certain
approaches apparently mandated by the text or historical expecta-
tion have become obsolete over the course of our history. This Part
thus lays out the case for a judicial role in making "compensating
adjustments" to the federal balance through doctrinal innovation.
I also take up some objections concerning the ability of courts
deciding individual cases to discern the appropriate direction and
magnitude of such adjustments.
Part III addresses the more difficult step, that is, the formation
and content of doctrine. Here I confront the question of institutional
choice, for the failure of text and history to determine the content of
federalism doctrine suggests that more functional considerations
should play a leading role. As I have already suggested, comparative
institutional analysis is more useful for influencing the structure of
doctrine rather than for asking whether courts should decide
federalism cases at all. I also consider the relevance of federalism's
underlying values-such as state experimentation or the ability of
national action to overcome collective action problems-to the
judicial task of doctrinal elaboration.
20051 1739
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It is important to emphasize, however, that this Article is meant
as a defense of the enterprise of making federalism doctrine, not an
attempt to carry that enterprise through to its conclusion. I have
pursued the latter course some distance in other work, suggesting
different organizing models for federalism doctrine and assessing
the Rehnquist Court's handiwork in light of those models."l And
Part III of the present Article concludes with two brief examples of
how the adjustment model might approach particular doctrinal
problems. But most of the task of making particular federalism
doctrines will have to await future scholarship. The burden of the
present effort is to elaborate the theoretical underpinnings that can
permit that work to go forward.
I. DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
Any casebook in constitutional law will illustrate the importance
of doctrine to the subject. The widely-used Sullivan and Gunther
text 14 places the Constitution itself-the document drafted at
Philadelphia in 1787 and ratified in 1789, as well as its subsequent
amendments-in an appendix at the end of the book, immediately
following page 1537.1 Much of the rest is doctrine, encompassing
"not only the holdings of cases, but also the analytical frameworks
and tests that the Court's cases establish." 6 My central claim in
this Article is that although the constitutional text (and its history)
mandate a federal system, courts must give content to that system
largely through doctrinal elaboration. This introductory Part
13. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Young, Two Federalisms].
14. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14th ed. 2001).
15. Id. at A-1 to A-15. Similarly, Laurence Tribe's leading treatise begins with the
proposition that "the provisions of the Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court,
taken together, generate a body of [constitutional] law." 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-1, at 3 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
16. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword]; see also ROBERT
F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 8 (1989) [hereinafter NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES] ("The most familiar content
of the Constitution is simply a series of judicial interpretations."); McNollgast, Politics and
the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1631, 1639 (1995) (defining doctrine as "the set of rules and methods to be used to decide a
particular class of cases").
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develops the distinction between text and doctrine and offers a
summary account of the judicial role in fleshing out our federal
structure.
A. The Problem of Doctrine
Doctrine is not the same as the Constitution.17 Sometimes it
bears very little relation to the document itself, such as when the
Court holds that states may not discriminate against interstate
commerce' 8  or that Congress may not "commandeer" state
legislatures or executive officials.' 9 Other times, the doctrine
elaborates upon the text, rendering its directives more specific in
their application to particular cases. In considering the scope of
Congress's affirmative commerce power, for instance, the Court
has held that the power extends to "channels" and "instrumentali-
ties" of commerce, as well as to activities that "substantially affect"
interstate commerce.2" In either case, however, the doctrine may
permit or require things that the document, standing alone, might
not.
Are the dormant commerce doctrine and the substantial effects
test part of the Constitution? Sai Prakash surely states an intuitive
reaction when he insists that "the exclusive, legitimate source of
federal constitutional law [is] the Constitution-that document
found at the National Archives and typically reproduced at the
17. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 26-27 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, Foreword]
(contrasting "documentarian" and "doctrinalist" approaches to constitutional interpretation);
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 50-107 (2004); Thomas
W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15
CARDozO L. REv. 43, 62-65 (1993) (giving reasons why judicial decisions should not be read
as "incorporated" in the enactments they interpret).
18. Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (conferring power on Congress "to regulate
Commerce ... among the several States"), with Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330
(1996) (observing that courts have long interpreted the Commerce Clause "as a limitation on
state regulatory powers" that "'prohibits economic protectionism"') (quoting Associated Indus.
of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647 (1994)).
19. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (admitting the lack of
"constitutional text speaking to this precise question" whether state executive officers may
be required to implement federal law).
20. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
20051 1741
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beginning of constitutional law casebooks."2' This view does not
dismiss doctrine altogether, but it does insist "that other putative
sources of constitutional law that could not somehow be traced back
to this Constitution [are] not appropriate fonts of constitutional
law."22 It turns out that virtually everything turns on what one
means by "traced back" in this formulation. I want to acknowledge
at the outset, however, that according constitutional status to judge-
made tests and rules that are not themselves written into the text
requires special justification. The nature and limits of such
justifications are critical in determining how far federalism doctrine
may go.
We might initially define constitutional "doctrine" as the residue
of interpretation that accumulates over time. Constitutional inter-
pretation is seldom easy. Judicial interpretations of the document
are often contestable and sometimes wrong. Yet we often accept
those interpretations as settled and move on, taking them as given
and building upon them in the resolution of future questions.
Doctrine in this sense is equivalent to precedent or stare decisis; it
represents our unwillingness to reopen interpretive questions
resolved in the past.
Even taken in this comparatively narrow sense, doctrine is
moderately controversial in constitutional law. Gary Lawson, for
example, has argued that it is unconstitutional to subordinate the
Constitution itself to what the judges have said about it in the
past.23 The argument has a strong intuitive appeal: If a judge
21. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 407,416-17 (2003)
[hereinafter Prakash, Overcoming] (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION (2001)).
22. Id. at 417.
23. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY
23, 23-24 (1994); see also Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[Tihe ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."). A counter-current holds that it is
unconstitutional not to allow courts to produce binding doctrine. See, e.g., Anastasoffv. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2000) (striking down circuit rule barring citation of
unpublished opinions on the ground that the Article III "judicial power" necessarily
encompasses the power to create binding precedent), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Ripple, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)'s confinement of the grounds for federal
habeas corpus relief to situations where state courts have violated "clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" unconstitutionally denies lower
1742 [Vol. 46:1733
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deciding today's case truly thinks-using all the tools of interpreta-
tion at his disposal-that the Constitution requires rule X, then by
what authority does he discount that interpretation and adhere to
rule Y, simply because rule Y was adopted in a prior decision?
Surely the Constitution itself trumps any authority the prior court
might have enjoyed.24
As long as we take precedent and doctrine simply to entail
deference to past interpretations, however, two answers to Professor
Lawson's argument seem readily available. One is that adherence
to interpretive precedent simply represents humility on the part of
the present interpreter-a recognition that his own interpretation
may be wrong and, more fundamentally, that prior readings are in
fact one of the most important "tools of interpretation" to be
employed in resolving present controversies.25 A second answer rests
on the practical-but basic-impossibility of treating all interpretive
questions as open in resolving each new case. Some questions must
be considered settled if we are to move forward. As Charles Fried
points out, "[w]e want to avoid being like the man who cannot get to
work in the morning because he must keep returning home to make
quite sure that he has turned off the gas."2"
courts authority to create binding precedent) (emphasis added), rev'd, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
That debate is well beyond the scope of my discussion here.
24. Professor Lawson makes the argument from an originalist perspective, where rule X
would be supplied by the present interpreter's best determination of the Constitution's
original meaning with respect to the point in issue. See Lawson, supra note 23, at 27-28. But
as Sai Prakash has pointed out, originalism does not necessarily entail a rejection of
precedent. See Prakash, Overcoming, supra note 21, at 428 ("Some originalists may believe
that [the original understanding of] Article III's vesting of the 'judicial Power' in the federal
courts enables courts to use precedent to allow supposedly erroneous doctrine to trump the
original understanding of a particular provision.").
25. See, e.g., Amar, Foreword, supra note 17, at 43-44 (noting that "precedent can teach
and help find the right answer" because "precedents reflect the earnest efforts of thoughtful
members of the nation's highest court deliberating about important issues with their minds
focused by the real-world facts before them"); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of
Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1269, 1292 (1997) (noting that "an essential element of
responsible judging is a respect for the opinions and judgments of others, and a willingness
to suspend belief, at least provisionally, in the correctness of one's own opinions").
26. Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1144 (1994); see also
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1064-68 (1990) (making
a similar, but more foundational, argument for precedent).
2005] 1743
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Doctrine has an additional component, however. In many
instances, the activity of interpretation per se may not produce
closure on a choice among doctrinal options, leaving the choice to
be made on other grounds. Those grounds may include independent
moral principles, pragmatic concerns about the workability of
particular rules, or institutional issues concerning the Court's
legitimacy. As Richard Fallon has observed,
Frequently, a perfect correspondence could not, even in princi-
ple, exist between the meaning of constitutional norms and the
doctrinal tests by which those norms are implemented .... [SI ome
constitutional norms may be too vague to serve directly as
effective rules of law. In addition, in shaping constitutional tests,
the Supreme Court must take account of empirical, predictive,
and institutional considerations that may vary from time to
time.2"
Doctrine thus entails the choices that judges must make "to
implement the Constitution successfully. In service of this
mission, the Court often must craft doctrine that is driven by the
Constitution, but does not reflect the Constitution's meaning
precisely."2
9
This aspect of doctrine frankly acknowledges that it supplements
the Constitution rather than encapsulating past interpretations
of the document. As such, it seems more vulnerable to Professor
Lawson's critique. Doctrine in this aspect is not simply privileging
one court's interpretation (the earlier one) over another; it
instead amounts to the use of something not quite the same as
the Constitution as a vehicle for implementing the Constitution's
provisions. That still seems relatively unproblematic where doctrine
27. As Professor Fried notes:
Doctrine and precedent are related, not identical. In civil law countries, doctrine
plays a great role in giving the law its substance and texture, but treatise
writers and academic discourse, not the opinions nor even the decisions of
courts, are the dominant organs of the growth and statement of doctrine there.
Fried, supra note 26, at 1141.
28. Fallon, Foreword, supra note 16, at 62.
29. Id. at 57 (emphasis omitted); see also 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 1-16, at 81-82 ("'Ihe
bare words of the Constitution's text, and the skeletal structure on which those words were
hung, only begin to fill out the Constitution as a mature, ongoing system of constitutional
law.").
[Vol. 46:17331744
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simply makes open-ended provisions more concrete. The majority
opinion in United States v. Lopez, for instance, used the long-
standing doctrinal trichotomy of "channels," "instrumentalities,"
and activities "substantially affect[ing]" commerce to make sense of
Congress's textual power over interstate commerce.3 ° In these
instances, the doctrinalist can plead necessity: Courts simply cannot
decide cases under the Commerce Clause-and, in particular, the
Supreme Court cannot guide future decisions by lower courts-
without specifying what "commerce among the several states"
means.31 The implementing doctrine is necessary in such instances
to ensure that like cases applying the constitutional provision in
question are, in fact, treated alike.32
Some doctrine, however, exists at a further remove from the
implementation of particular constitutional provisions. This is
particularly true of much federalism doctrine. The anti-comman-
deering principle, for example, does not implement any particular
constitutional provision;33 likewise, the dormant commerce notion
30. See 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
31. Fallon, Foreword, supra note 16, at 57. A related necessity occurs when a textual
provision is relatively determinate but practically unworkable in that form. The Free Speech
Clause, for instance, could hardly be more specific: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. But aside from Justice Hugo Black, we have
never been able to live with a right of free speech in this absolute form. The provision thus
cannot be implemented effectively without doctrine specifying exceptions and qualifications,
such as the "clear and present danger" test for restrictions on incitement to unlawful activity.
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
32. See Amar, Foreword, supra note 17, at 28 (conceding that "even after close study the
document itself will often be indeterminate over a wide range of possible applications," so that
"judicial doctrine can work alongside practical resolutions achieved by other branches to
specify particular outcomes and thereby concretize the Constitution").
33. Language in New York v. United States suggests that the Court believes the anti-
commandeering rule to be an implicit limit on every power enumerated in the text of
Article I:
[Jiust as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether
one views the question at issue in these cases as one of ascertaining the limits
of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative
provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty
retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992). But that limit is not necessary to
implement these powers in the way, for example, that some sort of doctrinal test of equality
is necessary to implement the Equal Protection Clause. One can imagine a Commerce Clause
without an anti-commandeering limit; one cannot apply equal protection without defining
what is meant by equality.
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hardly serves to implement the Commerce Clause's text, which
quite plainly operates only to confer power on Congress. 4 These
sorts of doctrine require a more elaborate justification than the need
to specify the meaning of particular constitutional text.
It may help to begin by adding a third category of constitutional
"law" alongside the text and the doctrine. That category would
include fundamental structural principles, like "federalism" or
"separation of powers." Those words do not appear in the constitu-
tional text, and yet they have long been understood as bedrock ideas
undergirding the textual provisions in the document and tying them
together into a coherent structure.35 Nor are these sorts of principles
properly classified as "doctrine," at least if we understand that term
to encompass relatively specific rules and principles that imple-
ment the textual provisions. On the contrary, textual provisions
such as the vesting clauses of Articles I, II, and III and the Tenth
Amendment "implement" broader ideas of separation of powers and
federalism, respectively. The text thus exists at an intermediate
level of generality, implementing broader ideas and yet requiring
further implementation through judicial doctrine.36
The critical question for present purposes is the relationship
between these fundamental structural principles and the doctrine
made by courts. Sometimes, courts will want to justify doctrine on
the ground that it directly implements structural principles, even
though the doctrine has little support in the text itself. The anti-
commandeering doctrine is an example. Other times, courts will
fashion doctrine to implement text, yet recur to the text's underly-
34. Similarly, the broad sovereign immunity accorded to state governments in cases like
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), hardly implements the text of the
Eleventh Amendment. On the contrary, the Court often describes the rather narrow text of
that Amendment as implementing a preexisting (and much broader) notion of sovereign
immunity in a particular instance where Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419,452 (1793),
had rejected such immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723 (1999). My own view is
that current doctrine goes well beyond what is necessary to implement the most plausible
account of the Founders' views on state sovereign immunity.
35. See, e.g., Amar, Foreword, supra note 17, at 30 (observing that "the phrases
'separation of powers' and 'checks and balances' appear nowhere in the Constitution, but these
organizing concepts are part of the document, read holistically"). One need not go all the way
with Professor Amar's notion of holistic interpretation to agree with him on this point.
36. See generally Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1601 (2000) [hereinafter Young, Jurisprudence of Structure] (discussing
the role of the political theory underlying structural provisions of the Constitution).
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ing principles to influence the form that the implementing doctrine
takes. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton," for example, both
Justice Stevens' majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence resorted to the Founders' underlying theory of representation
to support a doctrine that the Qualifications Clauses in Article I
supply the exclusive limitations on who can be a federal representa-
tive.38 In each case, it is hard to say that the text itself is doing the
work.
Can doctrine be justified even where it is not grounded in text?
The power of judicial review itself is generally justified in terms of
the Constitution's written-ness. Chief Justice John Marshall, for
instance, wrote in Marbury that the theory "that an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void" is "essentially
attached to a written constitution."39 Compared to more textualist
forms of judicial review, then, the argument that courts may
formulate constitutional doctrine driven not so much by text as by
fundamental structural principles cannot be grounded as easily in
the judiciary's obligation "to say what the law is."' ° One might go
further and deny the existence on authority of structural principles
apart from their specific instantiations in the text. One might insist,
in other words, that provisions like the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment exhaust the Constitution's commitment to
federalism.4' I want to argue that the vast range of doctrinal
elaboration by courts exercising the power of judicial review
nonetheless is legitimate, particularly in the context of federalism
doctrine. I also want to offer a general account of the considerations
that ought to guide courts in fashioning such doctrine. The next
Section advances an overview of that account, which is then
elaborated and defended in the remainder of the Article.
37. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
38. See id. at 806, 838, 841-42; see also Young, Jurisprudence of Structure, supra note 36,
at 1644-45 (discussing this aspect of Term Limits).
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added); see also id.
at 176 ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not
be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.") (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 177.
41. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,124 (1976) ("The principle of separation of powers was
not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the
document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."). One need not, I think,
read Buckley as denying that separation of powers means more than the sum of the specific
provisions in the document.
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The case for such doctrine rests on three distinct elements. First,
the Constitution's contemporary interpreters owe obligations of
fidelity not simply to the text, but also to the structure that the
text created. This is true under any of the most plausible theories
of constitutional obligation. Second, the text of the Constitution is
sufficiently incomplete on the subject of federalism that, if we are
to be faithful to the original structure, the gaps must be filled in
through doctrinal "implementation" by courts, as well as by other
political actors. Third, changes in the societal and political context
of federalism over time require doctrine to play a more dynamic role;
courts should not simply fill in the gaps in the federal system, but
also should adapt that system and the mechanisms of its enforce-
ment to historical change over time. This imperative owes much to
Lawrence Lessig's notion of "translation,"42 although I ultimately
think the judicial role is better characterized as one of "compensat-
ing adjustment."
I develop each of these arguments for doctrinal elaboration in
Part II. To say that such elaboration is necessary, however, leaves
scores of unanswered questions as to how it should proceed. The
remainder of the present Part offers a general account of the
considerations that ought to guide courts in fashioning federalism
doctrine.
B. Compensating Adjustments and the Judicial Role in Structural
Cases
My central claim in this Article is that making federalism
doctrine can be an act of fidelity to the Constitution comparable
to enforcing its textual commands. The argument, elaborated in
Part II, is that the text and history of the Constitution unequivo-
cally commit us to a federal structure, entailing some division and
balance of authority between the nation and the states. But both
text and history are remarkably ambiguous on the precise content
of this commitment, and that ambiguity extends not only to the
substantive balance to be struck, but also to the mechanisms
for enforcing that balance. The open-textured nature of the
42. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter
Lessig, Fidelity].
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Constitution's structural commitments calls for judicial imple-
mentation through doctrine: There is simply no way to administer
our federal system without developing rules to flesh out the
allocation and balance of authority. The Constitution's extended
existence over time, moreover, requires adjustment and adaptation
to new circumstances. Indeed, the most likely explanation for
constitutional ambiguity on federalism, to my mind, is that it
represents a deliberate strategy on the part of the Framers to allow
the mechanics of federalism to be worked out and adapted through
practice over time43-surely a prudent approach to a fundamentally
innovative and untested form of government. In any event, that sort
of filling-in and adaptation is what has actually occurred throughout
our history.
This Article is about doctrine, which means that it is principally
about courts. The role that courts should play is, at least to some
extent, a question of institutional choice, and I take up that
question in some detail in Part III. Much of what I say in this
Section about the need to implement and adapt our structural
commitments is applicable not only to courts, but also to other
political institutions, all of which have obligations to interpret the
Constitution.' And in fact much-perhaps most-of the work of
implementing and adapting the federal structure has been carried
on outside the courts."a Congress, the President, administrative
agencies, state political branches, and even private actors take
actions that operationalize federalism and adjust it to historical
change, and in many ways the discussion of compensating adjust-
ments by courts in this Section will remain relevant to those
activities.
The discussion here might also be generalizable in a different
way-that is, much of what I have to say about federalism doctrine
may be relevant to the more general question of doctrinal construc-
tion in other areas of constitutional law. Others have addressed
these questions more globally," and I draw heavily on their work
43. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES, supra note 16, at 22-26 (arguing that
stable constitutional principles cannot be solely the province of judicial interpretation).
45. See infra Part II.C.1; WHITTINGTON, supra note 1.
46. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORYOF THE CONSTITUTION (1982);
FALLON, supra note 21.
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here. But I also want to suggest that some aspects of the questions
are particular to subject matter; specifically, some arguments
for judge-made doctrine arise out of the manner in which the
Constitution approaches issues of structure. Notions of compensat-
ing adjustment, for instance, are probably more relevant to other
"balance of power" aspects of the structural Constitution-particu-
larly, to separation of powers-than they are to individual rights.47
That, in any event, is a question for future work. The focus here is
firmly on the more particular problem of doctrinal implementation
and adjustment of the allocation of authority between the states and
the nation.
1. Our Adjustable Federalism
Federalism is typically defined in terms of both the division and
balance of power." The notion of "balance" need not require a single
fixed point of equilibrium; the critical point is the tension between
state and national governments that enables each to act as a check
upon the other. Justice O'Connor thus argued in Gregory v. Ashcroft
that "there must be a proper balance between the States and the
Federal Government. These twin powers will act as mutual
restraints only if both are credible. In the tension between federal
and state power lies the promise of liberty."49 Rather than insisting
47. That is not to say that compensating adjustments are totally irrelevant to rights
questions. For example, one could argue that Fourth Amendment doctrine must be adjusted
in light of advances in surveillance technology. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001) (holding that the use of thermal imaging technology to look inside a home from the
outside violated the Fourth Amendment).
48. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution-The Case of the
European Union, 21 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 746, 748 (1998) ("[Flederalism searches for the
balance between the desire to create and/or to retain an efficient central authority ... and the
concern of the component entities to keep or gain their autonomy so that they can defend their
own interests."); see also, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
611 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that an expansive interpretation of
the dormant Commerce Clause undermined "the delicate balance in what we have termed
'Our Federalism") (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) (observing that limits on habeas corpus are necessary to maintain
"the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded") (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)); Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656,662 (1975) (invoking "the structural balance essential to the concept
of federalism").
49. 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
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on a precise equilibrium of political and institutional forces, then,
our scheme requires simply that each level of government have
sufficiently meaningful prerogatives to act as a check upon the
other. We must have a balance, but we have had different balances
at different times in our history. Moreover, federal systems may
become unbalanced in either direction-that is, toward disintegra-
tion or undue centralization.
This last point helps explain the very different roles played by the
courts at different times in our history. The Marshall Court was a
strong force for centralization, consistently interpreting Congress's
powers broadly and limiting state prerogatives. 0 Throughout the
nineteenth century, the Court imposed importantjudge-made limits
on state regulation through the dormant Commerce Clause."' The
Taft Court of the early twentieth century played a more decentraliz-
ing role by limiting the growth of national regulation under the
enumerated powers doctrine,52 although its simultaneous imposition
of due process limits on state regulation had the effect of creating a
uniform national economic policy of laissez faire.5" The New Deal
U.S. 89,123 (1984) (observing that sovereign immunity's reduction of a litigant's forum choice
is "a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism") (quoting Employees v. Mo. Pub.
Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result)).
Chief Justice Rehnquist has explained that federalism is simply a part of the Federalist
scheme of checks and balances:
It is too well known to warrant more than brief mention that the Framers of the
Constitution adopted a system of checks and balances conveniently lumped
under the descriptive head of "federalism," whereby all power was originally
presumed to reside in the people of the States who adopted the Constitution.
The Constitution delegated some authority to the federal executive, some to the
federal legislature, some to the federal judiciary, and reserved the remaining
authority normally associated with sovereignty to the States and to the people
in the States.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-78 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (construing Article I
to permit Congress to establish a national bank, and imposing on the States an implied bar
to taxation of federal entities).
51. See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 572-77 (1886)
(striking down an early state ban on freight rate discrimination by railroads on the ground
that the subject matter of the regulation was of a "national" rather than "local" character).
52. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-77 (1918) (striking down federal child
labor law); Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 51 DUKE L.J.
1513, 1537-80 (2002).
53. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 483,487 (1997) [hereinafter Gardbaum, New Deal] (arguing that the
'central goal of the Lochner era Court" was to promote a uniform "philosophy of economic
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Court unshackled both levels of government, 4 while laying the
groundwork for an overall shift toward national authority through
its seeming refusal to recognize any limits on Congress's power."
The Warren and Burger Courts furthered this shift both through
expansive rulings on Congress's enumerated powers56 and by im-
posing a wide variety of individual rights-based restrictions on state
policy.57 Most recently, the Rehnquist Court has made some efforts
to reinvigorate constitutional protections for state autonomy," while
continuing to play a centralizing role in other important areas. 9
nationalism"). Compare, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309-12 (1936)
(invalidating a federal attempt to regulate wages and working conditions in the coal industry
under the Commerce Clause), with Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609-
11 (1936) (invalidating a state minimum wage law under the Due Process Clause).
54. See Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 53, at 506 (arguing that "the net result of the
Court's leading decisions in both [the Commerce Clause and due process] areas was far less
a massive transfer of powers from the states to the federal government than a shift from a
regulatory vacuum to concurrent powers").
55. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-33 (1942) (upholding the federal
Agricultural Adjustment Act, even as applied to a single farmer's production of wheat for
home consumption); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-26 (1941) (upholding the
national Fair Labor Standards Act even as applied to intrastate commerce). See generally
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950) (commenting on
the demise of the Court's pre-New Deal regime of doctrinal limits on national authority).
56. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-99 (1968) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act as applied to state governments); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1964) (upholding public accommodations provisions of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act as within the Commerce Clause). The Warren and Burger Courts likewise
construed Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments broadly. See, e.g., City
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-80 (1980) (upholding section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, requiring preclearance of changes to state and local election rules with the Justice
Department); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-58 (1966) (upholding application of
the Voting Rights Act to bar literacy tests, which the Court itself had declined to declare
unconstitutional).
57. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-64 (1973) (invalidating state prohibitions on
abortion); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961) (imposing the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule on the states); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (striking
down racial segregation in public schools); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 489-97 (2000) (arguing that the Warren Court's individual rights
rulings amounted largely to an effort to impose values held by a majority of the country on the
recalcitrant Southern states).
58. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997) (holding that Congress may
not "commandeer" state executive officials to enforce federal law); Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67-68, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress, acting pursuant to its
Article I powers, may not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from private damages
suits); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-68 (1995) (striking down the federal Gun-
Free School Zones Act as outside the Commerce Clause).
59. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756,
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This highly compressed story ought to dampen enthusiasm about
judicial remedies for the long-term erosion of state authority; as
Vicki Jackson has pointed out, "the Court's record of activism on
behalf of the states as against national power is neither impressive
nor durable."" Although the Court has been a nationalizing force in
our history far more often than it has befriended the states, it has
occasionally acted to check national power, and this Article is
devoted to exploring how it might play that role more effectively.
But counting on the Court to play a primary role in that regard
seems unrealistic, and the most promising strategies for maintain-
ing some sense of balance in our system will need to pursue action
across a variety of legal, political, and private institutions.6'
The important point for present purposes, however, is to mark the
way in which the Court's federalism decisions have pushed in
different directions at different times. The Court has not confined
itself to implementing the Constitution's open-textured federalism
provisions by giving them more specific-but consistent--content.
Rather, the Court has tacked back and forth in response to different
institutional trends in different eras. Its role has been one of
compensating adjustment through doctrinal innovation, rather than
one of consistent interpretation of static principles.
Adrian Vermeule has described compensating adjustments as a
"second best" approach to maintaining our constitutional commit-
ments:
1764-65 (2004) (upholding federal preemption challenge to state rules requiring state agencies
and private fleet operators to purchase vehicles meeting strict anti-pollution standards);
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 112-16 (2000) (holding that federal law preempted
Washington safety regulations of oil tankers in state waters); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999) (interpreting ambiguous provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 to preempt traditional state authority to regulate the local telephone market). See
generally Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1384-86
(2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers] (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's decisions on
federal preemption of state law have taken more from the states than cases like Lopez have
given back); Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 13-23 (expanding and updating this
argument).
60. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 280 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, Narratives].
61. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1131-36 (1997) (exploring
legislative reforms).
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Given an irreversible departure from, or violation of, ideal
constitutional design, the best response is not to approximate
the ideal as closely as possible by adopting its remaining
components. Rather, the best response is to violate the ideal
along some other margin, in order to produce an offsetting
condition or compensating adjustment.62
In the federalism area, it may be less necessary than Professor
Vermeule suggests to say that a particular adjustment "violates" the
Constitution; the structure is sufficiently open-textured that many
different implementing doctrines may be accommodated to the text.
But the important point is that the text and history generally have
not compelled many of the Court's doctrinal innovations.63 Nothing
in the text compelled McCulloch's doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity or its application to protect state governments from
federal taxation in response to a strengthened national government
much later in the nineteenth century. And occasionally the Court's
adjustments have violated the best understanding of text and
history. Hans v. Louisiana's extension of state sovereign immunity
to federal question cases was probably wrong as a matter of original
understanding," but it arguably protected state autonomy at a time
of dire fiscal crisis and increasing federal power.65
The form of compensating adjustment employed here owes much
to Lawrence Lessig's theory of "translation."6 That theory suggests
that when the context of the Constitution changes, interpreters
62. Adrian Vermeule, Hume's Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. RaV. 421, 426
(2003) [hereinafter Vermeule, Second-Best]. Professor Vermeule attributes this idea to David
Hume. See id. at 421. Vermeule thinks that courts are generally ill-suited to make
compensating adjustments. I take up that objection in Part III.B.3, concluding that the
objections to judicial competence are sufficiently persuasive to counsel judicial caution but not
to exclude courts from that role altogether.
63. See Evan H. Caminker, Context and Complementarity Within Federalism Doctrine, 22
HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoLY 161, 162 (1998) [hereinafter Caminker, Complementarity] (arguing
that many of the Court's most important federalism doctrines, limiting both federal and state
power, were not dictated by the text or history of the Constitution but derived instead from
functionalist concerns).
64. 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116-23 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (demonstrating Hans's error).
65. That is emphatically not to say that the Rehnquist Court's further expansion of state
sovereign immunity is a useful compensating adjustment today. See Young, Two Federalisms,
supra note 13, at 23-32.
66. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 42.
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should change their readings of the Constitution in order to
approximate the effect of the original understanding in the changed
context. This notion that changes in context over time may require
what looks like doctrinal innovation as an act of fidelity is central
to my project. But at least in theory, compensating adjustments are
not precisely the same as translation. As Professor Lessig makes
clear, the "problem of translation" is a "problem faced by the
originalists": "The translator's task is always to determine how to
change one text into another text, while preserving the original
text's meaning." 7 In the context of federalism, this suggests that the
task is to preserve the precise equilibrium between national and
state power embodied in the Constitution's original understanding.
My approach, by contrast, is more Burkean than originalist."
Indeed, one key aspect of this project is to operationalize a Burkean
approach to constitutional interpretation. Burkean conservatives
are skeptical of human reason and foresight in the setting-up of
political arrangements, and they doubt the capacity of any single
generation, no matter how extraordinary, to comprehend, antici-
pate, and capture in a set of political institutions all the needs and
contingencies of a large and complex society.69 They thus stress the
organic and incremental growth of political institutions over time.v°
This perspective at once inspires a reverence for the past-the
67. Id. at 1173.
68. See generally Ernest A. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory
and Constitutional Interpretation 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 625-34, 686-88 (1994) [hereinafter
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism] (criticizing originalism on Burkean grounds).
69. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, in 8 THE WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 53, 138 (Paul Langford ed., Clarendon Press 1989) (1790)
[hereinafter BURKE, REFLECTIONS]:
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of
reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the
individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital
of nations and of ages.
See also J.G.A. Pocock, Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas,
in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202, 203
(1971) ("[Burke's] account of political society ... endows the community with an inner life of
growth and adaptation, and it denies to individual reason the power to see this process as a
whole or to establish by its own efforts the principles on which the process is based.").
70. See BuRKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 69, at 217 ("By a slow but well-sustained
progress, the effect of each step is watched; the good or ill success of the first, gives light to
us in the second .... The evils latent in the most promising contrivances are provided for as
they arise .... We compensate, we reconcile, we balance.").
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present generation, after all, is no more omniscient than its
predecessors-and a limit on that reverence based on the need for
constant reform.7' The insistence that reform be incremental,
however, means that Burkeans will be almost prohibitively
reluctant to launch a broad attack on established institutions.72
Under this Burkean sort of approach, courts owe fidelity to a
constitutional tradition that includes the whole sweep of our history,
not just the Founding moment.73 And courts proceed by moving the
law in increments rather than by seeking to impose (or restore) a
broad constitutional vision. This means that the appropriate
equilibrium state in our federalism may shift over time, and that in
any event the judicial task is to move incrementally in a particular
direction rather than to take the law to a particular destination.
Professor Lessig's particular doctrinal proposals in the federalism
area suggest that he might not ultimately disagree with this
approach; those proposals, such as "clear statement" rules and some
version of the anti-commandeering doctrine, 4 seem aimed at
imposing some incremental limits on federal power rather than
restoring some particular original balance. In any event, the image
of "compensating adjustment" fits my purpose better than that of
"translating" a specific text.
Compensating adjustment differs from a pure theory of transla-
tion in a second sense. If the task of the translator is to preserve
the meaning of a particular constitutional provision under new
circumstances, her focus is likely to remain fixed on that particular
provision. The adjuster's focus, by contrast, is more holistic: The
question is how resolution of particular doctrinal questions may
help move the overall system back toward balance. It follows that,
71. Burke, after all, spent most of his political career as a Whig reformer. See, e.g., id. at
206 ("A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my
standard of a statesman."). See generally CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE GREAT MELODY: A
THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY OF EDMUND BURKE (1992) (stressing the
reformist aspect of Burke's career).
72. See BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 69, at 112 ("[I1t is with infinite caution that any
man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable
degree for ages the common purposes of society.").
73. See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 68, at 669.
74. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT.
REV. 125, 186-88 [hereinafter Lessig, Translating Federalism]. These proposals overlap
substantially with my own proposals elsewhere. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13,
at 163-65.
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as Evan Caminker has argued, "a court cannot craft an optimal
doctrinal rule without considering the interactive effects between it
and other rules .... [SIometimes a court may properly assess
federalism doctrines in the aggregate rather than as isolated
solutions to discrete controversies."75 That does not necessarily
mean, as Dean Caminker suggests, that courts should formulate a
pro-nation rule in case B because it created a pro-states doctrine in
case A;7  in both cases, the court's task is to push toward overall
balance, and the likelihood is that neither case's rule will move the
needle all that far. But compensating adjustment does entail a more
holistic judgment than translation, because the court must make
an incremental adjustment to the general balance rather than
translate the meaning of a particular provision.77 The crude model
of federalism doctrine employed here has two steps. The first
requires courts to determine the appropriate direction of doctrinal
adjustment at any particular time. The Marshall Court interpreted
Congress's enumerated powers broadly in an era when the national
government was, practically speaking, much weaker than the
states, and it likewise devised doctrinal rules reining in state
regulation and taxation.v8 This was more an act of implementation
than adjustment, because the Constitution's initial thrust was
toward centralization. But the need for doctrinal creativity re-
mained. It fell to the Court to develop doctrinal mechanisms, such
as the principle of intergovernmental tax immunity in McCulloch
or the origins of the dormant Commerce Clause in Gibbons, that
helped carve out a place for the Constitution's new national
institutions and restrained centrifugal tendencies in the states. By
75. Caminker, Complementarity, supra note 63, at 161.
76. See id. at 163 (arguing that "sometimes the Court should consider pairs or perhaps
even sets of doctrinal rules and should measure these rules against each other to achieve an
optimal overall balance").
77. In suggesting that the court should make this sort of holistic assessment of the federal
balance, I am aware of arguments that holistic approaches to constitutional interpretation are
often unrealistic about both constitutional meaning and the institutional capacities of courts.
See generally Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble
with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000). But I am not advocating a holistic theory
of the Constitution, but rather that one aspect of it-federalism-should be assessed in a
holistic fashion. And the judgment I am asking courts to make is ultimately a rough and
intuitive one. See infra Part II.C.2.
78. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402-07 (1819).
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the 1990s, with national power firmly established and state
autonomy seemingly endangered, the Rehnquist Court was acting
on a parallel imperative to rein in national authority.79 Many of the
Court's actions are best understood as compensating adjustments
meant to push the system back toward balance. Any institution
charged with helping to maintain the federal balance must be alert
to the need, at different times, to throw its weight onto one or the
other side of the scale.
2. Incrementalism and Constraint
The second step involves formulating particular doctrines to affect
the necessary adjustment. Suggesting that courts should throw
their weight onto the scale raises an obvious question: How much
weight? This way of putting the question, however, unhelpfully
suggests the need for courts to have a comprehensive ideal of the
federal balance that should be achieved before acting to redress
threats to the system. Academics love to castigate the Supreme
Court for not having a full-blown, rigorously coherent theory of
federalism before it acts in particular cases.8 ° I think this demand
assumes an exaggerated view of the Court's ability to shift the
federal balance. Requiring the Court to develop a full-blown federal
vision of its own, after all, presumes that the Court could impose
that vision if it wished. But the limited ability of the courts to effect
social change has been amply demonstrated in other contexts.8' It
seems safe to say that if the federal courts could not impose school
desegregation on one region of the country while Congress and the
79. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429 (2002) [hereinafter Fallon, Conservative Paths]
(characterizing the current Court as pursuing a variety of doctrinal strategies designed to
check national authority more generally).
80. See, e.g., Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1447 ("[The Supreme Court's ...
federalism jurisprudence might, uncharitably, be described as 'a mess.' ... The decisions are
inconsistent with constitutional text and with one another, and they lack a persuasive
normative theory to justify the first inconsistency or to resolve the second."); Todd E. Pettys,
Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV.
329, 330 (2003) (complaining that the Court has "failed to articulate an overarching vision of
federal-state relations").
81. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991). But see Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1992)
(reviewing ROSENBERG, supra).
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Executive remained passive,82 it is unlikely that those same courts
can fundamentally reorder the federal balance in the face of efforts
by the national political branches to maintain their authority.83
If the institutional environment in which courts operate is
constrained in important ways, then we should develop different
expectations for federalism doctrine. Those constraints come from
a number of sources. There is the sheer institutional weight of the
national administrative state, not to mention the many more active
weapons--e.g., appointments, jurisdiction stripping, and control
over budgets and facilities-at its disposal." There is the force of the
Court's own more nationalist precedents, derived from the Court's
ultimate need to persuade other actors that it is enforcing the law
rather than its own policy preferences.85 And there is the fact that
in some cases, the written Constitution comes fairly close to
determinacy;86 for example, it is simply not open to a court, in light
of the Supremacy Clause, to announce a doctrine that federal
statutes may not preempt state law.
Despite these constraints, there are some cases that come to the
Court presenting open questions that may be resolved in favor of
either national or state authority. These are the interesting cases
for federalism doctrine. Lopez was such a case: Although the Court
82. ROSENBERG, supra note 81, at 41-169.
83. The Court has struggled to persuade even lower federal courts to go along with its
fairly modest efforts to recalibrate the federal balance. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H.
Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the
Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1262-99 (2003).
84. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 319-61 (5th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; McNollgast, supra note 16, at 1648-49.
85. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.):
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept
its decisions ... as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social
and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that
the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled
character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.
86. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 404-11 (1985).
87. I put to one side disputes about the Supremacy Clause's precise mandate. See Stephen
A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 773-77 (1994) [hereinafter
Gardbaum, Preemption) (arguing that the Clause guarantees the supremacy of federal law
but affords Congress no distinct "preemption power"). The text bars at least some doctrinal
possibilities, such as denying the supremacy of federal law.
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had upheld broad exercises of national authority under the Com-
merce Clause, it had never upheld a federal statute as close to the
margin of that Clause as the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act.a8
It was thus open to the Court to take what would have been the last
step-upholding the statute and, in effect, decreeing that the Clause
lacked any cognizable limits-or to say that the Clause's expansion
stops here. Either step would have required the articulation of
doctrine. Neither the Government's proposed rule that courts
should always defer to Congress's view of what affects interstate
commerce, nor the formula that the Court ultimately adopted,
allowing Congress to regulate only commercial activities, was
clearly mandated by the text or history of the Constitution.
Choosing whether to uphold or to strike down the exercise of
national power in such a case hardly required the Court to develop
a full-blown theory of federalism. The possibilities open to the Court
were far more limited. I see the doctrinal problem as having two
basic elements. The first, as I have already suggested, is directional:
The Court should ask whether its doctrinal elaboration should
operate to promote or to check national power. This requires some
view of the federal vision embodied in the Constitution, for it is the
gravitational pull of that vision that ought to determine the
direction of the Court's intervention. But the second doctrinal
element does not require the Court to attempt to replicate that
vision, and therefore the Court need not develop its vision with the
specificity demanded by the Court's critics. The task is, instead, to
choose a doctrinal principle from among the options open in the
given case.
88. The cases most often cited as going further are Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The latter,
however, seems like an easy case under the formula that Lopez adopted: Selling rooms in a
motel or barbecue in a restaurant, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), is plainly
commercial activity (the latter, in fact, is commercial activity of the highest order). Nor, in my
view, was Wickard a much harder case. Every commercial activity will have some instances
that are not performed for money. It is not implausible to say that activities that are usually
commercial ought to be regulable as part of a general scheme regulating commercial and non-
commercial activities alike. But see Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 139-41
(identifying problems with this approach). In any event, a close reading of Wickard reveals
that Farmer Filburn used his homegrown wheat primarily to feed livestock that were later
sold, bringing his actions within even a relatively narrow definition of "commercial" activity.
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
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The first thing to say about this second element is that it is
necessarily incremental. The question presented in Lopez was not,
"What should the scope of Congress's power be?" but instead "Is the
Gun-Free School Zones Act within the Commerce Clause?" To be
sure, it is possible to decide the latter question in a way that
purports to determine the former. But because the Court's authority
depends ultimately on the persuasiveness of its reasoning, such a
violation of craft norms would incur its own costs in terms of
compliance with and durability of the precedent set. 9 It is little
surprise that the Court's Commerce Clause decisions have pro-
ceeded much more cautiously, refusing to articulate a comprehen-
sive rule and leaving the ultimate boundary between state and
national authority to be extrapolated from the series of data points
marked by the Court's results.9 ° As Cass Sunstein has noted, cases
like Lopez are exemplars of judicial minimalism.9 Such decisions
thus allow the Court to follow an "incompletely theorized" vision of
federalism, making corrections as it goes along in successive cases.92
Attempts to develop a comprehensive theory in individual cases
simply would impede agreement among the succession of judges
that must tend the doctrinal stream over time.
The question remains, however, what guides these incremental
doctrinal developments. We deal by hypothesis with "open" cases,
in which the text (and possibly the history, too) does not dictate a
clear answer. I conclude that the form of doctrine should be shaped
primarily by functional or institutional considerations. These
considerations include, importantly, the critical but difficult
imperative that judicial doctrine command compliance by political
actors. That imperative suggests that doctrine should strive to aug-
ment the self-enforcing aspects of federalism,93 and that it must be
89. On the importance ofjudicial craft norms in constraining constitutional interpretation,
see Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV.
35, 37-46 (1981); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (declining to "adopt a
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity").
91. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 4, 23 (1996).
92. See id. (noting that Lopez "gave no deep account of federalism"). See generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
93. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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perceived as sufficiently principled and determinate to command
respect as "law."' Finally, federalism doctrine should be designed
to maximize the values that undergird our commitment to federal-
ism in the first place, such as the values of state-by-state diversity
and experimentation, political participation, and the ability of the
states to protect individual liberty.95
All of these points require further development. For now, the
important point is the basic model of doctrinal elaboration: Courts
must first determine the direction of incremental "push" in particu-
lar cases, then construct doctrines to implement that push by
reference to considerations that are primarily functional in nature.
I flesh out the relation of doctrinal elaboration to constitutional
fidelity in Part II. Part III turns to the institutional considerations
that guide courts in shaping doctrinal rules.
II. FIDELITY AND THE DIRECTION OF DOCTRINAL ADJUSTMENT
Federalism has many meanings, but the basic one in our system
is that we have two levels of government-the nation and the
states-and that power is divided between them as a matter of
constitutional principle.9" That concept has a rich history in this
country,97 and that history has played an important role in debates
about doctrine. I argue in this Part that both the constitutional text
and its history require us to have federalism doctrine. Fidelity to the
constitutional design requires a continuing commitment to the basic
elements of its structure. Even if one were convinced that all the
functional arguments for federalism-e.g., state experimentation,
ease of political participation-were spurious, it would not be open
to us to reject federalism and create a unitary system. I thus argue
in Section A that government officials bound by the Constitution
94. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
95. See discussion infra Part III.C.
96. See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some
Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1641-42 (2003)
[hereinafter Young, European Union] (discussing various definitions of federalism). Local
governments, of course, comprise a third level. But those governments have no independent
status as a matter of federal constitutional law.
97. See, e.g., SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (1993); RAOuL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); FORREST
McDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO 1776-1876 (2000).
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have a continuing obligation to enact and enforce laws and create
doctrines that maintain the basic attributes of the federal structure.
But exploring the basis for such an obligation makes clear that it
necessarily entails substantial flexibility in adapting the original
structure to current needs.
If text and history commit us to have federalism doctrine, those
sources also might function as a constraint. Text and history have
played an important role in recent doctrinal debate; witness, for
example, the historical trench warfare between Justices Stevens
and Thomas in the Term Limits case.9" As the remainder of this
Article will make clear, however, these sources play a less central
part in my own analysis. This hardly means that text and history
are unimportant or that they impose no constraint on the doctrinal
enterprise. I want to insist, however, that they leave many of the
crucial questions unanswered. Sections B and C of this Part seek to
explain the role of text and history and to explore the limits of what
history can and cannot tell us about federalism.
The first point, developed in Section B, is that we should not view
the text and history of the federal Constitution as a complete picture
of our federal system. This is true for at least two reasons. The
Constitution's great task was to reconstitute a national govern-
ment after the failure of the Articles of Confederation; it was not
necessary, however, to constitute the state governments, and the
Constitution did not purport to define their powers or obligations to
their citizens in any comprehensive way. So it should hardly be
surprising that "Our Federalism"-defined as the complete set of
structures at the national, state, and local level and the web of
complex interrelationships between them-must be fleshed out in
ways that are sometimes hard to tie directly to the document
ratified in 1789. Moreover, our Founders seemed to have viewed the
federal relationship as incomplete in 1789, requiring evolution and
adaptation over time. That is consistent, in my view, with the best
account of constitutional development, which emphasizes evolution-
ary change over the entire sweep of our history rather than an
exclusive focus on particular founding episodes.
Consistent with this evolutionary view, I argue in Section C that
our foundational commitment to federalism can be enforced under
98. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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contemporary circumstances only by means of compensating
adjustment. To the extent that the constitutional text and its
original understanding identified particular strategies for enforcing
federalism, those strategies largely have failed under modem
conditions. The primary strategy of the original Constitution for
preserving the federal balance-the doctrine of enumerated
powers-has become far less effective over the last century with the
advent of an integrated national economy. And the Framers'
political strategy, relying on the direct representation of the states
in Congress, has been undermined by such developments as the
direct election of senators and the advent of political parties and
interest group politics. We thus confront a choice between abandon-
ing the basic commitment to federalism or developing new strate-
gies for enforcing that commitment. Drawing on Professor Lessig's
work on translation in constitutional interpretation, I argue that
fidelity requires the latter course.99
A. Fidelity and Its Limits
Debates about federalism often proceed as if the constitutional
principle of federalism must stand or fall based on the functional
values that it serves.'00 The implicit suggestion seems to be that if
state autonomy is shown to be a bad idea from the standpoint of
protecting human rights or promoting good policy, we would be
justified in reading that principle out of the Constitution. That
suggestion flies in the face of the very notion of constitutionalism,
which is to entrench certain structures and values so that they will
be highly resistant to change, even if those structures or values fall
out of favor with the present generation.10' My view, of course, is
that federalism does serve important values, and I argue in Part III
that those values should help determine the structure of federalism
99. See Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 42.
100. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
101. See, e.g., 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 1-8, at 23 (comparing constitutional restrictions to
the ropes that bound Ulysses to the mast of his ship so that he would not be able to succumb
to the temptation of the Sirens); Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on
Bork, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1019, 1030 (1992) ("The purpose of constitutional restrictions on self
government is to impede policy adjustments in light of changing circumstances.").
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doctrine in important ways.' °2 But I want to insist in this Section
that the constitutional principle of a federal balance would compel
our adherence even if it could be shown to be pernicious from a
policy standpoint."3
Any argument from fidelity must begin with what the text and
history of the Constitution actually entail. Because those materials
have been well-canvassed elsewhere, I provide only the briefest
overview here. I then discuss the nature and limits of arguments
from textual and historical fidelity in the context of federalism.
1. Text and History
The constitutional text says relatively little about federalism. 10 4
One critical component of the federal structure is present in the
original text: the principle of enumerated powers. Simply by listing
specific powers for Congress rather than conferring a general
legislative authority, Article I establishes the notion that federal
power is limited." 5 Although Article I also includes a robust notion
of implied powers,"°6 Chief Justice Marshall would acknowledge in
102. See discussion infra Part III.C; see also Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 51-
53. On the values served by federalism, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN.
L. REv. 317 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54
U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) [hereinafter McConnell, Federalism].
103. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) ("Our task would be the same
even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of
devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the
framework set forth in the Constitution.").
104. As Matthew Adler has observed:
Places in the constitutional text where the states are explicitly accorded rights
against the national government are few in number and relatively minimal in
importance-notably, Article I, Section 9's prohibition of federal taxes on exports
from any state and of federal preferences for the ports of one state over another;
Article IV, Section 3's ban on the creation of new states through the division or
merger of old ones; and various references to the state legislatures, implying
that Congress cannot validly abolish them.
Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 162 (2001).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) ("With its careful
enumeration of federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the
Federal Government are reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as
granting the Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate.").
106. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (construing Article I's
"Necessary and Proper" Clause).
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Gibbons v. Ogden that "[tihe enumeration presupposes something
not enumerated."0 7 The Tenth Amendment emphatically underlines
this notion. 10 8 Even if Justice Stone was right to suggest that this
Amendment states "but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered,"0 9 contemporary confusion about that point
suggests that this in itself is an important office. In any event, the
Framers' reliance on this principle obviated (at least in their minds)
the need to incorporate in the text a more detailed description of the
federal relationship. The task of the federal Constitution was simply
to empower the new national government and establish its internal
structure.
In hindsight, it turns out that categorical enumeration may not
be such a great strategy for guaranteeing balance in a federal
system."0 As I discuss in Section C, the failure of this strategy to
prevent the national government from invading virtually every
category of state activity presents a difficult problem for federalism
doctrine. For present purposes, however, my point is simply that the
original Constitution includes, as a purely textual matter, a strong
commitment to a balanced federal structure. The document not
only refers to the states as viable and responsible actors at several
107. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). The Necessary and Proper Clause is sometimes read
as undoing the whole notion of enumerated powers, but that is not how the Clause was
originally understood:
As with the quiet evolution of the supremacy clause, the lack of controversy over
[necessary and proper] suggests that [the Framers] did not regard it as
augmenting the powers already vested in the national government.... There is
no reason to think that the framers believed the necessary-and-proper clause
would covertly restore the broad discretionary conception of legislative power in
the Virginia Plan.
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: PoLITIcs AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 180 (1996). Some commentators have argued that "proper" also amounts to a
textual protection for federalism. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 4.
108. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999):
The limited and enumerated powers granted to ... the National Government ...
underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the constitutional design ....
Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities
is removed by the Tenth Amendment, which ... was enacted to allay lingering
concerns about the extent of the national power. The Amendment confirms the
promise implicit in the original document.
109. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
110. See infra Part II.C. For an argument that emerging federal systems should not rely
overmuch on the strategy of enumeration, see Young, European Union, supra note 96, at
1663-77.
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points, but also structures the basic grant of federal lawmaking
power-arguably the Constitution's most important feature-in a
way designed to preserve state autonomy.
If the text itself focuses on empowering the federal government,
the surrounding history features more prominent concern for
protecting the states. Justice Powell observed in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority that "[miuch of the initial
opposition to the Constitution was rooted in the fear that the
National Government would be too powerful and eventually would
eliminate the States as viable political entities."1 ' Some of this
concern shaped the drafting of the document itself at Philadelphia.
As Jack Rakove has recounted, James Madison and James Wilson
arrived at Philadelphia with an aggressive plan "to render the
Union politically independent of the states and the states legally
dependent on national oversight.""2 But this position "only inspired
other delegates to articulate their notions of statehood with equal
vigor, ultimately producing in recoil a reaffirmation of the vital
place that the states would occupy in the federal system.""' That
reaffirmation is reflected in the structure of the Senate, implemen-
tation of the principle of federal supremacy, and the scope and
definition of federal legislative power."4
These concessions did not satisfy everyone. In one of the most
influential critiques, Elbridge Gerry complained that "Itihe
111. 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER
FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 28
(1999) (identifying "[tihe consolidationist/nationalist character of the new government" as one
of the central themes in Anti-Federalist writing).
112. RAKOVE, supra note 107, at 168-69; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 525-26 (1969):
Both Madison and James Wilson fought hard in the Convention to prevent both
equal representation of the states in the Senate and elimination of the
congressional veto of all state laws that Congress deemed unjust and
unconstitutional. Both proportional representation and the congressional veto,
they believed, would deny any recognition of state sovereignty in the
Constitution....
113. RAKOVE, supra note 107, at 170.
114. Id. at 170-80. Madison's own views evolved as the Convention worked through these
issues, so that in the end he incorporated the States' role as a central component of his theory
of checks and balances. See, e.g., LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES
MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 139-40 (1995) (observing that the
positions taken in The Federalist "confessed [Madison's] reconciliation to decisions he had
earlier opposed and outlined a position he defended through the rest of his career").
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Constitution ... has few, if any federal features, but is rather a
system of national government.""' Brutus, a pseudonymous writer
in New York, conceded that the proposed Constitution did not "go to
a perfect and entire consolidation," yet warned that "it approaches
so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly
terminate in it."" 6 Most Anti-Federalists were not states' rights
absolutists; many were willing to concede the need to strengthen
national authority beyond the Articles of Confederation model." 7
But virtually all Anti-Federalists feared that the Philadelphia draft
took this imperative too far."8
The Anti-Federalist opposition does not itself establish a constitu-
tional commitment to federalism; standing alone, it would corrobo-
rate claims that the Constitution was a profoundly nationalizing
document." 9 What is critical is the response to these concerns by the
Constitution's proponents. They might have conceded the charge of
consolidation and defended the virtues of national government; that
is surely what most legal scholars today would have chosen to do
had they been there. And the Federalists did defend the need for
central authority in some areas, such as foreign affairs. 20
115. Elbridge Gerry to the Massachusetts General Court, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 3, 1787,
reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 231, 232
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter DEBATE]. Luther Martin likewise complained that the
Philadelphia draft was not "in reality a federal but a national government" that would bring
about a "consolidation of all State governments." Luther Martin, The Genuine Information,
Address Before the Legislature of the State of Maryland (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 19, 45 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
116. "Brutus" I: If You Adopt It ... Posterity Will Execrate Your Memory, N.Y. J., Oct. 18,
1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 115, at 164, 166.
117. See, e.g., CORNELL, supra note 111, at 63 (observing that "[rielatively few Anti-
Federalists were willing to return to the Confederation as a model for federalism" and most
conceded "that some central authority ought to be created with sufficient power to force
compliance from the states").
118. See id. at 61-65, 98-99; RAKOVE, supra note 107, at 181 (observing that "[flor Anti-
Federalists, the decisive fact about the Constitution was how much more 'national' it was than
the Confederation"); WOOD, supra note 112, at 526-27.
119. The persistence of the political tradition that the Anti-Federalists represent, on the
other hand, does strengthen the case for a historical commitment to balance in our federal
system. See CORNELL, supra note 111, at 303-07.
120. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279-81 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(defending the need for unified foreign affairs powers); see also RAKOVE, supra note 107, at
178-79.
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But the Constitution's most prominent defenders also chose to
concede-even reaffirm-the importance of state governments and
to deny that the proposed national entity would unduly threaten
their role. Gordon Wood has recounted that "[u]nder this
Antifederalist pressure most Federalists were compelled to concede
that if the adoption of the Constitution would eventually destroy the
states and produce a consolidation, then the 'objection' was not only
'of very great force' but indeed 'insuperable.'"'2 ' According to Mark
Killenbeck, the Anti-Federalists' "concerns were widely shared, and
these individuals played an important role in shaping the text, the
ratification dialogues, and, eventually, the drafting and ratification
of what became the Tenth Amendment."'22 The debates thus
strongly suggest that both Federalist and Anti-Federalist leaders
alike were committed to a meaningful role for state governments
under the new regime.'23 More importantly, the fact that such
arguments were thought to be necessary in order to achieve
ratification indicates broad-based support for federalism in the
Founding Generation at large.
The Federalist assurances about state sovereignty and autonomy
have been well-catalogued elsewhere,124 and I will provide only a few
illustrative examples here. James Wilson's summation to the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention insisted that the proposed
Constitution, "instead of placing the state governments in jeopardy,
is founded on their existence." 2 ' Madison conceded in Federalist 39
that the new government had several national features but
emphasized that it remained federal in many crucial respects. 26 In
particular, he insisted that in "the extent of its powers ... the
proposed Government cannot be deemed a national one; since its
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves
to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all
121. WOOD, supra note 112, at 529.
122. Mark R. Killenbeck, Pursuing the Great Experiment: Reserved Powers in a Post-
Ratification, Compound Republic, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 107.
123. See id. (acknowledging that '[pireserving state 'sovereignty' was ... an operative and
occasionally important founding principle").
124. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 107, at 188-201.
125. James Wilson's Summation and Final Rebuttal: December 11, 1787, reprinted in 1
DEBATE, supra note 115, at 832, 841.
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 253-54 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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other objects." 27 And more specific assurances were given as well.
Hamilton, for example, pledged in Federalist 81 that nothing in
Article III of the Constitution should be understood as overriding
the traditional principle of state sovereign immunity.'28
Nor were these references to the continuing importance of
state governments mere grudging concessions to the opposition.
Federalism, for instance, constitutes half of the "double security" at
the core of Madison's theory of checks and balances in Federalist
51.129 Lance Banning has concluded that "[diuring the ratification
contest, as in 1793, Madison desired a well-constructed, partly fed-
eral republic-not, like Hamilton, because he thought that nothing
more could be obtained, but (more like many Anti-federalists of
1788) because he thought that nothing else would prove consistent
with the Revolution."3 ' As Professor Banning's comments indicate,
not all Framers-especially not Hamilton-necessarily shared this
view. But where we must choose between them, it seems likely that
Madison's is the more important perspective.' '
127. Id. at 256; see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45, 46, at 311-12, 315-17 (James Madison)
(J.E. Cooke ed., 1961) (assuring readers that the states would have the advantage in political
competition between the two levels of government).
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961). The
tougher question is whether Hamilton meant that further measures, such as federal statutes
purporting to strip the states of their immunity in particular classes of cases, could not
override the traditional immunity from suit. On that question, see Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 143-50 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (tracking carefully Hamilton's
argument).
129. Madison argued that "the compound republic of America" provided a "double security
... to the rights of the people" because, through the combination of federalism and separation
of powers, "[tihe different governments will controul each other; at the same time that each
will be controuled by itself." THE FEDERALIT No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed.,
1961). See generally infra text accompanying note 395 (discussing Madison's theory).
130. BANNING, supra note 114, at 297.
131. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 107, at xvi (noting that "Madison was the crucial actor
in every phase of the reform movement that led to the adoption of the Constitution"). Some
of the Framers may have wished to undermine state power more broadly than their public
comments suggested. See Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The
Meaning of the Constitution in Historical Context (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). But we deal here in original understandings, not intentions, and secrets do not count
unless they cast light on public meaning. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 144 (1990); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare
Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 725-27 (1988) ("The relevant
inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the language when the Constitution was
developed.").
1770
MAKING FEDERALISM DOCTRINE
In the end, there seems little doubt that the Constitution was
understood to reserve an important place for state governments. As
Jack Rakove concludes,
[t]he existence of the states was simply a given fact of American
governance, and it confronted the framers at every stage of their
deliberations. In the abstract, some of the framers could imagine
redrawing the boundaries of the existing states, and a few hoped
to convert the states into mere provinces with few if any
pretensions to sovereignty. But in practice the reconstruction of
the federal Union repeatedly led the framers to accommodate
their misgivings about the capacities of state government to the
stubborn realities of law, politics, and history that worked to
preserve the residual authority of the states-and with it the
ambiguities of federalism with which later generations would
continue to wrestle. 13
2
Federalism-defined simply as a measure of balance between the
states and the nation-thus has to be reckoned as one of our basic
constitutional commitments. If present-day interpreters may
disregard this commitment simply because we find federalism
outmoded, inefficient, or otherwise undesirable, then what exactly
do we mean by constitutionalism?
2. Obligation and Interpretation
If the text and history of the Constitution entail a commitment to
federalism, what does that mean for the Constitution's present
interpreters? The answer depends on two different theories: a
theory of obligation and a theory of interpretation. The former asks,
"What is it about the Constitution that binds us?" The latter
inquires, "How do we ascertain the meaning of the materials that
bind us?" Although these two questions are related in important
ways, they are not the same, and keeping them separate will help
in assessing arguments about fidelity to the Constitution's federalist
commitments.'33
132. RAKOVE, supra note 107, at 162.
133. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127,1128-33 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Dead Hand] (demonstrating how
various theories of obligation might lead to different theories of interpretation); Vermeule &
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One might express the claim of fidelity in a number of different
ways, depending on the theory of constitutional obligation that one
brings to the enterprise. Those who view the Constitution as a
binding social contract would stress the inherent authority of the
initial bargain. Other sorts of originalists might-stress the binding
nature of the Constitution as law, based on the authority vested in
the ratifiers by the sovereign people.1 4 Conventionalists, on the
other hand, would emphasize the need for society to agree on a basic
set of constitutive principles; such agreement becomes difficult if,
once a particular document is agreed upon, people remain free to
pick and choose which principles in that document will actually be
binding in individual instances.135 Finally, Burkeans would point to
the prescriptive wisdom immanent in a political order that has
survived for over two centuries and view departures from that order
with suspicion.'36
Each of these arguments establishes the binding nature of
constitutional obligation, independent of whether we would approve
various principles or structures in the Constitution on moral or
policy grounds.'37 The breadth of obligation, however, will depend at
Young, supra note 77, at 744-48 (discussing theories of constitutional obligation and their
relation to theories of interpretation).
134. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226,231 (1988) ("[The force
that gives legal rules their authority is some pre-existing right of the lawmaker."); Henry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 375-76 (1981) ("Our legal
gruindnorm has been that the body politic can at a specific point in time definitively order
relationships, and that such an ordering is binding on all organs of government until changed
by amendment.").
135. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 906-11 (1996) (discussing conventionalism as a basis for constitutional obligation).
136. See, e.g., Edmund Burke, On the Reform of the Representation in the House of
Commons (May 7,1782), in 2 THE WORKS OFTHE RIGHTHON. EDMUND BURKE 486, 487 (Henry
G. Bohn ed., 1841) ("It is a presumption in favour of any settled scheme of government against
any untried project, that a nation has long existed and flourished under it."); see also
Kronman, supra note 26, at 1031-34; Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 68, at
648-50.
137. Other theories of obligation might focus on moral or policy approval: We obey the
Constitution because we think it is a good one. I generally agree with Michael McConnell that
such approaches to constitutional obligation tend to defeat the very notion of
constitutionalism. See McConnell, Dead Hand, supra note 133, at 1129 ("If the Constitution
is authoritative only to the extent that it accords with our independent judgments about
political morality and structure, then the Constitution itself is only a makeweight: what gives
force to our conclusions is simply our beliefs about what is good, just, and efficient.").
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least to some extent on the particular rationale one accepts. The
broadest obligation would stem from the view that the original
understanding binds by its own force-that is, we are bound by the
Framers' conception of federalism because they said so. i" 8 I have
argued at length elsewhere that this conception of constitutionalism
is less persuasive than one that takes account of the entire arc of
our history,139 and most seem unwilling to accord this sort of
dispositive authority to a particular phase of our national develop-
ment. Even those who do accept the contractarian account of
obligation tend to moderate its implications in other ways, such as
a strong commitment to stare decisis in adjudication. 4 ° Others have
insisted that fidelity to the Constitution's original understanding
may require, under modern circumstances, some alteration in
institutions or doctrine.' 4 '
The other accounts of obligation produce significantly more
limited implications. Take conventionalism first. The basic notion
here is that a diverse society needs to agree on a basic set of ground
rules, which include not only a constitution, but also rules for
interpreting that constitution.142 The need to secure widespread
agreement tends to rule out efforts to substitute some other set of
principles for the constitution that history has left us. But conven-
tionalism is basically presentist in its fundamental criterion: the
need to secure societal acceptance. As a result, the constitution that
binds is the one that has come down to us-a product of the entire
arc of our history, rather than a few isolated founding moments. If
the goal is societal agreement on a basic set of rules, we cannot
isolate the Constitution's provisions from "the gloss which life has
written upon them" 14 3 because that gloss informs what our fellow
138. See, e.g., Prakash, Overcoming, supra note 21, at 417 (arguing that the Constitution
binds "because of who originally enacted it (the Founders), how it was ratified (by a super-
majority), and subsequently how it was amended").
139. See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 68, at 673 (insisting that "there
can never be a single isolated point in time to which we can appeal to find the complete
meaning of our mutual commitments").
140. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 134, at 229; Monaghan, supra note 134, at 382 ("The
expectations so long generated by this [nonoriginalist] body of constitutional law render
unacceptable a full return to original intent theory in any pure, unalloyed form.").
141. See Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 42, at 1169.
142. See Strauss, supra note 135, at 906-16.
143. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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citizens understand the Constitution to mean.'" The conventionalist
is thus bound by more recent history as well as by the Founding,
and he will find it impossible to reject entirely the more nationaliz-
ing trends of the twentieth century. 145 But the widely felt need to
maintain a demonstrable connection to the Founding means that
the original commitment to federalism will retain some gravita-
tional force for most conventionalists.
The Burkean perspective is similar. Like conventionalists,
Burkeans believe that the binding force of history extends to the
whole sweep of our national story: not just 1787, but 1800, 1868,
1876, 1937, 1964, 1980, 1994, etc. A Burkean proponent of federal-
ism must be prepared to live with the New Deal, the Great Society,
and other developments that have themselves stood the test of
time.'46 At the same time, caution about radical change will argue
for harmonizing these developments, to the extent possible, with the
original structure. The Burkean will look, for example, for ways to
maintain limiting principles on federal power notwithstanding the
significant expansion of the national administrative state that has
occurred since 1937.
From a variety of different theoretical perspectives, then, federal-
ism's prominent place in the original constitutional design, as well
as its continuing significance in the years since, impose an obliga-
tion of fidelity to the federal balance between the states and the
nation. The conventionalist and Burkean perspectives allow for
gradual evolution of this balance over time. Moreover, as I discuss
further in the Sections that follow, even a strong originalist may
have to allow for "translation" of the original understanding into
144. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033,
1070 (1981) ("The question is not simply what the framers thought, but what has become of
their ideas in the time between their age and ours.").
145. It is true that a conventionalist would have to accept some other "constitution" if it
could be shown that the substitute was able to secure broader societal acceptance than the
Constitution as understood here. But conventionalists tend to care about questions like, "Is
that likely to actually happen?" Conventionalism necessarily rests on an unproven but highly
plausible empirical judgment that there are no alternative constitutions out there likely to
secure anywhere near the same level of acceptance as the Philadelphia document, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
146. I have attempted a more expansive account of the Burkean perspective elsewhere. See
Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1139,1183-
87 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Judicial Activism]; Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra
note 68.
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contemporary circumstances, and any theory of interpretation must
come to terms with institutional limits of courts as constructors and
enforcers of doctrine. For that reason, history can provide only
limited guidance on the question of what federalism doctrines to
adopt. As my colleague Frank Cross has observed, "the Constitution
clearly creates a federalist structure of government" but "it does not
necessarily command anything approaching current federalism
doctrine."'47
B. The Case for Adjustment
The argument thus far supports a judicial obligation to enforce
the Founders' commitment to some sort of balance between national
and state authority. The model of "compensating adjustment" that
I sketched in Part I, however, asserts not only that judges owe
fidelity to this commitment, but also that they should be willing to
"make" doctrine to enforce it, even where such doctrines are not
derivable directly from the text and history of the Constitution. I
undertake to defend this latter point in the present Section. Along
the way, I hope to illustrate more thoroughly how the first step of
the adjustment model-identifying the direction of adjustment
-should operate.
1. The Constitution's Incompleteness on Federalism
We are accustomed to viewing the Constitution as a complete
statement of our political arrangements, but that impression is
false. Whether or not the states existed "prior" to the federal
government as a matter of political theory, there is no dispute that
the original state governments were already up and running when
the Constitution was drafted in 1787. The new Constitution thus
had no need to constitute them; its purpose was primarily to carve
out a place for a new, stronger central government. As Chief Justice
Marshall explained early on:
[Ilt was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers
retained by the States. These powers proceed, not from the
147. Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDozO L. REv. 1, 3 (2002).
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people of America, but from the people of the several States; and
remain, after the adoption of the constitution, what they were
before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instru-
ment.'48
To be sure, this carving-out addressed many of the important and
contested issues of federalism. But others were left unaddressed,
especially in the original, unamended document. Most importantly,
the federal Constitution did not empower state governments; rather,
it left to the state constitutions the task of constituting state
governments and delegating to them some portion of the popular
sovereignty. 149 The Constitution's general agnosticism on the powers
delegated to state governments initially went unremarked in the
text; it would later be made explicit by the Tenth Amendment's
proclamation that "powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." 5° In other words, the sover-
eign people were free to delegate particular reserved powers to their
state governments or simply not to empower their governments to
act in those ways.
The original Constitution likewise did not address the question
of sovereign immunity, either for the new national government or
its state counterparts. Debate at Philadelphia and in the ratifying
conventions focused on whether Article III would itself override the
traditional immunities of state governments, with the apparent
resolution that it would not.'' But whether one thinks that the
states' preexisting immunity itself had constitutional status (the
position of the Rehnquist Court majority)52 or that it was a form of
common law subject to statutory override (the view of the Court's
148. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).
149. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846-50 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
151. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 142-44 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (finding some disagreement on the issue, but acknowledging that "James Madison,
John Marshall, and Alexander Hamilton all appear to have believed that the common-law
immunity from suit would survive the ratification of Article III"); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at
548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
152. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
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dissenters),5 3 the present point is simply that the constitutional
text did not address the question.154 This was a significant omission
given widespread concerns during the founding era about crippling
lawsuits against state governments.' Sovereign immunity thus
provides further evidence of the Framers' willingness to allow major
issues of federal structure to be worked out through processes
-judicial development, statutory enactments, norms of practice-
other than constitutional drafting." 6
Nor did the federal Constitution, for the most part, define the
rights of individuals vis-A-vis their state governments. This is true
despite the fact that many of the Founders in Philadelphia felt
strongly that state governments needed to be reined in. 5 7 The
Constitution did state that the national government would be
responsible for enforcing a basic commitment to republicanism, and
it forbade the states to do certain things, such as to grant titles of
nobility or to impair the obligation of contracts.' But this handful
153. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 130-32 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. A majority of the Court in Chisholm v. Georgia thought that the text did address the
question of state immunities in Article III. See, e.g., 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450-51 (1793)
(opinion of Blair, J.). But even there, several justices found it necessary to rely on broader
structural arguments, see id. at 454-57 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (relying on a theory of popular
sovereignty), and the reaction to Chisholm casts doubt on the correctness of the majority's
reading of the text, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (observing that Chisholm
"created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that ... the Eleventh Amendment...
was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted").
155. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,406 (1821) ("It is a part of our history,
that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the
apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very
serious objection to that instrument.").
156. One might think that the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment shortly after Chisholm
was an attempt to move the question of sovereign immunity back into the realm of
constitutional text. See generally John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading
of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (arguing that a precisely worded
text like the Eleventh Amendment should be treated as exhaustive of its subject matter). But
the Amendment's text could not have been intended as a complete statement on the subject:
It left too many questions, like the immunity of states in federal question or admiralty cases,
unresolved. (It said nothing about federal immunities, moreover.) And indeed the
Amendment's text has played a much less important role in the development of our law of
state sovereign immunity than one might have expected. See Young, Jurisprudence of
Structure, supra note 36, at 1606-16.
157. See MCDONALD, supra note 97, at 17-18; RAKOVE, supra note 107, at 47 (concluding
that Madison intended for the Constitutional Convention "to seize the occasion of reforming
the national government to treat the internal defects of the states").
158. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
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of restrictions hardly purported to be a complete description of the
rights of citizens against their state governments, and when a more
inclusive catalog of individual liberties was added in the Bill of
Rights, those liberties bound only the national government.'59 The
scope of individual rights enforceable against the state governments
was left to rest on state constitutions. As cloudy as the meaning of
the Ninth Amendment is, 160 it seems at least to disavow any
suggestion that the federal Bill of Rights should be a complete
description of a citizen's rights against government. As Forrest
McDonald has observed, "[tihe Ninth was understood as integral to
a system of divided sovereignty. By refusing to nationalize
unenumerated rights, the Ninth left the question of the protection
of such rights to the states or to the people of the states."'6'
The national Constitution thus did not establish a complete
government. It essayed neither a comprehensive list of governmen-
tal powers nor an exhaustive list of individual rights. Sovereignty
remained in the People, who gave life to their system of federalism
by delegating that sovereignty to their several governments.'62 The
system can be fully appreciated only by viewing the whole, that is,
the federal Constitution, the state constitutions, and-most
important for present purposes-the web of practices that has
grown up to mediate potential conflicts between these two levels of
government.
Each of our various institutions has contributed to this web.
Congress, for example, has enacted statutes staking an exclusive
claim to some areas," 3 denying the existence of federal power in
Union a Republican Form of Government ...."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
159. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 249-50 (1833).
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
161. MCDONALD, supra note 97, at 24. I do not mean to take any position here on whether
federal law should also recognize certain unenumerated rights. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766-74 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). My point is simply that the
Ninth Amendment suggests that the definition and protection of many rights unenumerated
in the federal Constitution would fall to the states.
162. See generally WOOD, supra note 112, at 530-31 (discussing James Wilson's influential
theory of popular sovereignty).
163. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a) (2000) (providing that federal law "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").
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others,' providing for cooperation in still others,"6 5 and occasionally
regulating the lawmaking procedures themselves by which federal
law impacts the states.6 ' The President promulgates executive
orders on federalism issues, consults with states and represents
their interests in supranational organizations, 6 ' and issues
interpretive rulings on the preemptive effect of federal statutes.'69
State governments implement some federal statutes, 170 lobby
Congress and the Executive on structural issues,'7 ' and work
together on issues of shared concern through interstate compacts,17
2
164. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2000) (providing that
"nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the [Federal Communications]
Commission jurisdiction with respect to ... intrastate communication service").
165. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990) (observing
that the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act "made the States and the Federal
Government partners in the struggle against air pollution").
166. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (imposing certain procedural restrictions on the
enactment of federal legislation imposing financial burdens on the states).
167. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206, 208 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000):
Agencies shall construe ... a Federal statute to preempt State law only where the
statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other clear
evidence that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or where the
exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under
the Federal statute.
168. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C) (2000)
(establishing a consultation mechanism when state law is challenged before the World Trade
Organization).
169. See, e.g., Preemption of State Standards and Waiver Procedures for Nonroad Engines
and Nonroad Vehicles, 40 C.F.R. § 85.1603 (construing the preemptive effect of federal
environmental law on state standards).
170. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption:
Lessons from Environmental Regulation, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 214-20 (1997)
(describing the states' role in implementing federal environmental laws).
171. See, e.g., Natl Governors' Ass'n, Principles for State-Federal Relations (Feb. 4, 2000)
(statement of proposals for reform on structural federalism issues), available at
http'//www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1, 1169,C_ISSUE_BRIEFAD_3164,00.html; see also
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1566-67 (2003) (discussing the
role of the National Association of Attorneys General in lobbying for the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, which restricted the powers of federal courts to interfere with the administration
of state prison systems).
172. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) (upholding
compact among twenty-one states coordinating taxation of businesses, notwithstanding
failure to secure congressional consent). See generally 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 6-35, at 1238-
42 (discussing interstate compacts).
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uniform state laws,'173 and collective litigation.174 And private and
semi-private organizations and social movements have influenced
the federal balance by creating non-governmental mechanisms for
interstate cooperation, 75 motivating and responding to inter-
jurisdictional competition,7 6 altering the workings of the "political
safeguards of federalism,"'77 and simply by choosing to focus reform
efforts at either the state or federal levels. The focus of this Article
on judicial doctrine should not distract us from federalism's very
vigorous life "outside the courts."7 '
Courts have, however, played a significant role in defining our
federalism through their own web of doctrine. Judicial doctrine
implementing the federal system includes not only such familiar
constitutional issues as the scope of the affirmative and negative
Commerce Clauses or the principle of state sovereign immunity, but
also the whole corpus of conflict of laws,'1 79 judge-made abstention
173. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2004); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1999).
174. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993) (examiningjoint
antitrust action against various insurance companies by nineteen state attorneys general);
Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison
of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 549, 552-55 (2000) (describing
state cooperation in litigation against tobacco companies).
175. The American Law Institute, for instance, is an organization ofludges, lawyers, and
law teachers that eases coordination problems in areas dominated by state law by publishing
"Restatements" of basic principles in each subject. See http-/lwww.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm
(describing the ALI's functions and membership) (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). Likewise, the
National Collegiate Athetic Association-which includes both state and non-state
actors--effectively imposes uniform national regulation of college athletics, overcoming
collective action problems with state-by-state regulation while avoiding the need for extensive
federal rules. See httpA/www2.ncaa.org/aboutncaa/overview/ (describing the NCAA) (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005).
176. See, e.g., THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS
23-25 (1990) (observing that state and local governments respond to relocation and
investment decisions made by private companies and individuals).
177. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 115-18 (2001) (discussing the impact of the national
political parties' decisions to move to a primary system in presidential elections on the role
of such parties in protecting federalism).
178. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Constitution Outside the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry,
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 437 (1992).
179. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-23 (1985) (holding that
a forum state may not constitutionally apply its own law to civil claims with which it has no
significant contacts); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (discussing the
relation between choice of law rules and the federal system).
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doctrines, 8 0 and interpretations of foundational statutes like the
habeas corpus statute,'' Section 1983,82 or laws governing the
scope of federal jurisdiction."3 It is worth noting how little of this
web is constitutionally entrenched; most of it can be changed
through ordinary legislative processes.' 4 I have argued elsewhere
for recognizing the constitutional aspects of such non-entrenched
rules;8 5 the important point for present purposes, however, is
simply to emphasize how little of our federalism is directly con-
trolled by the constitutional document itself.
This web of statute, practice, and doctrine is considerably more
complicated than anything the Founders could have envisioned in
1789. Their initial strategy for dividing powers through enumera-
tion and reservation gave rise to the regime of "dual federalism,"
predicated on the "maintenance of the independent integrity of
180. See, e.g., Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976)
(holding that federal courts may sometimes abstain to avoid duplicating state court litigation);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 43-54 (1971) (holding that federal courts must ordinarily
abstain from interfering with pending state criminal proceedings); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,498-501 (1941) (holding that federal courts should abstain in order
to allow state courts to resolve state law questions that would avoid decision of a federal
constitutional question).
181. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2000); see, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)
(holding that federal courts generally may not grant habeas relief based on "new rules" that
were announced after the petitioner's state conviction became final); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (restricting federal courts' ability to grant habeas relief where the petitioner
has procedurally defaulted in state court).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a cause of action for violations of federal law by
persons acting "under color of' state law); see, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980)
(holding that § 1983 provides a cause of action against state officials for violations of at least
some federal statutes); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (holding that § 1983 creates
an exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which ordinarily bars
injunctions against state court proceedings).
183. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (federal question jurisdiction); Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-10 (1986) (holding that federal courts
have significant discretion in determining the scope of § 1331). See generally Henry M. Hart,
Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, Preface to the First Edition, in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 84, at
ix (suggesting that "[flor every case in which a court is asked to invalidate a square assertion
of state or federal legislative authority, there are many more in which the allocation of control
does not involve questions of ultimate power").
184. See Ernest A. Young, What British Devolutionaries Should Know About American
Federalism, in PA'ERNS OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM (Basil Markesinis & Jorg Fedtke
eds., forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Young, British Devolutionaries] (arguing that, like the
British Devolution Acts, most key aspects of U.S. federalism are not constitutionally
entrenched).
185. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 132-34.
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federal powers and state powers through separations of national
and state spheres of action."'86 Dual federalism seemed to promise
a fairly straightforward role for courts, which could evaluate the
constitutionality of both state and federal measures simply by
asking whether the right government was acting in the right sphere.
For most of the nineteenth century this chiefly entailed limiting
state power under the judge-made doctrine of the negative commerce
power;.. 7 later on, the Court also began to enforce the textual limits
of the Commerce Clause itself as a limit on national power.'88 As I
have discussed elsewhere,' policing separate state and federal
spheres turned out to be a highly complex and ultimately unsustain-
able task. From the beginning, however, courts have used not just
the federal constitutional text but a vision of the structure of the
whole as a basis for constitutional federalism doctrine.
The Framers also had a second strategy, which relied on political
and institutional safeguards for federalism. That strategy, at least
as they envisioned it, obviously relied much less on courts and
judicial doctrine in favor of political competition. 9 ' Unfortunately,
as Robert Nagel has pointed out, the Framers "significantly
underestimated the forces that would favor centralization."' 91 As I
discuss further in the next Section, the notion of political enforce-
ment has been undermined by changes in the :incentives facing
federal politicians, the severance of direct ties between federal
representatives and state political institutions, and the watering-
down of institutional mechanisms at the national level that once
186. John Kincaid, From Dual to Coercive Federalism in American Intergovernmental
Relations, in GLOBALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS, POLICY
ISSUES, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 29 (Jong S.
Jun & Deil S. Wright eds., 1996).
187. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-49 (1827) (holding that a
state could not require a foreign importer to be licensed by the state prior to selling imported
goods).
188. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal law
restricting interstate shipment of goods made by child labor as an effort to regulate labor
conditions internal to a state).
189. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign
Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 139, 157-61 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Dual
Federalism].
190. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 45 & 46 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961);
Pettys, supra note 80.
191. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 9 (2001).
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encumbered federal lawmaking. These changes in the institutional
context call for corresponding changes in the "political safeguards"
strategy, including an enhanced role for judge-made doctrine.
2. Change and Adjustment
The courts have always derived doctrine from both the text of the
Constitution and the underlying structure of our federal system, but
the need to rely upon the latter may have increased over time.192
This is not surprising: the critique of written constitutions has long
been that they are incapable of foreseeing and adapting to the
future circumstances and needs of the polities they constitute. 193
Most acknowledge that our own Constitution has accommodated
this difficulty chiefly by being open to adaptation without formal
amendment through the evolving practices of the political branches
and the incremental doctrinal development of courts.194 As Professor
Lessig has explained, this adaptive enterprise can-and should-be
a means of fidelity to the original document and structure, rather
than a departure from them.'95 The "response of fidelity" to changed
circumstances, he argues, "is to articulate these previously under-
stood conventions, and apply them today to assure that the
constitutional structure original ly] established is, so far as possible,
preserved."'96 This effort-"to translate that original structure into
the context of today'--must at least in part be a judicial effort of
"implying limits on the growth of federal power."'97
Compensating adjustment, like Professor Lessig's notion of
translation, involves changed readings of the constitutional text and
192. I say "may" because it is not clear that any foreseeable version of the modern Supreme
Court would develop structure-based doctrines to limit federal power that are comparable in
aggressiveness to the negative commerce jurisprudence that developed in the nineteenth
century and survives to this day. In other words, the most radical use of doctrine to order the
federal relationship has existed without serious jurisprudential challenge for over a century
and a half.
193. See, e.g., Joseph de Maistre, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political
Constitutions (1810), in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 147, 149, 151 (Jack Lively trans.,
1965); see also Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 68, at 666-69.
194. See, e.g., Jackson, Narratives, supra note 60, at 276-77.
195. See generally Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 42, at 1187-89; Lessig, Translating
Federalism, supra note 74.
196. Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 74, at 127.
197. Id. at 127, 145.
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structure in response to changes in the context in which the text
and structure must operate. With respect to federalism, three
related sets of changes are central. The first involves changes of
fact-for example, the integration of the national economy, the
explosion of communication and transportation among the several
states, changes in the nation's external and internal security
environment, and the advent of comparatively new problems, such
as environmental pollution, that often seem to defy state-by-state
solutions. These sorts of factual changes have been central to the
evolution of federal power in our system. As Professor Lessig
observes, "[tihe scope of the [federal] power clause is seen to turn
upon facts in the world, and as these facts change, the scope of the
power too is seen to change." 9 ' To cite just one example, the notion
of what counts as "[ciommerce ... among the several States"1 99
cannot help but change in response to the nationalization (and
globalization) of the economy.
The question is not whether constitutional doctrine should change
in response to these factual changes in the world; it already has.
Consider the "dormant Commerce Clause" doctrine. That doctrine
started out with at least some tie to the constitutional text; it simply
read Article I's grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce as exclusive, thereby forbidding state regulation of
commerce "among the several States.""' As the national economy
became more integrated, however, it became increasingly difficult
to distinguish between interstate and intrastate commerce. That
made it impossible to enforce a rule that the states could not
regulate in ways that impacted interstate commerce, much as it
made it equally difficult to enforce a rule that Congress could not
regulate in-state activities. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
accordingly morphed into a quite different rule that simply barred
the states from discriminating against out-of-staters.2 °'
198. Id. at 132.
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
200. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209-10 (1824).
201. See Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 74, at 164. Vestiges of a second
rule-that the states may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce, even if they are
non-discriminatory-may also survive. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970). But like the anti-discrimination rule, the Pike balancing test bears almost no relation
to the constitutional text. In any event, the balancing test has not been applied very
rigorously in recent years. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 6-6, at 1062.
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This rule makes a fair amount of functional sense, and it has a
formal quality that makes it relatively easy for courts to enforce." 2
But the doctrine no longer bears any recognizable relationship to
the text. Once one abandons the rule that at least some Article I
powers are simply exclusive, there is no longer any warrant to read
the Commerce Clause as limiting state powers. Certainly the Clause
says nothing about discrimination, and the presence of other
constitutional provisions that do-the Privileges and Immunities
and Equal Protection Clauses203 -suggests that textualist attention
is best directed elsewhere. Thus, it is better to understand the
modern dormant Commerce Clause as a doctrinal construction
meant to facilitate the structural needs of the federal system as a
whole.
A similar transition has occurred in "affirmative" Commerce
Clause doctrine. Prior to 1937, the courts focused on whether an
act of Congress addressed interstate or intrastate commerce. Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons had insisted that "[tihe
enumeration [of Congress's powers in Article I] presupposes
something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the
language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively
internal commerce of a State."2 4 Lopez and its progeny, however,
focus simply on whether the regulated activity is "commercial" at
all. The Court has said that the effects of such "commercial"
activities will be aggregated across the range of similar activity
occurring nationwide, thus virtually guaranteeing a finding that the
activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. 205 This conces-
sion to the integrated national market arguably departs from the
text by effectively reading "among the several States" out of Article
.26 The new doctrine thus represents a doctrinal compromise
202. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 217
(criticizing the antidiscrimination test but conceding that "[diecisions applying this principle
generally have provoked little disagreement on the part of individual Justices").
203. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
204. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
205. The classic "aggregation" case is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942), which
held that Congress could regulate even a single farmer's wheat crop on a substantial effects
theory, because the aggregate activities of all similarly-situated farmers would affect the
national economy. But Lopez made clear that the underlying activity must be commercial in
nature to support this move. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1995).
206. Alternatively, one could say that current doctrine recognizes that regulating intrastate
commerce will almost always be "necessary and proper" to regulating interstate commerce.
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meant to balance the system's need for some line of demarcation
between Congress's broadest power and the states' reserved
authority, on the one hand, with the recognition that the old line-
the textual line-simply did not prove coherent or workable in
actual application. Current doctrine nods to the text by carrying
over the insistence that regulated activity be "commercial," but
Lopez's looser standard amounts to "fidelity" only in the adaptive
sense that Professor Lessig has described.0 7
As these examples suggest, changes in the factual context of
federalism led to a second sort of change, that is, the failure of the
original enforcement strategies. I have already described how the
Constitution's original strategy for allocating and balancing federal
and state powers relied on enumeration of federal powers and
reservation of the remainder to the states. "Dual federalism" was
the most natural form for this strategy to take, and it counted
heavily on the feasibility of drawing a sharp line between exclusive
spheres of state and federal authority. That line-drawing effort
ultimately failed, °8 both because of changes in the factual world
-the increasing integration of the economy, which blurred lines
between interstate and intrastate commerce-and because the
Founders may simply have underestimated the indeterminacy of
Article I's enumerative language and the doctrinal rules that courts
would develop to implement it. I doubt whether the factual change
can wholly account for the failure; after all, it seems likely that the
economy was sufficiently integrated to link interstate and intra-
state markets (e.g., the price of wheat in New Jersey and the price
of bread in New York) even in the Founders' day. Rather, I suspect
that the collapse of dual federalism was in substantial part a
failure of doctrine-the failure of courts to develop doctrinal tests
that could command widespread acceptance and support for
separating state and federal power. 0 9
That account does less violence to the text. But either way, a part of the Commerce Clause's
operative language has been rendered meaningless or irrelevant to the decision of cases.
207. See Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 42. More rigorous fidelity to the text would no doubt
look much like Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lopez, which recommended uprooting a much
broader swath of jurisprudence and returning to a far narrower view of federal power. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
208. See Corwin, supra note 55; Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 74, at 129-31.
209. See infra notes 410-17 and accompanying text (discussing the "Frankfurter
constraint"). Whether we should even call this a "failure" is itself a valid question. After all,
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Whatever the cause, the failure of the original enforcement
strategy requires either that we accept a basic alteration in the
character of our federal system or that new doctrines be constructed
to preserve the original norm of balance. In reality, the choice is
probably between a stark version of the former and some combi-
nation of the two. No doctrinal proposal on the table today would
come close to restoring the particular balance struck in 1789; an
expanded federal role is simply a fact of modern life.210 By balance,
then, I mean simply that some meaningful measure of state
autonomy is constitutionally guaranteed. Fidelity to even this more
modest objective, however, will require some measure of doctrinal
innovation in lieu of a strong doctrine of enumerated powers. That
is not to say that a reconstructed enumerated powers doctrine-one
that does not depend on defining mutually-exclusive state and
federal spheres-cannot play some role. 21 But that sort of con-
straint seems likely to be relatively weak. If that is correct, then
preservation of a federal balance will likely require doctrinal
innovation that is less directly grounded in constitutional text.
A third aspect of change in the Constitution's institutional context
has to do with the maturation of the system itself. By "maturation,"
I mean the tendency of successful constitutional systems to outlive
the immediate set of problems that gave rise to them. Structural
provisions are often drafted against a historical and institutional
background in which particular problems loom large. 1 2 Gordon
Wood has recounted, for example, how the first wave of state
constitutions after Independence were designed to compensate for
the experience of unchecked executive authority under George III
dual federalism endured for over a hundred years. It may be a mistake to expect greater
permanence from any doctrinal construct. Nor was the failure necessarily unanticipated by
at least some of the Founders. See RAKOVE, supra note 107, at 176-77 (discussing Madison's
misgivings about "the impossibility of dividing powers of legislation, in such a manner, as to
be free from different considerations by different interests, or even from ambiguity to the
judgment of the impartial") (quoting a letter from Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787).
210. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 601 & n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging that
it may be "too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60
years").
211. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994);
Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 189, at 157-61 (arguing that post-Lopez commerce
jurisprudence plays a useful role without returning to the assumptions of dual federalism).
212. See, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 182-84 (2001).
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and his royal governors.213 By 1787, however, the powerful state
legislatures that those initial constitutions created had themselves
come to be perceived as a threat to liberty-a threat with which the
original documents, with their focus on cabining executive power,
were ill-equipped to deal.2 14 This sort of change presents two obvious
alternative responses: The Constitution can be amended again,
reorienting its structural provisions against the new threat, or the
Constitution's current interpreters can work to adapt the structure
more incrementally. 215 The latter option would include not only
doctrinal innovation by courts, but also sub-constitutional changes
to statutory law or institutional practice by the political branches.
Our own national Constitution has moved in a number of ways
beyond the original set of problems that inspired the Philadelphia
drafters, and these changes have important implications for
federalism. With good reason, the Founders perceived the central
problem in moving from the Articles of Confederation to the
Constitution as one of re-establishing and strengthening the central
government. James Madison insisted, for example, "that the balance
is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the
[State Governments] than of the [Federal Government]. "26 The
original document thus includes a ringing statement of national
supremacy in Article VI; the considerably more ambiguous affirma-
tion of state sovereignty in the Tenth Amendment comes in as a
response to post-Philadelphia criticism. And judicial review of
federalism issues was initially conceived-and implemented by the
Marshall Court-primarily as a tool for reining in centrifugal
impulses in the states. 217 As late as the early twentieth century,
213. See WOOD, supra note 112, at 148-50.
214. See id. at 409.
215. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional
Common Law (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (comparing these two options
from an institutional perspective).
216. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 310 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
217. See, e.g., RAKOvE, supra note 107, at 81-82 (recounting that judicial review was
endorsed early on at Philadelphia as an alternative to Madison's proposal for a general
congressional negative on state laws). The Marshall Court struck down only one federal
statute-the minor provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act at issue in Marbury v. Madison. On
the other side of the ledger, it invalidated eighteen state laws. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 2005-37 (Johnny H. Killian &
George A. Costello eds., 1996). See generally Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer,
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes contemplated dispensing with
judicial review of Acts of Congress while insisting on the need to
check state legislation.21
The pendulum of federalism has swung far indeed since then. The
federal government is here to stay, and its supremacy over the
states is largely unquestioned. This is not to say that centrifugal
forces have disappeared. The Supreme Court still sees a need to
rein in state protectionism under the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine,219 and it has increasingly asserted authority to close off
state forays into foreign affairs.22 ° The system has "matured,"
however, in the sense that threats to the federal balance are at least
as likely to come from the national direction. These threats take any
number of forms, including federal forays into traditional fields of
state regulation like education... or local telephone service,"'
congressional imposition of unfunded mandates2 and the states'
Politics].
218. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920) ("I do not
think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration
as to the laws of the several States.").
219. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997); Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
220. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 397 (2003) (invalidating California's
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act on the ground that it interfered with national foreign
policy); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (finding Massachusetts's
program disadvantaging would-be state contractors that did business in Burma to be
implicitly preempted by federal legislation).
221. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Kate Zernike, 'No Child Left Behind" Brings a Reversal:
Democrats Fault a Federal Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at A16 (reporting
Democratic candidates' criticism of the Act, partly on grounds that it usurps local control of
schools); Political Battle Surges over Bush Education Policy, CNN.com, Jan. 8, 2004, LEXIS,
CNN.com File (reporting criticisms that federal law imposes mandates without adequate
funding).
222. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 412 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
223. See, e.g., Paul Gillmor & Fred Eames, Reconstruction of Federalism: A Constitutional
Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (1994). The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C.) was supposed to alleviate this problem, but the Act simply imposes a
fairly loose procedural constraint on such mandates. See Recent Legislation-Federalism, 109
HARv. L. REV. 1469 (1996) (describing the Act's provisions). Since UMRA's enactment, at least
fifty-four additional mandates have been enacted. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AREVIEW
OF CBO's ACTIVITIES IN 2003 UNDER THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 7 (2004) (finding
sixteen intergovernmental mandates); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A REVIEW OF CBO'S
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increasing dependence on federal funding grants," the federaliza-
tion of crime,225 and federal efforts to quash state positions on social
and moral issues that differ from the national majority view.226 The
extent to which any of these developments are a bad thing is, not
surprisingly, both contestable and contested. What seems clear is
that centralizing pressures are considerably stronger now than they
were in the early Republic.
The constitutional structure was created with a second problem
in mind alongside the weakness of the central authority. That
problem was the "tyranny of the majority," which plays a central
role in the Founders' analysis of the problem of faction. In Federalist
10, for example, Madison rather blithely states that "[i]f a faction
consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by
regular vote"; the difficult problem arises "[wihen a majority is
included in a faction."227 This focus on majority tyranny colors some
of the Founders' most important views on federalism; in particular,
it gives rise to their assumption that the national government will
be less vulnerable to faction than the governments of the several
states.228
AcTIVITIES IN 2002 UNDER THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 3 (2003) (finding twenty
intergovernmental mandates); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A REVIEW OF CBO's
ACTIVITIES IN 2001 UNDER THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 3 (2002) (finding twelve
intergovernmental mandates); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CBO's ACTIVITIES UNDER THE
UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT, 1996-2000, at 14-15 (listing six enacted
intergovernmental mandates). One of the most important is the No Child Left Behind Act, see
supra note 221.
224. See Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461 (2002).
225. See, e.g., Susan R. lein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1541 (2002).
226. See, e.g., Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (striking down federal law
preempting California provision for medical marijuana use), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909
(2004); Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9,
2001) (AG Order No. 2534-2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306) (ruling seeking to
preempt, pursuant to the federal Controlled Substances Act, Oregon's allowance of physician-
assisted suicide).
227. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis
added).
228. See, e.g., id. at 64:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests;
you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists,
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Here, too, the passage of time has required us to expand the
universe of potential threats to the integrity of the system.
Certainly there are areas and issues concerning which Madison's
analysis still seems to hold true, and the national government may
enjoy significant advantages over state governments in protecting
local minorities from local majorities.229 But as the scope, institu-
tions, and responsibilities of government at all levels have expanded
over time, more recent political science has also produced a strong
countercurrent critical of Madison's "failure to appreciate the
disproportionate influence that can be wielded on a national level by
certain groups that may be relatively small in numbers but that are
cohesive and can avoid the problem of too many free riders."23 ° This
literature suggests that "the diffusion of power among a multiplicity
of governments may increase the difficulties such groups experience
in realizing their objectives."2"' Our contemporary structure must
thus guard against two kinds of factions-majorities and cohesive
minorities-and Madison's assumption of national superiority at
combating faction can no longer be taken for granted.2"2
The third and possibly most basic way in which our institutions
have "matured" involves a transformation in the range of functions
and responsibilities ascribed to government. The Founders seem
to have presupposed a rather minimalist vision of government
responsibilities. This vision enabled them to rest much of the
vertical and horizontal separation of powers on institutional
it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other.
(emphasis added); id. (asserting that "the same advantage, which a Republic has over a
Democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small Republic-is
enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it").
229. See, e.g., DAVIDL. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: ADIALOGUE 45(1995) (identifyingexamples).
230. Id. at 79.
231. Id. at 80 (footnote omitted).
232. Madison's argument has also been undermined by the maturation of the states
themselves into large political communities by the standards of Madison's day. The total
United States population in 1790 was around 3.9 million. See TIME ALMANAC 2003, at 120
(Borgna Drummer ed.). In 2000, the State of California alone boasted 33.8 million inhabitants.
Id. at 143. The United States in 1790 had slightly more people than the State of Oregon (the
28th most populous state) today. Id. at 166. The largest state in 1790-Madison's own
Virginia, with approximately three-quarters of a million people-was about the size of the city
of San Francisco or Indianapolis today. See 2000 Census: US Municipalities over 50,000:
Ranked by 2000 Population, available at httpJ/www.demographia.com/db-uscity98.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2004).
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mechanisms that also tended to hamstring governmental action.
The division of the legislature through bicameralism, for example,
as well as the provision for Presidential veto, makes federal statutes
hard to enact. Brad Clark and others have demonstrated that the
proliferation of "veto gates" throughout our national lawmaking
institutions-that is, mechanisms that allow particular actors to
derail or delay national action-is central not only to the separation
of powers, but also to federalism.233 A national government that can
act only with difficulty, after all, will tend to leave considerable
scope for state autonomy.
234
Over time, however, the People have demanded that government
take on a wider and more activist role, and our horizontal and
vertical separation of powers has come under pressure.235 In
particular, the nondelegation doctrine has slipped from being a
potentially important constitutional rule against assigning lawmak-
ing authority outside the Article I process to a less pervasive canon
of construction limiting delegations that implicate particular
constitutional values.3 6 It is now fair to say that most federal law
is made not through the cumbersome method prescribed by Article
I but through administrative procedures in executive agencies.237
233. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 1321, 1341-42 (2001).
234. See id. at 1325:
[E]ven when national power is quite unquestioned in a given situation,
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures frequently operate to screen
out attempts by the federal government to exercise such authority. The states
are the direct beneficiaries of this screening mechanism because the federal
government's inability to adopt "the supreme Law of the Land" leaves states free
to govern.
(footnote and internal quotation marks omitted); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 59, at 1361-
64 (making a similar argument).
235. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 1-7, at 16 ("In the modern era of increasingly accepted,
and indeed often demanded, affirmative governance, there has emerged an inescapable
tension between Model I's ideal of dividing, separating, and checking powers so as to contain
government, and the conviction that real freedom requires governmental action rather than
passivity.").
236. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000).
237. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("For some
time, the sheer amount of law-the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct
the operation of government-made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking
engaged in by Congress through the traditional process."); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,
487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the
most significant legal trend of the last century.... They have become a veritable fourth branch
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The effect of this shift-and the resulting vast expansion in federal
lawmaking capacity and output-on federalism has only recently
become a subject of study.238 It is true that state governments have
also become far more activist governments than their early Republic
counterparts. 239 Nonetheless, it would be surprising if the small-
government mechanisms that the Founders assumed would protect
state autonomy turned out to work as well in a big-government age.
One can understand a number of well-established doctrinal
innovations as responsive to the maturing of our institutions. For
example, the federal Constitution's Bill of Rights has evolved,
through constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation, from
a set of provisions narrowly directed at the national government to
a charter of basic guarantees comprehensively directed at all
American governments.24 ° This shift expanded the sort of federal-
ism concerns that courts must heed. The potential of individual
rights decisions to restrict the autonomy of state governments is
well understood, 241' but prior to incorporation, this was not a concern
of the federal courts. Although state courts might restrict the
autonomy of state governments by broadly construing individual
rights provisions of their own state constitutions, this raised no
issue of federalism; these restrictions were imposed by the states on
themselves. The autonomy of state political systems in rights
situations was guaranteed by the federal structure itself, which
simply did not apply federal rights provisions to state govern-
ments. 24 2 There was no need for judicially-created federalism
doctrines to add to that safeguard.
After incorporation, however, state policies (including, perhaps
most importantly, state criminal convictions) became subject to
of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories .... ").
238. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 233.
239. See Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 53, at 491.
240. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (noting that nearly all of the
Bill of Rights has now been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to bind the states).
241. See, e.g., id. at 172-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Warren Court's
criminal procedure decisions had the effect of "fastening on the states federal notions of
criminal justice"); Baker & Young, supra note 177, at 157-59 (discussing how the Supreme
Court's recognition of a broad right of association in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640 (2000), constrained state autonomy to regulate discrimination).
242. See, e.g., 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 1-3, at 7-8 (describing the nineteenth century non-
incorporation doctrine as a principal protection for state autonomy).
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override by federal rights provisions.243 It is now commonplace to
think of a case like Lawrence v. Texas,2 4 which recognized a right
to engage in homosexual sex under the Due Process Clause, as
raising significant issues of federalism. In effect, Lawrence national-
ized a core issue of gay rights by articulating a federal right binding
on the states.245 Although the Court's incorporation cases tended to
reject federalism-based opposition to the notion of incorporation
per se,246 the Court responded by crafting a number of doctrines
that protected state autonomy in other ways. In particular, it
created a number of remedial doctrines, including the abstention
doctrines2 4v and judge-made limits on federal habeas corpus relief,248
which limit the practical impact of federal rights on state
autonomy.249 Incorporation brought the federal Constitution close to
being a complete charter of rights, with the consequence that
federalism safeguards against over-expansive interpretations of
rights had to be created within federal constitutional law and
grafted onto the interpretation of federal statutes.
Likewise, the fading of the enumerated powers doctrine has
brought the Constitution much closer to describing a comprehen-
243. Like many of the changes I have described, this was a function of both constitutional
and statutory developments. Incorporation would have had far less impact on state
governments if Congress had not extended the writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners in
1867, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (repealed by Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, §
2, 15 Stat. 44) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2002)), or created a private right of action
against state officers for violating federal rights in 1871, Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of
1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
244. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
245. Whether the Court will take the further step of nationalizing the related-but far
more controversial--question of gay marriage remains to be seen.
246. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 681 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing, to
no avail, that "this Court should continue to forbear from fettering the States with an
adamant rule which may embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar problems in
criminal law enforcement").
247. See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 32-34 (1959)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); R.R. Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
248. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,316 (1989); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
87 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
249. I do not claim that these doctrines were exclusively a response to incorporation. Some,
such as Pullman abstention, originated in response to claims under provisions like the Equal
Protection Clause that had always applied to the states. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498. I do
think, however, that incorporation gave substantial impetus to these sorts of doctrines by
proliferating federal rights-based threats to state autonomy.
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sive government. In such a comprehensive system, state autonomy
cannot be protected adequately simply by relying on the jurisdic-
tional limitations of federal institutions. Instead, limits on
federal power must be developed within the purview of the federal
Constitution itself---despite the fact that that Constitution could not
have originally been intended as a complete description of the
federal relationship. The Rehnquist Court has been struggling with
this doctrinal task since 1991, when it stepped back from the brink
of total judicial abdication in Gregory v. Ashcroft.250 Justifying that
effort and suggesting how it ought to proceed is the principle burden
of this Article.
3. Compensating Adjustment in Practice
The notion that courts should formulate doctrinal constraints on
federal power in order to preserve the Founders' notion of a federal
balance under modern circumstances seems more controversial
than many other contemporary instances of adjustment. Few have
disputed, for example, the notion that our concept of a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment must evolve along with the develop-
ment of ever more sophisticated surveillance technology.25' The
controversy over doctrinal innovation in federalism derives from a
variety of sources, including the painful history of the Court's effort
to impose similar limits prior to 1937252 and the perception of many
current legal academics, who came of age in the 1960s, that state
governments are a retrograde force in American society."' The
250. 501 U.S. 452,461 (1991) (imposing a clear statement rule of statutory construction to
limit Congress's ability to regulate state institutions). The Court had flirted with such
abdication in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985).
251. See, e.g., Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 74, at 132-35 (describing the
evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine to cope with technological changes that threatened
individual privacy); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the
use of thermal-imaging technology to look inside a house counts as a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (extending Fourth
Amendment protection to cover telephone wiretaps).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604-07 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(summarizing the pre-1937 cases).
253. See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 66, 67 (2001) ("In my formative years as a lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s
and 1970s, [federalism] was regularly invoked as a bulwark against federal efforts to prevent
racial oppression, political persecution, and police misconduct."). But see Baker & Young,
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depth of this opposition requires careful consideration of the
appropriate role of courts in preserving the federal balance.
Nonetheless, there is good reason to find the notion of compensat-
ing adjustment consistent with both historical understandings and
current practice. Mark Killenbeck, for example, finds that the
Framers "understood that the text as ratified provided an impor-
tant, but by design not necessarily a definitive matrix for analyzing
sovereignty issues."2" Rather, they expected that many issues of
federalism would be worked out in the course of time.255 Likewise,
Jack Rakove states more generally that "[wihatever else we might
say about [the Framers'] intentions and understandings, this at
least seems clear: They would not have denied themselves the
benefit of testing their original ideas and hopes against the
intervening experience that we have accrued since 1789."256
As I have already suggested, the Founders' vision of a flexible
federalism may be understood through a variety of different
interpretive lenses. We might shift to new, ahistorical strategies
for protecting federalism as an act of "translating" the original
design into new contexts. Such translation, as Professor Lessig has
pointed out, often entails a "duty of creativity" for the contemporary
interpreter. 7 A Burkean, on the other hand, might simply say that
our duty of fidelity runs to the whole of our history, not simply the
founding moment, and that part of the duty of fidelity is the
adoption of incremental reforms designed to preserve the basic
character of our institutions.258 Finally, a conventionalist might
argue that the essential characteristic of federalism doctrine is its
ability to command widespread assent, and pragmatic virtues of
consistency and coherence are more important by this measure than
the connection of doctrine to the Founders' own expectations about
how federalism would be enforced." 9 The case for departure from,
supra note 177, at 133-62 (arguing that the equation of federalism with a particular political
orientation is a fundamental mistake).
254. Killenbeck, supra note 122, at 85.
255. See id.
256. RAKOVE, supra note 107, at xv.
257. Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 74, at 1205-06 (emphasis omitted).
258. See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 68, at 664.
259. See Strauss, supra note 135, at 912 ("Conventionalism suggests that, other things
equal, the text should be interpreted in the way best calculated to provide a focal point of
agreement and to avoid the costs of reopening every question.").
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or modification of, the Founders' own enforcement strategies can
thus be made from any of these perspectives.
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that history provides
only limited assistance in answering particular doctrinal questions.
In the Ports Authority case,26 ° for instance, the Court confronted the
question of whether state governments should enjoy sovereign
immunity in proceedings before federal administrative agencies.
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas acknowledged that "[iun
truth, the relevant history does not provide direct guidance for our
inquiry. The Framers ... could not have anticipated the vast growth
of the administrative state."26' As a result, "the dearth of specific
evidence indicating whether the Framers believed that the States'
sovereign immunity would apply in such proceedings is unsurpris-
ing. "262
The Ports Authority Court overcame this lack of specific historical
evidence primarily through doctrine rooted in more functional
considerations.263 Justice Thomas first examined proceedings before
the Federal Maritime Commission, to which the South Carolina
Ports Authority had been subjected, to determine whether they
were institutionally similar to federal judicial proceedings in which
the Eleventh Amendment would bar jurisdiction.264 He then asked
whether the underlying value of federalism that state sovereign
immunity is supposed to protect-state dignitary interests-is
threatened by federal administrative adjudications.265 One can
quarrel about whether the particular value of dignity is really
260. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
261. Id. at 755.
262. Id.
263. Justice Thomas did say that "[wie ... attribute great significance to the fact that States
were not subject to private suits in administrative adjudications at the time of the founding
or for many years thereafter." Id. But this argument seems important primarily as simply
indicating the absence of historical counterexamples to the Court's ultimate result; it can bear
little affirmative weight. After all, "[blecause formalized administrative adjudications were
all but unheard of in the late 18th century and early 19th century," we should not be
surprised that states did not appear in them. Id. In any event, the remainder of the majority
opinion makes clear that the more functional considerations are doing the analytical heavy
lifting here.
264. See id. at 756-59.
265. See id. at 760-61.
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crucial to federalism,2"' but the basic approach of building doctrine
with an eye on federalism's underlying values seems sound.
Justice Scalia's opinion in Printz v. United States26 7 illustrates a
similar dynamic. Much of that opinion discusses historical argu-
ments for and against the anti-commandeering doctrine,268 but those
arguments have struck many observers as inconclusive. This should
not be surprising. The early Republic featured a nascent central
government with few resources of its own and strong political
representation of state institutions. Daniel Halberstam has shown
that in the European Union-which shares those characteris-
tics-implementation of central policy by subunits may actually
safeguard the autonomy of those subunits. But state implementa-
tion is not necessarily good for state autonomy when the central
government is established, has vast resources of its own, and
political representation of the states is less entrenched.269 The best
justification for the anti-commandeering doctrine, then, arises from
the need to translate the Founders' vision of state autonomy from
the first situation to the second, that is, from a new federal republic
with weak central institutions to an established one dominated by
a strong national authority.
This need to adapt the structure through doctrine is pervasive.
For that reason, we cannot count on history to mandate particular
doctrines. I do not mean to reject historical influences entirely in the
shaping of contemporary strategies for enforcing federalism; I argue
in Part III, for example, that the Founders' basic notion of promot-
ing self-enforcing limits on national power is a good starting point
for current doctrine.27 0 The important point is simply that if
contemporary functional and institutional considerations suggest
that a particular doctrine can limit national power in a workable
266. See, e.g., Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the
Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1921 (2003); Young, Two
Federalisms, supra note 13, at 157-58.
267. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
268. See id. at 905-25.
269. See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in
THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION 245-49 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Halberstam, Comparative Federalism]; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy
of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't,
96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
270. See infra Part III.B.1; see also Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 69-91.
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way, one ought not have to ground that doctrine in text and history
as the ultimate test of its legitimacy.
C. Objections
I want to conclude this Part by addressing some objections that
may arise at the first stage of my proposed analysis. Each potential
objection questions either the notion that courts can identify the
appropriate direction in which to adjust the federal balance at any
given time, or that the appropriate direction at our given time is in
the direction of greater state autonomy. This is likely not a complete
catalog of potential objections, but the points considered here may
serve to illuminate the central proposal.
1. The Indeterminate Object of Fidelity
Michael Klarman has been the most prominent critic of notions
of translation and compensating adjustment (he groups them
together).27' Professor Klarman argues that "this translation
enterprise is quite hopeless." "The obvious problem," he contends,
"is one of indeterminacy-translating old concepts into modern
contexts inevitably implicates the very sort of unconstrained
judicial subjectivity that translation's proponents seek to avoid."272
The initial objection need not detain us long: Klarman criticizes
translators for "adjust[ing] the Framers' constitutional commit-
ments to reflect changed circumstances, but fail [ing] to ask whether
the Framers would have remained committed to the same concepts
had they been aware of future circumstances."273 The right question
is thus not "how the Framers' commitment to federalism principles
should be adjusted to reflect the reality of a modern, industrial,
highly integrated economy," but rather "whether the Framers would
retain their commitment to federalism at all in light of these
radically changed circumstances."274 But what difference does the
271. See Michael Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997); see also id. at 398
(suggesting that "this notion of compensating adjustments" is "really just another variation
of the translation question").
272. Id. at 395.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 396.
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latter question make? Our commitment is not to the Framers
themselves, but to the Constitution that they in fact produced. The
possibility that they might have produced a different constitution
under different circumstances is interesting, but hardly authorita-
tive.
Professor Kiarman also asks a more compelling question,
however: "[When translating, how do we know which circumstances
to hold constant and which to vary-that is, when asking what the
Framers would have done under modern circumstances, which
aspects of their world do we vary and which do we leave in
place?"2 75 The examples that Klarman gives of this problem seem
unilluminating to me,2 76 but I think the following puts his point in
its best light: The Framers' commitment to federalism existed at
several different levels of generality, including not only a structural
commitment to constitutionalized decentralization, but also more
general values that the structure was thought to serve (such as the
efficient provision of social services) and more specific mechanisms
to implement the commitment (such as the guarantee of equal
representation in the Senate). All three levels may be thought to be
in harmony in the beginning, but over time they may diverge, and
in that event the translator or adjuster must determine which level
to try to maintain, and which is subject to change. So, for instance,
if in 1937 we no longer think of states as the most efficient providers
of government services, may an adjusting court modify the original
commitment to federalism in order to maintain the commitment to
efficiency? Likewise, if the Senate comes frequently to act at cross-
purposes to state autonomy (perhaps because senators now perceive
themselves as national politicians with national interest-group
constituencies), should the adjuster compensate by protecting state
autonomy in some other way or move away from protecting states
in order to maximize the prerogatives of the Senate? Daryl Levinson
has argued in the same vein that compensating adjustments depend
275. Id. at 402.
276. Professor Klarman asks, for instance, why one should "vary the edsting state of
technology when translating the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce," but
not "treat as relevant variables ... the modem proliferation of national and international
markets, the transportation and communications revolutions, and so forth." Id. at 402-03. The
answer is that of course all these things are relevant, but they have little to do with what I
took to be Klarman's more serious objection, which is that it is hard to identify the right
aspects of the Framers' world to hold constant, not the relevant changes in circumstance.
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on "framing" the relevant constitutional transaction in a particular
way; otherwise, one does not know which alterations or continuities
in the structure count for purposes of evaluating the need for
compensation.277
The answers to these sorts of questions are not easy. But I think
Professor Klarman's objection suffers from a common problem with
indeterminacy arguments. It helpfully demonstrates that choices
that have sometimes been taken for granted are in fact choices, and
that the bases for those choices are not obvious. But the objection
then moves far too quickly from the observation that a choice must
be made to the conclusion that any such choice must be arbitrary. 8
The fact that an assumption can be questioned does not mean that
the question has no answer-only that more work must be done to
provide that answer. Notably, Professor Levinson is not so ready to
throw up his hands in the face of these framing problems. Such
problems, he says, argue not for judicial abdication but for
"redirect[ing] the focus of constitutional adjudication from identify-
ing and remedying harm"-in this case, to particular state
prerogatives-"to addressing broader social problems related to
political process, distributive outcomes, or the structure of institu-
tions."279 This need for broader focus may be another reason to
prefer compensating adjustments, which pay attention to the overall
state of the federal balance, to narrower forms of "translating" the
meaning of isolated provisions.2 °
So how do we tell which aspects of the original understanding to
extract and preserve, and which ones to jettison as expendable? One
way to answer that question is as an originalist: The historical
materials will sometimes tell us what is a core structural principle,
what is an incidental benefit of that principle, and what is an
implementation mechanism. I think that claim can be made out in
277. See Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J.
1311, 1367-71 (2002).
278. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 271, at 408 ("[T]he enterprise of translation is
fundamentally about abstracting from the Framers' more specific intentions. Yet there are
an infinite number of ways in which one can abstract from specific intentions.").
279. Levinson, supra note 277, at 1383-84.
280. Framing problems also argue, in my own view, against attempting to fix a particular
equilibrium point that compensating adjustments seek to achieve. Better to move
incrementally in individual cases than to attempt to define and implement a specific and
comprehensive vision of federalism.
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the context of federalism, although I will not recapitulate the
historical evidence necessary to do so here. My own reading of the
Founding era debates and the historical literature strongly suggests
that the concern was for an overall balance between the nation and
the states, and that more specific mechanisms like the structure of
the Senate or the doctrine of enumerated powers were advanced in
service of that broader commitment. If that is true, then one can say
without fear of arbitrariness that the commitment to a federal
balance is the constant to be maintained, and the failure of the
enumerated powers mechanism is a change for which to be compen-
sated. Likewise, I think the history can take us at least some
distance toward discerning which values, such as government
efficiency or state-by-state experimentation, were incidental benefits
of the structure and which, such as the protection of individual
liberty, are central values to be held constant.28'
This originalist answer might seem strange, given my rejection
of other aspects of originalism.282 But I do not think I have to reject
this much. The primary problem with originalism is its rigidity: One
simply cannot expect one generation to anticipate all the problems
or craft solutions to the challenges that will inevitably arise as
history unfolds. But using originalist methods to identify core values
in the Constitution does not implicate those problems.28 3 In any
event, a more evolutionary answer would be to look at the course of
our history and our law to see what is the core commitment and
what is an implementation mechanism. What one finds, I think, is
that the commitment to some basic notion of meaningful checks on
the central authority recurs across all kinds of different doctrinal
contexts. Mechanisms like enumerated powers, as well as back-
ground values like state experimentation or policy diversity, have
waxed and waned in importance; the commitment to some sort of
federal balance has remained relatively constant. In any event, the
281. The members of this more fundamental class of values may, of course, come into
conflict, as individual liberty and federalism surely have in the context of race throughout our
history. But these sorts of conflicts are endemic to any theory of constitutional interpretation
that does not foolishly try to assimilate all of constitutional law to a single value. See generally
LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 24-30 (1991) (criticizing
these sorts of theories).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
283. One might ask, "Can't core values evolve, too?" And the answer would be that of course
they do. I address that objection in subsection 3, infra.
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occasional difficulty of making these sorts of choices among different
aspects of our constitutional heritage does not mean the choices are
impossible to make.
It ought to be no surprise that Professor Klarman's critique of
translation and compensating adjustments ultimately leads him to
reject constitutional fidelity altogether. Klarman recognizes that his
arguments implicate a "more fundamental" question: "Does the
Constitution deserve our fidelity at all?"2 ' And his answer is, "Of
course not. Why would one think, presumptively, that Framers who
lived two hundred years ago, inhabited a radically different world,
and possessed radically different ideas would have anything useful
to say about how we should govern ourselves today?"285 I will not
recapitulate here the many arguments for constitutional fidelity,
notwithstanding this "dead hand" problem.286 The important
observation for present purposes is that Klarman ends up at this
point because his version of the indeterminacy argument is a
counsel of despair: We cannot possibly figure out which aspects of
the Constitution are worth preserving under changed circum-
stances, so why bother? But if one accepts that indeterminacy need
not be complete-and if one is writing at least in part for non-
academic lawyers who do not have the luxury of throwing up their
hands and need to think about how to muddle through with the
business of constitutionalism-then something like the compensat-
ing adjustments model I have offered here seems helpful.
2. Finding the Balance Point
The second set of potential objections posits a need for courts to
identify a particular point of equilibrium as a predicate to making
284. Klarman, supra note 271, at 381.
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 26; McConnell, Dead Hand, supra note 133. It is also
worth noting that Professor Klarman addresses notions of translation and compensating
adjustments as answers to the dead hand problem. See Klarman, supra note 271, at 382
(asking, "Are there any interpretive approaches that can avoid both the dead-hand problem
and the judicial subjectivity problem?"). But I make no attempt to answer the dead hand
question here. I have tried to show that compensating adjustments are appealing across a
variety of different theories of obligation, but I have not tried to establish any particular
theory of obligation here. Anyone expecting compensating adjustment to do that much
theoretical work is bound to be disappointed.
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compensating adjustments in the direction of that equilibrium. We
might feel such an imperative for at least two different reasons.
First, one might accept that the text and/or history of the Constitu-
tion do not dictate particular federalism doctrines in many instances
and yet still insist that one can derive from those sources a correct
or mandatory overall allocation of power. Any judicial innovation
would thus have to be carried out in fidelity to this mandatory goal.
Alternatively, one might simply say that a particular point of
equilibrium is inherent in the notion of "balance" upon which I have
relied. It is meaningless to say the Constitution prescribes "balance"
between the nation and the states unless one really means that the
Constitution prescribes a particular balance. The first version of the
argument might be employed either to constrain innovation to work
toward a particular end or, perhaps more likely, to discredit the
whole notion of fidelity to balance on the ground that the Founders'
particular vision of federal-state relations is unsustainable today.
The second version would raise a daunting practical objection to my
approach, on the ground that some "optimal" equilibrium would, if
not manifest in the text or history of the Constitution, be exception-
ally difficult for courts to identify.
I want to reject the notion that courts must identify a particular
point of optimal or correct equilibrium between national and state
power in order to make federalism doctrine. If the Founders
envisioned a specific balance of power, as opposed to simply an
unspecified equilibrium in which each level of government would
have meaningful responsibilities of its own and some ability to
check the other, that vision does not emerge clearly from either the
text or the history of the Constitution. The text itself incorporates
elements in the allocation of power that practically guaranteed
alterations over time-most obviously, the Commerce Clause tied
the allocation of authority to the level of integration in the
economy.2 87 Moreover, historical accounts convey a general sense
that much concerning the federal balance would remain to be
worked out.2 8 The immediate task that the Framers confronted was
to choose the direction and mechanisms of present reform, not
287. Likewise, Madison explained in Federalist 41 that the textual division of powers would
accord relatively greater authority to the nation in wartime than in peacetime. THE
FEDERALIST No. 41, at 278 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
288. See Killenbeck, supra note 122, at 85.
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necessarily to crystallize the ideal end-state. As Mark Killenbeck
has observed, the Framers were "pragmatists who viewed their
assignment [as] creating not the 'ultimate' Union, but simply 'a
more perfect' one."28 9
But what about the other version of the objection, that identifying
a point of equilibrium is necessary not so much because the Framers
had one in mind, but because it is inherent in the task of translation
or compensating adjustment? We might posit that necessity in two
different senses: Either, as Michael Klarman has suggested, we
"need D to identify with precision the point at which ... changes [in
circumstances] have become sufficient to justify a translation,"290 or
we need to identify the point of equilibrium to which the Court is
trying to get back. On either account, the notion of compensating
adjustment requires a court to identify a specific balance between
state and national authority that is "in" the Constitution.
I want to deny the need to identify a precise point of equilibrium
for either of these purposes. Professor Klarman's version seems to
assume that the constitutional principle that the Court must
preserve defines a bright line between government activity that is
completely acceptable, on one side, and that which is completely
unacceptable, on the other. That is why the Court must identify the
precise point at which historical change pushes government
behavior from one side of the line to the other. But at least when the
constitutional principle in question is, like federalism, a norm of
rough balance, Klarman's picture seems an inapt description of
affairs. The point is not that at some instant in the first part of the
twentieth century, national power crossed a constitutional line in
the sand. Rather, I have argued that the Constitution embodies a
norm of meaningful power-sharing between the states and the
nation, and that the steady erosion of that balance, in one direction
or the other, is something for which courts ought to compensate
when they decide individual cases. The judge in such a case need
289. Id. at 86; see also WHITINGTON, supra note 1, at 75 (stating that the original
constitution "left many issues regarding the nature of American federalism unresolved and
available for future debate"); WOOD, supra note 112, at 525 ("[Als crucial as the idea of
federalism was to the Federalists in explaining the operation of their new system, it seems
clear that few of them actually conceived of it in full before the Constitution was written and
debated.").
290. Klarman, supra note 271, at 407.
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not identify precisely when one level of the government became too
powerful; instead, he must simply determine which side of the
equation predominates at that moment and use whatever freedom
the current case affords to compensate in the other direction.
The question then becomes whether it is possible for a judge to
tell the direction of dis-equilibrium in the system at any given time.
Surely many observers at the present time, for instance, would say
that the system has drifted out of balance in favor of national
power.291 But is it possible for a judge to assess or demonstrate that
sort of intuition in any rigorous way? Just two years ago, this
humble author chastised a judge for making the opposite asser-
tion-that the Supreme Court had shifted the balance of federalism
too far in favor of the states-on the ground that we lack a good
metric by which to gauge governmental power.292 Moreover, even if
we do accept intuitive judgments, it seems clear that both the state
and national governments have increased in power since the
nineteenth century.293 Is it so clear that the federal balance needs
to be pushed back in the direction of more limited federal power?
I think the answer is yes, despite difficulty of demonstrating that
answer to be true. Notwithstanding the growth of state governmen-
tal authority in absolute terms, we deal with a norm of balance; one
key value behind that norm, after all, is the ability of each level of
government to check the other.294 The relevant question, then, is the
relative growth of national power vis-&-vis the states. Absent any
good overall measure of government authority, we may have to
rely on an intuitive judgement here. But I think the basic intu-
ition-that the power of the national government has grown to the
291. This is true of both friends and foes of state power. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 149 (2d ed. 1996) (describing federalism, in
the sense of limits on national power, as a "wasting force in U.S. life"); John 0. McGinnis,
Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90
CAL. L. REV. 485, 511 (2002) (observing that "constitutional federalism has been declining for
the better part of a century"); Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery
of Fundamental "States'Rights", 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 215 (2004) ("Federal power and
supremacy long ago eclipsed state power, no matter what barometer one consults.").
292. See Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the National Government? State Sovereign
Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1587 (2003)
[hereinafter Young, Sky Falling] (reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S
POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002)).
293. See, e.g., Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 53, at 566.
294. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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point of tilting the constitutional balance at the expense of the
states-is widely shared. To the extent that one can imagine a gray
area in which it would not be clear whether the national govern-
ment or the states were predominant, we are not presently living
in that gray area. The states are not dead by any stretch of the
imagination, but it seems fair to say that they are plainly subordi-
nate entities rather than "balancing" ones today.
Although it is hard to prove this assertion in any sort of rigorous
way, I can bolster it along several different dimensions. One thing
that is fairly easy to measure is the financial resources gathered
and expended by governments. In 1902 (the first year for which both
national and state/local figures are readily available), the total
combined revenue and expenditure of states and local governments
exceeded national revenues and expenditure by roughly two to one.
By 2000, however, the national government had surpassed states
and localities by both measures.295 One would expect the change to
be even more stark if figures dating back to the Founding were
available. In any event, the shift in financial resources over time is
quite striking.
A considerably more impressionistic measure uses as a yardstick
a well-known passage from the Hart and Wechsler Federal Courts
casebook. The introduction to the unit on "the Relation Between
State and Federal Law" in the first edition, published in 1953,
stated that: "Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It
rarely occupies a legal field completely, totally excluding all
295. Total expenditures of the national government in 1902 were $485.2 million, compared
with $1.095 billion combined spending by states and localities. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 1114, 1127 (1976). In 2000, the national government spent $1.7888 trillion,
compared with $1.7429 trillion by states and localities. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 285, 322 (2004). On the revenue side, the national
government took in $653 million in 1902, compared to $1.048 billion for states and localities.
See STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra, at 1122, 1126. By 2000, national government revenue was
$2.0252 trillion, compared to $1.9423 trillion for states and localities. See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra, at 285,322. There are complications, of course. For instance, in 2000, $291.9
billion of state and local revenue came from the federal government. Id. at 285. Depending on
how one looks at them, these grants may reflect either state and local influence in
Washington, D.C., or federal leverage over state policy. More generally, the definitions and
accounting methods involved with these statistics are sufficiently complex to counsel caution.
Nonetheless, the overall picture ought to be relatively clear.
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participation by the legal systems of the states."296 By the fifth
edition of the casebook, published in 2003, this statement was in
quotes and followed by a question asking whether it is still true.297
The current editors conclude that "at present federal law appears to
be more primary than interstitial in numerous areas."29" Again, the
shift in assessment by knowledgeable observers of the nation-state
balance seems considerable even over just the last half-century.
We might also think about the assessment problem indirectly, by
looking not to the state of the balance itself but to the mechanisms
that the Framers themselves looked to for preservation of that
balance. I do not mean to deny the possibility that other safeguards
may substitute for the original mechanisms.299 But if we respect the
Framers as intelligent architects with some idea of what maintain-
ing a federal balance might require, then the deterioration of their
original safeguards should be at least circumstantial evidence of a
shift. Consider two such safeguards: the textual doctrine of enumer-
ated powers and the expectation that federal law would be made
only through a cumbersome legislative process. Nowadays, as Gary
Lawson has observed, "discussing the doctrine of enumerated
powers is like discussing the redemption of Imperial Chinese
bonds."30 0 Likewise, the advent of the administrative state-
designed to ease the process of national lawmaking-and the courts'
abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine have considerably
undermined inertial barriers to the replacement of state law with
296. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEM (1953) (quoted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 84, at 494). Even this early edition
recognized significant change since the Founding: 'This was plainly true in the beginning
when the federal legislative product (including the Constitution) was extremely small. It is
significantly true today, despite the volume of Congressional enactments, and even within
areas where Congress has been very active." Id.
297. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 84, at 495 ("In the fifty years since the First
Edition was published, the expansion of federal legislation and administrative regulation
noted in this discussion has accelerated; today one finds many more instances in which
federal enactments supply both right and remedy in, or wholly occupy, a particular field.").
298. Id. at 495.
299. Compare, e.g., Kramer, Politics, supra note 217, at 219 (arguing that political parties
substitute for the original "political safeguards of federalism"), with Saikrishna B. Prakash
& John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1459, 1480-89 (2001) (denying that parties play this role effectively).
300. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1236 (1994). This remains basically true notwithstanding the Court's decisions in Lopez and
Morrison, which occurred after Professor Lawson's comment.
1808 [Vol. 46:1733
MAKING FEDERALISM DOCTRINE
federal norms."0 ' If these original safeguards of the federal balance
are largely nonexistent today, then it seems appropriate to encour-
age courts to develop compensating mechanisms.
One question remains outstanding: If courts know that the
system is out of balance, must they determine a single correct
equilibrium point in order to restore that balance? Again, I think
the answer is no, because the question mistakes the task actually
before the courts in federalism cases. If we were instead amending
the Constitution, we would be tempted to try to fix the federal
balance at the "right" point of equilibrium. There would be pressure
to do this in part because once one embeds some particular aspect
of federalism in constitutional text, it becomes hard for courts to
adjust away from that aspect in the future. For that reason,
amenders of the text would need to be quite confident that they
were fixing the balance at the optimal point.
Courts deciding individual cases confront a quite different
situation. As I have already suggested, courts simply cannot impose
a comprehensive vision of federalism on the system'° 2-and this
relieves them of the obligation to try. Individual cases generally do
not present more than one or two of the myriad different legal issues
that may arise in federalism cases, and even with respect to a single
issue an individual decision generally can make only a marginal
adjustment in the doctrine. Moreover, virtually all cases present any
number of constraints on the doctrinal options open to the court. In
view of all these limitations, it is unclear that a specific vision of the
optimal federal balance is even useful, let alone necessary, to
resolving individual disputes. There is no reason, in other words, to
assume that approximating a definitive equilibrium point is a viable
"second best" way to decide individual cases. Instead, courts just
301. On the importance of limits on non-congressional lawmaking to federalism, see
generally Clark, supra note 233. On the rejection of any judicial enforcement of this principle,
see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that
"the scope of delegation is largely uncontrollable by the courts"); Lawson, supra note 300, at
1240 (noting that "[tihe Supreme Court ... has rejected so many delegation challenges to so
many utterly vacuous statutes that modem nondelegation decisions now simply recite these
past holdings and wearily move on"). Professor Lawson goes on to point out that "[tihe
rationale for this virtually complete abandonment of the nondelegation principle is simple:
the Court believes-possibly correctly-that the modern administrative state could not
function if Congress were actually required to make a significant percentage of the
fundamental policy decisions." Id. at 1241.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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need to know in which direction to move-always incrementally-in
the case in front of them.
It may be helpful to think of the individual court as a long-
distance hiker setting off on a journey that cannot be completed in
a single day. The hiker need not know exactly how far it is to the
ultimate destination. Instead, he need only know the general
direction of that destination and be able to choose a hospitable
resting place at the close of each day. Likewise, the court must know
the general direction in which to make its compensating adjust-
ment, and the doctrinal instantiation of that adjustment must meet
a number of practical criteria to be viable. °3 Of course, the closer
the hiker comes to his destination-the closer we think the federal
balance is to equilibrium-then the more we need to be specific
about where the destination lies. But as long as we are convinced
that the destination remains some way off, then both the hiker and
the court can afford to be a bit vague about how far away it is.
3°4
Indeed, if we take more pessimistic views of the factors pushing
for centralization in our system and the capacity of courts to effect
sweeping changes in the structure of government, then those courts
may never need to know where the precise point of equilibrium lies.
Think of our poor hiker now pressing into a gale-force wind, so that
the best he can do is to resist being blown backward too quickly.
Peter McCutchen has described compensating adjustments "as a
form of constitutional damage control,"35 and that term aptly
portrays courts not as moving the system in a desired direction but
trying to slow movement away from equilibrium. In this conception,
the optimal point of balance obviously becomes even less important;
a court needs to know which sort of changes to resist, but need not
worry overmuch about how far to push back in the opposite
303. See infra Part III.
304. If hypothetical hikers will not do, consider the Federal Reserve's effort to steer the
economy toward a "neutral" interest rate that would balance the supply and demand of
capital. In practice, it is extremely difficult to tell where the neutral rate actually is. This need
not paralyze current policy, however, because most agree that "a nominal fed funds rate of
2.25% [the current rate in December 2004] is still below any sensible estimate of neutrality."
Aiming for a Happy Medium, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2004, at 118. As part of an institution that
makes marginal adjustments to forces it cannot control outright, 'Fed officials can head for
neutrality, even while acknowledging that they do not really know where it is." Id.
305. Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).
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direction. This may be a somewhat less inspiring picture of the
judicial function, but from a Burkean standpoint, slowing the pace
of change is itself a valuable office.
For all these reasons, I doubt that we need to agree on an end-
state in order to choose contemporary federalism doctrine. The
judicial process proceeds incrementally; as I have argued elsewhere,
that is one of its most important strengths.3 0 6 As long as courts
formulate doctrine in incremental rather than sweeping terms, they
can focus on ascertaining the direction of incremental change
without necessarily formulating a firm idea of how far that change
ought to go in the future. In Lopez, for example, the Court con-
fronted the question of whether it should end its half-century
moratorium on striking down federal statutes as outside the
Commerce Power. One could answer that question affirmatively,
deciding that the Court should be more willing to strike down
federal laws on this ground than it had been, while leaving a more
complete version of Commerce Clause doctrine to be developed in
future cases. °7 For reasons that I will discuss further,0 8 the
incremental method seems like the best approach. Even if text,
history, or contemporary political theory could paint us a complete
picture of the federal end-state envisioned by the Founders, I would
suggest that courts should pay that picture relatively little atten-
tion.
3. Has History Moved On?
The last set of potential objections that I want to consider here all
raise the possibility that historical, social, and institutional changes
since the Founding have cancelled or overridden the imperative to
adhere to an eighteenth century conception of federalism. A short
answer to the objection, stated that way, is that no one is arguing
for courts to reimpose an eighteenth century conception of federal-
ism. The question is whether they should, from time to time, make
compensating adjustments to our present constitutional doctrine in
306. See Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 146, at 1208-09.
307. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (noting that if the Court had
upheld the statute in question, there would have been no basis for ever invalidating commerce
legislation).
308. See infra Part III.B.
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order to bolster limits on national authority. I have embraced an
evolutionary view of constitutional change in this and other work,
but nothing in our history since the Founding absolves courts of
their obligation of fidelity to the basic notion of a federal balance.
A number of scholars and judges have argued that the Constitu-
tion has changed in ways that undermine the Founders' commit-
ment to federalism. Some have claimed that the Reconstruction
Amendments that followed the Civil War--or even the War
itself-substantially established a new commitment to national
supremacy and predominance.3" Others have relied on later
amendments, such as the Seventeenth, which altered the political
dynamics of federalism in ways detrimental to the states.310 Still
others have cited the New Deal as a watershed "constitutional
moment" that amended the federal bargain, even in the absence of
any formal alteration in the constitutional text.31 ' These changes
are said to undermine the case for compensating adjustments
limiting federal power. As Justice Souter observed in Morrison,
"[almendments that alter the balance of power between the
National and State Governments, like the Fourteenth, or that
change the way the States are represented within the Federal
309. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 207 n.3 (1992) (White, J.,
dissenting):
mhe nature of federal-state relations changed fundamentally after the Civil
War. That conflict produced in its wake a tremendous expansion in the scope of
the Federal Government's law-making authority, so much so that the persons
who helped to found the Republic would scarcely have recognized the many
added roles the National Government assumed for itself.
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rehabilitating Federalism, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1333, 1340 (1994)
(book review) ("Mhe Civil War and the constitutional amendments that followed it
dramatically changed the conception of the relationship of the federal and state
governments."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 691 (2004) (reviewing DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION (2003))
("The outcome of Grant v Lee [sic] resolved the most important issue of antebellum
constitutional dispute-the nature of the Union-in favor of the nationalist view of
sovereignty and against the South's state-sovereignty view."); Norman W. Spaulding,
Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective
Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1992 (2003) (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments
render the Rehnquist Court's revival of federalism illegitimate).
310. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 650-52 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments established federal supremacy
over the states).
311. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-08 (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 268-74 (1998).
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Government, like the Seventeenth, are not rips in the fabric of the
Framers' Constitution, inviting judicial repairs."312
This strand of nationalist argument raises too many different
issues of both history and constitutional theory to permit adequate
treatment here. For that reason, I have set aside the burden of
more thorough treatment for a separate essay.313 Here, I wish only
to sketch the outlines of an answer. Where the argument relies on
formal changes in the Constitution, such as the Fourteenth or
the Seventeenth Amendment, there is no way to deny that the
Constitution has, in fact, changed. The question is in what sense.
The Fourteenth Amendment, like the Thirteenth and Fifteenth,
nationalized a set of individual human rights and conferred power
on the national government to enforce them. This a fundamental
change, to be sure, but the argument that those amendments should
also defeat efforts to preserve federalism in other areas-such as the
scope of Congress's Article I powers, or Congress's ability to "com-
mandeer" state officials to enforce ordinary federal laws-stands on
far shakier ground. Much historical evidence suggests that the
Framers of these amendments meant to confer national power to
deal with the issues of racial oppression that led to the War, while
preserving the basic allocation of authority between states and
nation intact in other areas.314
The argument that amendments directed at individual rights
have collateral effects on structure also raises theoretical questions
concerning the proper construction of amendments. The history of
the Seventeenth Amendment, for example, suggests that its primary
purpose was to further direct democracy by allowing the people of
each state to choose their senators directly.315 That change, however,
312. 529 U.S. at 652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
313. See Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Movement of History (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
314. See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 57 (1999) (concluding that the authors of
the Fourteenth Amendment "were not hearty enthusiasts for national power, and they
understood the incorporation of the Bill of Rights as a narrow and limited grant of national
power"). Even one of the most radical proponents of the notion that Reconstruction repealed
federalism has conceded that "the survival thesis [that a strong commitment to federalism
survived Reconstruction] enjoys a closer link to historical instantiations of our national
identity than any claim that the Reconstruction Amendments represent a new constitutional
order." Spaulding, supra note 309, at 2029.
315. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Elections: A Structural
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had important collateral attacks on the "political safeguards of
federalism" by ensuring that senators would represent interests
concentrated at the state level but not the institutions of state
government themselves.316 The question then becomes how we
should treat this collateral change: Should we read it as part of the
amendatory force of the new constitutional provision, so that we
would consider the Seventeenth Amendment as having altered our
basic commitment to federalism along with the election procedure
for senators? Or is it a regrettable side effect that may warrant
some form of compensating adjustment in federalism, such as an
effort to bolster the "political safeguards" in other respects?317 To
answer this question, one needs a theory of constitutional amend-
ment, and I have no space to develop such a theory here. The short
answer, however, is that to the extent one finds Burkean
incrementalism appealing as an approach to constitutional change,
one would want to read amendments more narrowly.
Non-textual events like the Civil War and the New Deal raise
somewhat different issues. I do not want to reject entirely the notion
that changes in the Constitution may occur without amendments
that go through the Article V process; the essence of common law
constitutionalism, after all, is that the meaning of the Constitution
evolves over time.31 I do want to suggest that the bar should be
awfully high before we find that historical events, unaccompanied
by Article V amendments, have cancelled structural commitments
reflected in the original text. More importantly, we need not think
of changes like the New Deal as having changed the meaning of the
Constitution for courts in order for those changes to have a signifi-
cant impact on constitutional structure. Such changes are reflected
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1353-55 (1996).
316. Kramer, Politics, supra note 217, at 223-26.
317. One can see the difficulty of this question by comparing a parallel example from
individual rights jurisprudence. If, for instance, an amendment permitting school prayer were
to become part of the Constitution, should we interpret such an amendment narrowly, with
little gravitational force outside the situation to which it is specifically addressed? Or should
we read it broadly, as watering down the prior aversion to government endorsements of
religion, so that the non-endorsement principle should be read to have less force in other
contexts as well?
318. I am profoundly skeptical, however, of punctuated non-textual change as a result of
"constitutional moments" and the like. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1221 (1995) (criticizing such notions).
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in changes to the environment in which courts operate-in the
statutory schemes and institutions with which they must coexist, in
the pressures brought to bear on the appointments process, and the
like. Those changes affect the constraints on judicial decisions in
innumerable ways and therefore affect doctrine. And they may
make the commitment to federalism harder to enforce. But to
recognize these constraints is not to say that, in cases where all
those constraints still leave courts some room to maneuver, courts
owe no fidelity to the original value of federalism.
One might, however, push the nationalist argument further.
Michael Klarman has suggested, for instance, that "if national
power expanded to meet changing reality, perhaps this is a good
argument for not making any compensating adjustment."319 But this
is simply a suggestion that the course of history may reveal
normative deficiencies in the Constitution's structural values. By
and large, the constraints on national power in the Constitution
have been generous enough to allow significant expansions of power
to meet modern needs. But until the Constitution is validly
amended, the Founding commitment to federalism should also
retain some degree of gravitational force.
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF
FEDERALISM DOCTRINE
Once courts identify the direction in which constitutional
equilibrium lies, they must still formulate specific doctrinal rules
designed to push in that direction. This is the second step in the
model of doctrinal evolution that I summarized in Part I. I have
already suggested that, in many instances, constitutional text and
history will provide relatively little guidance in this task. Instead,
courts must rely on more functional considerations. This is in
keeping with the basic notion of translation and adjustment
discussed in Part II: Text and history can point the direction that we
need to go, but the route to get there will be different because the
terrain has changed.
My account of doctrinal construction in this Part tries to bring to
bear some of the emerging literature on comparative institutional
319. Klarman, supra note 271, at 400.
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choice. That literature argues that decisions should be assigned to
the institutions most competent to make them, and that the
competence of any given institution must be assessed in comparison
with other candidate institutions rather than in isolation.320 I
conclude in Section A that either/or versions of this inquiry are less
useful in federalism disputes than they might appear. Although it
is interesting to ask whether such disputes should be assigned
exclusively to courts or to other actors as a matter of institutional
design, the system we in fact have generally does not leave courts
with discretion to decline to decide cases within their jurisdiction
simply on the ground that some other actor might do the job better.
Institutional considerations are helpful, however, at the level of
interpretive choice-that is, at the point that courts must formulate
doctrine to answer particular federalism questions. Section B
canvasses how considerations of institutional character and
competence can inform that inquiry. Section C considers the
relevance of federalism's underlying values and the ways in which
those values might be translated into specific doctrines. Finally,
Section D offers two brief examples of how this analysis might apply
to particular doctrinal problems.
A. Institutional Choice
A discussion of federalism doctrine necessarily assumes that
courts should have a role in federalism disputes. But the proper
role of courts in disputes over allocation of authority in our own
federal system has been deeply controversial. 2 ' Prominent
commentators-and some Supreme Court justices-have argued
that courts should not "intervene" in federalism disputes; rather,
those controversies should be left entirely to politics.322 The
320. See generally NEIL H. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5-13 (1994).
321. Compare, e.g., Kramer, Politics, supra note 217 (arguing for little or no judicial role),
with Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001) (responding to Kramer), and Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism
Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069 (2001) (same).
322. See, e.g., sources cited in note 2, supra. Putting the question this way-and it usually
is put this way, see, e.g., William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of
Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 153 (1998) (describing the core debate
as one over "judicial intervention to enforce federalism")-is itself somewhat misleading. See
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participation of courts in federalism disputes, and thus the rele-
vance of judicial doctrine to such disputes, cannot be taken for
granted.
Part of the problem with the institutional debate is that it has
typically been framed as a question whether the federal balance
should be enforced "by courts." 2 ' But I have never seen a proponent
of judicially-enforced federalism who argues that the judicial role
should be exclusive. And certainly much development in our federal
relationship has stemmed from the practice of the political branches
at national, state, and local levels. 24 The issue is whether the courts
must be uniquely excluded from this process. My basic argument is
that if federalism is constitutionally mandatory-if it is part of the
law-then courts must play a part in enforcing it when presented
with cases within their jurisdiction that raise such issues.325
Lynn Baker and I have taken up the basic judicial review
question-whether there is something unique about federalism
questions that warrants their exclusion from the norm of judicial
review-at great length elsewhere.326 That discussion identified
three distinct sets of arguments for exclusion, based on a lack of
judicial competence to decide such questions, the sufficiency of non-
judicial enforcement, and federalism's lack of normative appeal.327
We found none of these arguments persuasive. The same common-
law method of doctrinal elaboration that has facilitated judicial
enforcement of individual rights, for example, is available in
federalism cases.32 There are equally good reasons to reject the
infra text accompanying notes 429-30.
323. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with
Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 228-29 (2000).
324. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 2-3.
325. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2182 (1998) [hereinafter Jackson, Principle] (arguing that
"[w]ithin the framework of U.S. constitutionalism ... the rule of law requires some judicial
enforcement of federalism constraints on national power").
326. See Baker & Young, supra note 177, at 80-87; see also John C. Yoo, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1332 (1997) [hereinafter Yoo, Judicial
Safeguards] (comparing issues of federalism with individual rights cases and the respective
judicial review standards for each).
327. See Baker & Young, supra note 177, at 78.
328. See id. It is striking that some of the same Justices who have most vocally doubted the
competence of judges to make federalist doctrine have been the most eloquent advocates of
common law doctrinal innovation to protect individual rights. Compare, e.g., United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647-50 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the judiciary
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notion that the national political process affords complete protection
for state autonomy: National politicians tend to protect the interests
of their private constituents but may often view state political
institutions as competitors; to the extent that vertical representa-
tion of state interests is effective, it may facilitate the horizontal
imposition of powerful states' preferences on other states; and much
federal law is produced through processes that avoid the "political
safeguards of federalism" altogether. 29 Finally, we rejected the
notion that federalism has a constant political valence, so that
"liberals" should oppose judicial enforcement of it (or "conservatives"
favor it) as a normative matter; rather, as issues like gay marriage
or preemption of state environmental measures demonstrate, people
of all political stripes may find state autonomy normatively
appealing in some instances even if not in others. a0
In this Article, I want to consider the judicial review question
more explicitly as one of institutional choice. Federalism posits a
goal-balancing national and state authority-but, as Neil Komesar
has insisted, we must still ask which institutions are best positioned
to pursue that goal. 3 ' This analysis, moreover, must be comparative
in nature. It is not enough to say that this or that institution is well-
or ill-suited to handle a certain set of questions. Instead, the likely
performance of each institution must be compared with that of the
alternatives. "Issues at which an institution, in the abstract, may be
good may not need that institution because one of the alternative
institutions may be even better. In turn, tasks that strain the
abilities of an institution may wisely be assigned to it anyway if the
is not competent to develop doctrinal limitations on national power), and United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 607-08 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (comparing efforts to develop such
limits to Lochner), with Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755-65 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (finding that, despite the failure of substantive due process doctrine in the
Lochner era, the judiciary remains not only competent but obligated to develop doctrine
protecting unenumerated rights under the Due Process Clause).
329. See Baker & Young, supra note 177, at 106-33; Hamilton, supra note 321; Marshall,
supra note 322, at 144-55; Prakash & Yoo, supra note 299.
330. See Baker & Young, supra note 177, at 133-62; see also Ernest A. Young, Welcome to
the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 1277 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Dark Side] (discussing state and local resistance to
the USA PATRIOT Act based on concerns for civil liberties).
331. See KOMESAR, supra note 320, at 5 ("Goal choice and institutional choice are both
essential for law and public policy. They are inextricably related.").
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alternatives are even worse.""3 2 We thus need to focus on the
distinctive institutional capabilities of courts, legislatures, and
executive actors, and ask how these different capacities bear on
federalism questions.
Comparative institutional analysis is relevant to federalism
questions in at least two ways. There are what we might call "first
order" questions that involve allocating decision making authority
between federal and state institutions. For example, should we
entrust the states with primary responsibility to resolve the issues
of physician-assisted suicide or gay marriage, or should those
questions be resolved at the federal level? Then there are the
"second order" issues, which involve choosing institutions to decide
the first order questions. In other words, should the allocation of
authority over physician-assisted suicide or gay marriage be settled
by Congress, the Executive, or a court deciding the matter as a
question of constitutional law? The first order questions are
important and interesting, but my concern here is with the second
order issue: Which institution should draw and police the boundary
between state and federal authority?
This turns out to be a very complex question. I make two
primary points about it in this Section. The first is that once we
start thinking about the factors involved in comparative institu-
tional analysis, the "question" turns out be incredibly multifarious.
It seems highly unlikely that all the various incarnations of the
boundary-drawing question will have the same answer, or that the
answer to many of them will involve a categorical choice of one
institution over all the others. The second point is that compara-
tive institutional analysis functions most comfortably at the level
of institutional design. Once we shift to the perspective of partici-
pants within the legal system as it is presently constituted,
opportunities to shift decision making authority altogether in
response to comparative institutional analysis narrow considerably.
Institutional analysis is more likely to influence how decisions are
made by the institutions involved. For courts, this means that
institutional analysis may be most important in shaping doctrine
rather than in determining whether courts may decide federalism
issues at all. As I note at the conclusion of the Section, this impres-
332. Id. at 6.
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sion is consistent with the practice of many other federal systems
around the world, which entrust at least some level of authority to
enforce the federal arrangement to courts.
1. One Issue, Many Questions
The debate in the federalism literature-and in judicial opinions
in federalism cases-is whether courts should decide federalism
issues. The same arguments are routinely imported from one
doctrinal context to another. For example, Herbert Wechsler's
notion that the political process generally protects federalism better
than courts 333 was transformed by Justice Blackmun into an
argument for judicial abdication in the Garcia case, which involved
judge-made restraints on congressional action that admittedly fell
within the commerce power.334 Then Justice Stevens invoked it in
Kimel,335 a case about state sovereign immunity from suits by
private litigants. Finally, Justice Souter took up the same notion in
Morrison, a case about whether courts should enforce the limits
of the commerce power itself. We are accustomed to treating
different first-order federalism questions differently: We do not
assume, for example, that the national government should control
public education simply because it regulates the safety of nuclear
power. But we frequently treat the second-order, who-should-draw-
the-boundary issue, as a unitary question.
That strikes me as a mistake. Thinking about the question from
the perspective of comparative institutional analysis can help us
start to see why. This perspective typically considers such factors as
the distribution of stakes that various actors have in an issue, the
costs of information about the issue, the costs of participating in
the alternative institutions, and the expertise and scale of those
institutions. 337 But surely these factors will vary considerably
depending on the particular aspect of federalism under discussion.
The costs of information about issues of basic legislative power, such
as the scope of the Commerce Clause, may be quite different from
333. See Wechsler, Political Safeguards, supra note 12, at 558-60.
334. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-56 (1985).
335. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,93-95 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
336. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647-50 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
337. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 320, at 7-8.
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the costs of understanding the ins and outs of the relationships
between state and federal courts. Likewise, the likelihood that state
institutional actors will intervene to protect their own structural
interests may be considerably greater in the case of suits by private
actors than limits on Congress's spending power. The point is
simply that if we run the comparative institutional analysis on each
of the various federalism questions currently in dispute, we have
little reason to think that the results will point uniformly in one
direction.
A second problem is that issues of federalism generally arise in
the context of a particular policy that either the federal or a state
government seeks to implement. Congress, for example, may wish
to ban possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of a school, thereby
raising an issue of whether such legislation falls within the scope of
the Commerce Clause.338 The participation of and positions taken by
various actors are likely to be driven at least as much by the
particular policy at stake (How do you feel about gun control?) as by
the issue of allocating authority between the nation and the states.
Even a casual observer of recent debates about federalism in
Congress will recall instances in which one political party or the
other has championed state autonomy depending on its views on the
underlying policy issue. Republicans-the supposed party of state
autonomy-have pressed for national uniformity on gay marriage,
physician-assisted suicide, and partial-birth abortions; Democrats
have rediscovered the virtues of state autonomy on tort reform and
regulation of Health Maintenance Organizations."'
A really sound comparative institutional analysis would have to
assess the various key factors in terms of both the federalism issue
and the underlying policy issue (medical marijuana vs. school
safety). That would likely be awfully hard to do, and the results
would not be broadly applicable to all cases of the same federalism
question. After all, the dynamics of institutional participation on the
338. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
339. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., States' Rights Isn't the Issue, WASH. POST, June 22, 2001,
at A25. It is easy to discount these sorts of political shifts on structural matters as simple
opportunism. Our Founders, however, seem to have counted on just such opportunism as a
critical mechanism for maintaining both vertical and horizontal checks and balances among
governing institutions. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed.,
1961); Young, Dark Side, supra note 330, at 1308-09.
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second-order federalism question (Who decides how broad the
Commerce Clause is?) might be quite different in a context involving
a different underlying policy issue. All of the factors crucial to
comparative institutional analysis-the distribution of stakes, the
costs of information, etc.-are likely to vary depending on whether
the underlying first-order question involves Congress's authority to
legislate on, for instance, tort reform, abortion, or physician-assisted
suicide.
There is an important place for comparative institutional analysis
of federalism questions, but it will have to be done retail rather than
wholesale. That suggests that categorical polar positions on judicial
review--courts should always have the final say on federalism
issues, or courts should stay away from such questions entirely-are
misguided, at least from the pragmatic perspective of institutional
analysis. My argument here would not answer the quite different
claim that the Constitution itself mandates a categorical institu-
tional choice.34 But to the extent that functional considerations
guide the choice of institutions, a categorical choice of either judicial
or political channels for resolution of federalism disputes seems out
of place.
2. The Obligation to Decide
As Neil Komesar has observed, institutional choice "is about
deciding who decides." 4' Institutional analysts often seem to
assume that the institutions being compared-say, courts and
legislatures-are equally free to decide or not to decide the issue in
question. Critics of a judicial role on federalism questions often
seem to make the same assumption that courts are free not to decide
when such questions are put to them. But the question of when a
court may decide not to decide an issue presented to it is itself a
complicated, doctrine-intensive question, and I argue that the law
governing this question severely limits the ability of courts to forego
decision simply because another institution might have comparative
advantages relevant to the issue. This does not make institutional
340. My arguments about the political question doctrine in the next subsection are at least
partially responsive to such claims. See infra text accompanying notes 346-57.
341. KOMESAR, supra note 320, at 3.
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choice irrelevant to courts; rather, such considerations are chiefly
relevant to the types of doctrines that courts should employ in
particular kinds of cases, which will in turn control the extent of
judicial involvement with particular sorts of issues.
Practitioners of institutional choice must distinguish between two
perspectives: the perspective of institutional design and the
perspective of participants in the system that exists. Institutional
analyses seem generally to proceed from the former perspective.
They ask: If we were setting up a system to resolve a particular kind
of issue, what sort of institutions would we choose? My primary
interest here, by contrast, is in developing a theoretical template to
guide real courts when confronted with real federalism cases.
Comparative institutional analysis thus ought to inform their choice
among the options that the legal system provides, but such analysis
cannot supply a basis for radical alterations in the system itself.
Indeed, the willingness to contemplate fresh starts and wholesale
revisions implicit in most discussions of institutional design is
inconsistent with the Burkean, incrementalist perspective offered
here.
Although the most obvious instances of institutional design occur
in the drafting or amendment of a constitution, other uses for the
design perspective exist outside the realm of radical and explicit
constitutional change. If Congress is convinced that federal courts
are not well-suited to decide particular federalism questions, for
example, it may be able to restrict their jurisdiction over such
questions.342 Likewise, courts have some occasion to make design
decisions by defining the contours of the political question doctrine,
which might take certain federalism issues out of the judicial
purview altogether.343 Neither of these approaches, however, has
342. The issue of constitutional limitations on Congress's power to restrict federal
jurisdiction is one of the most famously murky issues in constitutional law. See, e.g., Henry
M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). The most important practical
limit is that wherever Congress seeks to use federal courts to enforce federal law, see, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (addressing a federal criminal prosecution in
federal court), the federal courts necessarily will have the opportunity to consider the defense
that the federal law in question falls outside Congress's power.
343. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (rejecting as nonjusticiable a
request to settle the locus of state governmental authority under the Guarantee Clause).
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played a major role with respect to federalism. In the mid-nine-
teenth century, Congress did strip the Supreme Court ofjurisdiction
to decide a case involving the constitutionality of Reconstruc-
tion--certainly a federalism issue of the first magnitude. 4  But
since that time there has been no significant effort to confine the
Court's jurisdiction over federalism questions.345
Nor has the political question doctrine played a significant role in
federalism disputes, at least since the Court declared a Guarantee
Clause claim nonjusticiable in 1849.346 Prior to Baker v. Carr,34 v the
Court might have chosen to make the political question doctrine into
a general vehicle for comparative institutional analysis. But Baker
344. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-15 (1868) (upholding Congress's
action as valid under the Exceptions Clause of Article III). But see Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 85 (1869) (reading Congress's action very narrowly to permit Supreme Court review
of a similar case).
345. The only clear instance of jurisdiction-stripping since Reconstruction did bear some
relation to federalism concerns, but its practical significance seems relatively minor. One
provision in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(E), barred Supreme Court review of federal court of appeals decisions granting or
denying leave to state prisoners to file a second or successive petition for a federal writ of
habeas corpus. See generally Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (upholding this provision
of the AEDPA). Restricting Supreme Court jurisdiction in habeas cases effectively denies the
Court the opportunity to decide the proper allocation of authority between federal and state
courts in state criminal litigation; in that sense, the 1996 Act raised an institutional design
issue of the sort I have been discussing. But the 1996 Act restricted only the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction (not the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary as a whole) over a small set of court
of appeals decisions concerning a small subset of federal habeas petitions-appellate
"gatekeeper" decisions denying the right to file a successive habeas petition. The AEDPA thus
seems to be the exception proving the rule that jurisdiction-stripping has not been a favored
vehicle for Congress to redesign the Constitution's allocation of institutional authority to
decide federalism disputes.
Issues of federalism also helped prompt one of the major institutional re-design proposals
of the last century: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's court-packing plan. See WILLIAM
E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT 133 (1995) (describing how the old Court's federalism and economic
substantive due process cases together moved FDR to try and change the structure of the
Court). Interestingly, however, that plan did not seek to reallocate authority to decide
federalism issues; instead, it simply sought to change the result in such cases by appointing
justices friendly to the President's broad view of federal legislative authority.
346. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42 ("Under this article of the Constitution it rests with
Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State."). On the extent to
which some Guarantee Clause claims may remainjusticiable, see Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1988).
347. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection claims for equal apportionment of
state legislative districts are justiciable).
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began a process of transforming a general prudential inquiry into a
basically rule-bound, narrow exception to a general principle of
judicial review. 48 The Court's most recent pronouncement, in Nixon
v. United States, 49 makes clear that non-justiciability turns on two
of the factors identified in Baker: a textual commitment of the issue
in question to the political branches, and a lack of judicially
manageable standards for deciding the issue. 5 ° Neither of these
factors fit comfortably with the notion that courts may decline to
decide federalism issues if, based on a comparative institutional
analysis, they find some other institution better suited to the task.
The first factor-textual commitment- obviously substitutes a text-
based inquiry for institutional analysis. 51 The second-judicially
manageable standards- does seem more consonant with an inquiry
into judicial competence. 352 It is, however, single-institutional in
that so long as courts have manageable standards to decide, we do
not ask whether some other institution could decide even better.353
More importantly, it makes institutional analysis subservient to
348. A more prudential and broadly applicable version of the political question doctrine
may survive in foreign affairs cases, see Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United
States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1402-03 (1999), although the
Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on such a case in several decades. But even here,
the most recent decisions tend to get rid of foreign affairs issues on other grounds, such as
standing or ripeness. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003) (dismissing a claim
that the war in Iraq was unconstitutional primarily on ripeness grounds; a second ground
suggested the simple absence of a constitutional question on the merits). My own view is that
Louis Henkin was largely correct to suggest that there is no such thing as a political question
doctrine. See generally Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.
597, 622 (1976) (arguing that all political question cases amount to either the Court's decision
to "accept decisions by the political branches [as being] within their constitutional authority"
or to "refuse some (or all) remedies for want of equity").
349. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
350. Id. at 228-29.
351. See id. at 228 (observing that under the first prong, "the courts must ... interpret the
text in question and determine whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed");
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-48 (1969) (conducting a detailed inquiry into the
original understanding of the Qualifications Clauses of Article I in order to determine whether
those clauses were a "textual commitment" of qualifications controversies to Congress).
352. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1990) (undertaking a
limited inquiry into the judiciary's institutional competence in rejecting argument for
nonjusticiability under this prong).
353. See KOMESAR, supra note 320, at 6-7 (criticizing institutional analysis that focuses
only on a single institution without comparing it to others).
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doctrine; only if doctrinal tools are wholly lacking can a court choose
some other institution to decide."a
I am unaware of any serious argument that the text of the
Constitution commits federalism issues generally to Congress, and
few seem to argue more narrowly that particular federalism
questions can meet the high standard for nonjusticiability in Baker
and Nixon.355 Jesse Choper has called for courts to hold federalism
issues nonjusticiable, but he relies on a prudential notion of non-
justiciability that has little connection to the political question
doctrine in its present form.35 Dean Choper's proposal is thus one
of institutional design; under current institutional arrangements,
the political question doctrine exhausts the set of circumstances in
which federal courts may refuse to decide a constitutional issue
based on the characteristics of the issue itself. Courts may decline
decision on grounds of standing or ripeness or abstention, for
example, but these principles turn on the characteristics of the
parties, the timing of the claim, or the equitable nature of the relief
requested. There is no general "out" for courts on the ground that
some other institution may do a better job.357
354. Moreover, I am aware of only one case in which the Supreme Court has held an issue
nonjusticiable based solely on a lack ofjudicially manageable standards, without also relying
on a textual commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch. That is certainly
understandable. As I have noted elsewhere, one sees claims that doctrinal standards are
incoherent and unmanageable in virtually every area of constitutional law. See Young, Two
Federalisms, supra note 13, at 11. If that were itself a basis for declaring the cases
nonjusticiable, we could do away with much constitutional law altogether. See Baker &
Young, supra note 177, at 104-05. For a general discussion, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
355. John Yoo notes, for example, that the majority opinion in Garcia-generally regarded
as the high water mark of the notion that courts should not decide federalism issues-"did not
resort to the political question doctrine." Yoo, Judicial Safeguards, supra note 326, at 1332;
see also Zick, supra note 291, at 310 ("In light of subsequent events [to Garcia], it seems that
no one ... subscribes to the theory that federalism ought to be treated as nonjusticiable.").
356. See CHOPER, supra note 2, at 193.
357. To be sure, a fair amount of such comparative institutional analysis goes on in shaping
standing, ripeness, and mootness doctrine. Justice Scalia, for instance, has argued that the
aspect of standing doctrine barring adjudication of "generalized grievances" stems from a
judgment that widely-shared harms are best addressed through the political process, while
focused injuries are better suited for courts. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894-97 (1983).
The important point, though, is that the institutional analysis is internal to standing doctrine
and must be accommodated to other, non-institutional aspects of standing doctrine. It is thus
a form of interpretive choice, which I discuss in the next Section. One does not do comparative
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From the perspective of institutional design, of course, we might
choose to have a broader political question doctrine.3" At the level
of ordinary practice, however, courts will generally be bound by
John Marshall's insistence that "[w]e have no more right to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which
is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
[C]onstitution."'59 Chief Justice Marshall's justification for judicial
review in Marbury v. Madison6 ° relied heavily on the obligation of
courts to apply the relevant rules-including constitutional
rules-to whatever cases come before them.36' It would be hard to
introduce institutionally-based choice about when to engage in
judicial review without undermining the case for judicial review
across the board.
3. The Ubiquity of Judicial Enforcement
It is worth noting that the controversy over a judicial role in
federalism disputes is a relatively unusual feature of American
constitutional law. Many federal systems around the world seem to
assume, virtually as a matter of course, that the institutional
independence of a court is crucial to enforcing allocations of power
among the system's various component units."2 The European
institutional analysis in its pure form in the context of standing doctrine.
358. A broad doctrine that held constitutional issues nonjusticiable whenever comparative
institutional analysis suggested that some other institution might perform better would, of
course, throw much of constitutional law open to question. That does not make the possibility
uninteresting, of course, but I have no occasion to pursue it here.
359. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). This rule has exceptions, but
they are rarely wholly prudential. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
711 (1996) (holding that federal courts' ability to dismiss claims on abstention grounds
generally depends on whether the plaintiff seeks only equitable relief).
360. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
361. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 114 (1962) (interpreting Marbury to hold that "the judiciary's
power to construe and enforce the Constitution ... is to be deduced from the obligation of the
courts to decide cases conformably to law"); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965) (arguing that courts decide constitutional
questions "for the reason that they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their
jurisdiction and in doing so must give effect to the supreme law of the land").
362. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU
LAW 321 (Paul Craig & Grdinne de Bdrca eds., 1999) (observing that most divided power
systems envision a boundary-policing role for courts); 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, PAUL JACKSON &
PATRICIA LEOPOLD, 0. HOOD PHILLIPS AND JACKSON: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
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Court of Justice has long played such a role in the European Union,
and the proposed new Constitution for Europe does nothing to
abrogate that role. 63 British commentators on the new Devolution
Acts, which shift some aspects of domestic governance from
Westminster to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, have widely
assumed that dividing power in this way will necessarily require
British courts to enforce the division through judicial review.364
Other federal systems likewise provide for judicial review in
enforcing the federal balance,"' and some foreign commentators
even include a role for a court as part of the basic definition of a
federal system. The European jurist Koen Lenaerts, for example,
has stated that "Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign
is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and
umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order."366
These examples should be considered with caution: The ubiqui-
tous risks of cross-national comparisons are often at their maximum
when we consider questions of structure. 67 The fact that these other
LAW 7 (8th ed. 2001) (British textbook, observing that judicial power to invalidate legislation
"is comparatively rare ... except in federal states ... where some check is necessary to preserve
the rights of the federation and its component members").
363. See, e.g., Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising)
2000 E.C.R. 1-8419 (European Court of Justice decision invalidating a Community directive
banning advertising of tobacco products as outside Community "competence"). See generally
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,2457 (1991) (describing the
European Court of Justice's role in drawing the boundaries of the European Union's authority
vis-&-vis the Member States); Young, European Union, supra note 96, at 1634-36, 1671-76
(same). The German Constitutional Court has likewise insisted on the right to police the
boundary between the respective authorities of the EU and the German state. See Brunner
v. European Union Treaty, BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993)printed in translation in [1994] 1 C.M.L.R.
57.
364. See, e.g., Paul Craig & Mark Walters, The Courts, Devolution and Judicial Review,
1999 PUB. LAW 274, 289 ('fAlny division of legislative power will raise certain fundamental
issues which must be resolved by the courts and which will shape the entire nature of that
division of authority."); Timothy Jones, Scottish Devolution and Demarcation Disputes, 1997
PUB. LAw 283, 283 ('If powers are to be distributed between two legislatures (Edinburgh and
Westminster), a legal line of demarcation must be drawn, which inevitably means litigation
and a role for the courts.").
365. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of
Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 734, 756-59 (2004) (describing the role of constitutional
courts in enforcing federalism in Germany).
366. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 205, 263 (1990) (emphasis added).
367. See Halberstam, Comparative Federalism, supra note 269, at 213 (showing that
compelling subnational units to enforce national law may promote or undermine subnational
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systems have some form ofjudicial review for federalism questions,
moreover, tells us little about how deferential that review is with
respect to other political actors. George Bermann has observed, for
example, that "the European Court of Justice has never taken the
opportunity to define restrictively the Treaty's competence-confer-
ring provisions, nor has it seriously questioned whether a Commu-
nity law measure bears a sufficient connection to the internal
market to justify its adoption" under the treaty.368 On the other
hand, the same court has been quite aggressive in "adjusting" the
legal framework to bolster European integration by announcing the
direct effect and supremacy of Community law, and by establishing
the liability of Member States for failure to implement Community
directives.6 9 Whether these courts have chosen, as a matter of
interpretive choice, to be deferential or not, the important point at
present is that they have treated federalism questions as questions
of law, subject to judicial resolution.
My own view is that many foreign discussions take the judicial
review issue a little too much for granted; surely the American
debate has taught us that a judicial role must be defended.37 ° The
widespread embrace of judicial review by federal systems around
the world, however, ought at least to shake the conventional wisdom
in American academia that federalism disputes should be left
entirely to politics. It suggests that this conventional wisdom may
be shaped by many Americans' association of federalism with
certain substantive evils, such as slavery and racism,37' rather than
by any universal truths concerning the institutional capacities of
courts to deal with questions of government structure. Neither the
autonomy, depending on the surrounding institutional context); Jackson, Narratives, supra
note 60, at 272-74.
368. George A. Bermann, The Role of Law in the Functioning of Federal Systems, in THE
FEDERAL VISION, supra note 269, at 199-200.
369. As Professor Bermann points out, the reluctance of the ECJ to restrict the powers of
the Community institutions, at the same time that the Court has been quite willing to
enhance Community powers vis-&-vis the Member States, may be attributable to "the EU's
great potential for effective political safeguards of federalism," such as the regular
opportunities for the Member States' direct representatives to amend the relevant treaties.
See id. at 203, 212.
370. See Young, British Devolutionaries, supra note 184 (criticizing British assumption that
courts will necessarily take the primary role in enforcing allocation of power embodied in the
Revolutionary Acts).
371. See Baker & Young, supra note 177, at 121-25, 143-49.
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pro- nor the anti-judicial review position should be embraced
uncritically.
The argument that courts should not enforce federalism princi-
ples has generally been part and parcel of the "double standard" in
constitutional law that grew up after the Supreme Court's "switch
in time" in 1937.372 Just as the courts have been generally unwilling
to enforce notions of economic substantive due process after 1937,
so too they have been reluctant to enforce principles of federalism,
such as limits on the national commerce power. 73 This notion of a
"double standard" has been criticized in general 374 and with
particular regard to federalism.3 5 The important point for present
purposes, however, is that the double standard has not generally
taken the form of a categorical rule that courts may not decide
economic substantive due process or federalism cases. 376 Rather, the
courts have simply fashioned doctrines on the merits that defer in
most cases to judgments by political actors.377
372. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (4th ed. 1982) (describing "a double standard of judicial attitude,
whereby governmental economic experimentation is accorded all but carte blanche by the
courts, but alleged violations of individual civil rights are given meticulous judicial
attention").
373. See Baker & Young, supra note 177, at 75-76 (noting that federalism principles have
been linked with economic substantive due process in constitutional "exile" after 1937).
374. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 179, at 267 ("[Wle should take the whole Constitution
seriously. We cannot legitimately pick and choose the clauses we want enforced.").
375. See, e.g., Baker & Young, supra note 177, passim (arguing that none of the plausible
rationales for a "double standard"justify a refusal to enforce federalism principles); A.E. Dick
Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental
Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 797 (1985) ("It is no less legitimate and proper for the Supreme
Court to concern itself with assuring the health of federalism as it is for the Court to uphold
individual liberties as such. In neither case is abdication of the Court's proper role consistent
with the principles inhering in the Constitution.").
376. One possible exception is Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), in which Justice
Black's majority opinion asserted that the Court had abandoned entirely"the use of the 'vague
contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believed to
be economically unwise ..."; such arguments should be "addressed to the legislature, not to
us." Id. at 731 (footnote omitted). But Justice Harlan's separate concurrence, which simply
stated that "this state measure bears a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible
objective," id. at 733 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment), probably better states the
governing law. The Court has continued to suggest that it is willing to assess economic
regulation under the rational basis test, although it never strikes such legislation down. See,
e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n, 539 U.S. 103 (2003).
377. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993) (stating a
particularly deferential version of the "rational basis" test).
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B. Interpretive Choice
To say that courts should have a role is emphatically not to say
that comparative institutional competence is irrelevant to issues of
federalism. Rather, they remain highly relevant-even central-to
the decisions that particular institutions make as to how to handle
these issues. Institutions frequently decide, after all, to accord
deference to other institutions in the decision of particular ques-
tions. Congress, for example, ordinarily has the power to draw some
boundaries between state and federal authority by deciding when to
preempt state law. It may decide, however, that an executive agency
could perform this task better in certain circumstances and delegate
its preemptive power to the agency.378 Likewise, courts may adopt
highly deferential federalism doctrine based on the comparative
institutional judgment that the boundary between state and
national authority ordinarily ought to be drawn by the political
process. The adoption of such doctrine does not obviate the court's
obligation to render a decision, but the manner of decision incorpo-
rates substantial deference to other actors. The institutional
capacities of courts and other actors in the system are critical to
that judgment. Institutional choice thus folds into the interpretive
choices required in making federalism doctrine.
This question, as Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have
observed, is one "of institutional competence writ small. To the
extent that interpretive authority over certain questions has been
allocated to the courts ... there remains the question what interpre-
tive rules courts should use in constitutional cases.""7 9 My objective
in this Article is not to formulate a comprehensive set of doctrinal
recommendations on federalism questions, but rather to explore
how the development of such doctrines should proceed.
378. See, e.g., Symens v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050,1053-54 (8th Cir. 1998)
(finding that Congress implicitly delegated authority to the Department of Agriculture to
preempt state laws on cattle vaccines). We might term these sorts of decisions provisional
institutional choices because the delegations in question are subject to recall by the delegating
institution. Congress, for example, can always reassume its control over preemption decisions
notwithstanding its prior delegation to'an executive agency. That, however, hardly makes
these choices unimportant.
379. Sunstein & Vermeule, Interpretation, supra note 11, at 938.
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Interpretive choice typically involves "the selection of one
interpretive doctrine, from a group of candidate doctrines, in the
service of a goal specified by a higher-level theory of interpreta-
tion."38° For present purposes, however, that description must be
qualified in three ways. First, choosing federalism doctrine does not
truly involve "a choice among possible means to attain stipulated
ends."38' We may agree on a very general end-preservation of some
notion of balance between national and state authority-and yet
have very different notions of what elements of that balance are
actually important. In a companion article to this one,382 for
example, I distinguish between state "sovereignty," defined as the
unaccountability of state governmental institutions to federal actors
and to their citizens, and state "autonomy," by which I mean the
state government's right to make certain decisions and to perform
certain functions for its citizens. These concepts overlap to some
extent but differ widely in emphasis, and the choice of which sort of
federalism "end" to pursue has important implications for doctrine.
My view is that we ought to consider state autonomy more impor-
tant, but the primary point for present purposes is that the ends of
federalism doctrine are contested.
The second qualification is that we are not choosing one interpre-
tive doctrine for federalism questions. As I have already discussed,,
issues of federalism arise in a vast array of different contexts, and
it would be highly surprising if one interpretive doctrine could
address them all. Attempting to fashion a global doctrinal solution
to federalism problems at a particular point in time would also
sacrifice one of the chief virtues of the common law method, which
is the incremental development of principles to solve particular
problems in particular circumstances. One can, I think, propose a
set of more general doctrinal strategies to help guide the develop-
ment of doctrine in particular contexts, and I have tried to do that
elsewhere.8 3 I have space here only for an overview of how these
strategies should be developed.
380. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 76 (2000) [hereinafter
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice].
381. Id. (emphasis added).
382. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 13-15.
383. See id. at 120-58.
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Finally, interpretive choice generally presupposes that the
institutional choice questions are settled. As Professor Vermeule
points out, "[i]nterpretive choice is the intra-institutional parallel to
Komesar's conception of the allocation of responsibilities among
institutions."3" But the institutional question is not settled here;
rather, I have argued that outside the setting of ex ante institutional
design, courts must generally address institutional issues in the
context of choosing particular doctrines that are more or less
deferential to other institutional actors. As Professor Kramer
has noted, "there is no single doctrine of judicial review ....
[C] onstitutional law is filled with doctrines that require the Justices
to defer in varying degrees to other decisionmakers acting in the
realm of ordinary politics.""' Even though I have ruled out whole-
sale judicial abdication of federalism issues to the political process,
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of courts vis-a-vis
other actors plays an important role in shaping federalism doctrine.
This is hardly a revolutionary insight. David Strauss noted years
ago that "in deciding constitutional cases, the courts constantly
consider institutional capacities and propensities .... [C]ourts create
constitutional doctrine by taking into account both the principles
and values reflected in the relevant constitutional provisions and
institutional realities."386 The use of institutional factors as tools to
shape doctrine both enhances and constrains ordinary institutional
analysis. The remainder of this Section considers two senses in
which this is true. The first is that because we are no longer making
a binary choice between institutions, judicial doctrine may be used
to reinforce rather than supplant the political branches' own
institutional mechanisms for handling federalism issues. The
second point is that although institutional analysts typically seem
to assume that different institutions approaching the same problem
will ask basically the same questions, judicial decision making is
actually quite different from action by the political branches. In
particular, courts' obligation to decide cases according to law
imposes important burdens of coherence on judicial action. Those
384. Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, supra note 380, at 91 (emphasis added).
385. Kramer, Politics, supra note 217, at 287.
386. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 207
(1988).
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burdens have played, and will continue to play, an important role in
shaping federalism doctrine.
1. Collaborative Enforcement and Institutional Self-Dealing
Institutional analysis of the allocation of authority over federal-
ism questions sometimes seems to proceed as if one institution or
another will have sole authority over a particular sort of question.
Either the courts are to "establish areas of state control that are to
remain immune from federal regulation" 87 or those questions must
be "remit[ted] ... to politics." 8 Other applications of comparative
institutional analysis often qualify this binary model, of course, but
the qualifications often seem to assume that we are still simply
allocating particular aspects of an issue to one institution or the
other."9 I am suggesting here, however, that institutional analysis
should primarily shape judicial doctrine, and doctrine is sufficiently
flexible to open up a third possibility-that is, that one institution's
activity on a particular question might be tailored primarily to
helping another institution decide that question in a sensible way.
What I have in mind is the notion, prominent in the constitu-
tional theory of our Founders, that structural constraints on federal
political actors ought generally to be self-enforcing. As I have
observed elsewhere, Madison's famous account of separation of
powers and federalism in Federalist 51 does not mention judicial
review as an enforcement mechanism; rather, it depends primarily
on the ambitions of the multifarious state and federal institutional
actors to keep one another in check.39 ° "Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected
with the constitutional rights of the place."39' The system is thus
387. Yoo, Judicial Safeguards, supra note 326, at 1312.
388. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
389. Professor Komesar's discussion of tort reform, for example, often seems to take this
tack by suggesting that judicial decision making should predominate on issues with a
particular distribution of information and decision costs, while political institutions should
control on other issues. See KOMESAR, supra note 320, at 171-95. But he also occasionally
qualifies that categorical view by noting techniques of shared responsibility, such as judicial
narrowing constructions of legislative enactments. See id. at 193.
390. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348-51 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961); Young,
Two Cheers, supra note 59, at 1353-54.
391. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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primarily intended to police itself through a "policy of supplying, by
opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives ...392 This
does not mean that judicial enforcement is inappropriate; as
Federalist 78 makes clear, the Framers expected some judicial role
in boundary-enforcement.393 But it does suggest that courts were not
envisioned as the primary line of defense.
At the same time, I want to insist that there are limits on the
extent to which courts should rely on other political institutions to
hold the federal structure in place. Much of the Framers' constitu-
tional theory can be summed up in the rule that "foxes should not
guard henhouses,"394 and yet the argument for exclusive reliance on
the political safeguards of federalism ultimately asks Congress to
restrain itself. It may be that Congress often will be sympathetic to
state institutional interests; indeed, the limited efficacy of judicial
review (and the course of our history) suggests that power will
steadily shift from the states to the nation, even with judicial
intervention, unless Congress (and the Executive) restrains itself
most of the time. Basic concerns about institutional self-dealing,
however, ought to counsel that no part of our government should be
the ultimate judge of its own power in all instances. 39" As Vicki
Jackson has observed, "j] udicial renunciation of continued review
of federalism cases ... is likely to be destabilizing; telling any
392. Id.
393. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 252-54 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961); RAKOVE,
supra note 107, at 175-76.
394. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 446 (1989). A less homey version states that no man should be judge in his own case. See,
e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (citing "a law that
makes a man a Judge in his own cause" as an example of an act "contrary to the great first
principles of the social compact," and insisting that "[ilt is against all reason and justice, for
a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it").
395. See, e.g., 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 1-7, at 17:
[Tihe continuing perception of many Americans over two centuries has been
unshaken: ... [G]overnment officials cannot always be relied upon to behave
voluntarily as the Constitution demands. Neither the effective maintenance of
structural checks and balances, nor the adequate discharge of government's
affirmative obligations, have been thought likely without some form of
intervention from a point at least partially outside of ordinary majoritarian
politics.
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political body that its power vis-A-vis another political body is
legally unchecked is not conducive to responsible action."39
The likelihood that nonjudicial political and institutional
mechanisms will often function imperfectly suggests an intermedi-
ate role for courts-not as alternative decision makers, but as
collaborators who sit to ensure that the essential checks and
balances within the political branches remain in place. This is the
basic idea of "process federalism."3 7 As I have developed elsewhere,
I doubt that process-based doctrine is a complete answer to the
problem of enforcing federalism.398 I do believe, however, that critics
of the process approach have missed the vast potential that this sort
of collaborative enforcement has for redressing some of the current
imbalances in the system.399 If that potential is largely unrealized
at present, it may be in part because the notion of process-based
doctrine has not yet adequately been explored.
2. Judicial Decision Making and the Frankfurter Constraint
A second problem with institutional analysis is that it often seems
to assume that the basic character of the decision to be made, once
we choose the right institution to make it, does not vary according
to the institution chosen.4"' But courts, legislatures, executive
officials, and markets decide questions quite differently due to the
396. Jackson, Narratives, supra note 60, at 281.
397. See generally Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341; Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21-25 [hereinafter Young, State
Sovereign Immunity].
398. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 59, at 1390-91; Young, Two Federalisms, supra
note 13, at 90.
399. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 121-28.
400. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1247, 1266 (2000):
Judges have the power to make policy by ruling in ways that determine the
outcome of litigation. Judges in lawsuits against the gun industry have
frequently exercised this power by granting defense motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment, thereby rejecting plaintiffs' policy proposals.
Judges could, in future cases, rule in favor of plaintiffs, thereby supporting their
policy proposals.
(footnote omitted). This assumption is somewhat more defensible-although still
questionable-in contexts like tort law, where judges have independent common lawmaking
powers.
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ways that they are constituted and the constraints imposed by their
institutional roles. To assume that when we commit a given problem
to a court rather than a legislature, the court will nevertheless ask
the same question that the legislature would ask, is to disregard
many of the rich differences between institutions that lie at the
heart of institutional choice. Choosing who decides often fundamen-
tally affects what question will be decided.
A crucial characteristic of judicial decision making-as opposed
to executive or legislative action-is that courts must make
decisions according to law.4" We all know that courts make policy
and value choices, but for most it is crucial that courts do not have
the same entitlement to forthrightly choose policy and value as a
legislature might. Rather, the value and policy choices that courts
make arise from the inevitable indeterminacies in the law that
courts must apply.4 2 Ideally those choices are themselves grounded
in the applicable legal materials, broadly construed.4"' Failing that,
they are at least constrained in scope by those legal materials.4'4
One can, of course, argue endlessly about the nature of the differ-
ence between judicial and legislative decisions. But most would
agree that courts are more constrained in the sorts of choices they
can make than legislative or executive actors.40 5
This aspect of judicial decision making imposes two strong
constraints on interpretive choice. The first is to privilege constitu-
tional text and, to a lesser extent, history over other more functional
or consequentialist sources of doctrine. Part II argued that neither
text nor history can provide many determinate answers to federal-
ism questions. Nonetheless, sometimes they do provide clear
401. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
373 (1978) (observing that "adjudication cannot function without some standard of decision").
402. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (1961).
403. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1975) (arguing
that where the directly applicable legal materials fail to determine an answer, judges should
return to the more basic principles and policies of the law).
404. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAw 351-52 (Max Knight trans., 1967) (1960)
(arguing that "the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications
are possible" and that "there is no [legal] criterion by which one possibility within the frame
is preferable to another").
405. They may be less constrained in other respects. Individual legislators, of course, are
highly constrained by the need to convince a majority of their colleagues and the procedural
hurdles to lawmaking. In this respect, they can only envy the splendid isolation and broad
remedial flexibility accorded to the single federal trial judge.
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answers: The text clearly guarantees, for example, each state the
right to elect two senators absent some fundamental change in the
structure.4 6 Few theories of constitutional interpretation allow
departures when the text speaks clearly,40 7 and most also consider
the historical understanding of that text to be relevant in some
way.4 8 There will thus be some instances in which clear text and/or
history dictate particular doctrinal outcomes, regardless of institu-
tional factors.
The second and probably more important constraint is that
judicial decision making must be coherent in a way that decisions
by the political branches need not always be. Professor Lessig has
observed that "[whatever else defines a successful judicial system,
one dimension of its success is its ability to deliver consistent
rulings in cases that appear to be the same. 4°9 Consistency is
central to the legitimacy of the judicial role, as Lessig explains:
To the extent that results of a particular rule appear consistent,
it is easier for the legal culture to view this rule as properly
judicial, and its results as properly judicial .... To the extent,
however, that the results appear inconsistent, this pedigree gets
questioned; it becomes easier for observers to view these results
as determined, or influenced, by factors external to the rule-in
particular, factors considered political.4 1
406. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("The Senate ... shall be composed of two Senators from each
State ...."); U.S. CONST. art. V ("[NJo State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate."). I set to one side the more difficult question whether the requisite
change would require something other than an ordinary amendment. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra
note 311, at 79-88.
407. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1987) ("Arguments from text play a universally
accepted role in constitutional debate .... Where the text speaks clearly and unambiguously
... its plain meaning is dispositive.").
408. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
614-20 (1999) (arguing that some version of originalism has become widely accepted
throughout the community of constitutional lawyers); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through
History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1592 n.14 (1997) ("[In truth, the turn to
originalism seems so general that citation is almost beside the point.").
409. Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 74, at 170-71; cf Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) ("[The main
constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting
with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is achieved.").
410. Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 74, at 174.
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This phenomenon gives rise to what Lessig calls "the Frankfurter
constraint": "[A] rule is an inferior rule if, in its application, it
appears to be political, in the sense of appearing to allow extra-legal
factors to control its application.""' Because we can expect the
Court to try to minimize the political costs that arise when its
results are perceived to be political, the Court will-and should
-move away from rules that are not susceptible to determinate
application.412
The "Frankfurter constraint" derives its name from Felix Frank-
furter's analysis of Commerce Clause decisions in the first part of
the nineteenth century, which emphasized the Court's desire to
avoid the appearance of "judicial policy-making."41 ' This constraint
plays a crucial role with respect to contemporary doctrine. Both the
majority opinion in Garcia and Justice Souter's dissents in Lopez
and Morrison, for example, claimed that the Court should defer to
the political branches on federalism questions because such
questions cannot be resolved in a sufficiently determinate, law-like
way.414 Justice Souter has warned of "the portent of incoherence"
hanging over any attempt to develop doctrinal limits on the
commerce power415 and explicitly invoked the Court's painful
institutional memories of the Lochner period.416
411. Id.
412. Id. at 174-75.
413. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMNERCE CLAUSE: UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE 54 (1937); see also Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 74, at 174 n.142
(invoking Frankfurter's analysis).
414. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,546 (1985) (complaining
that prior doctrine, which tried to protect "traditional" state functions "inevitably invites an
unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which
ones it dislikes"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603-04 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stressing the Court's tradition of deference to Congress in Commerce Clause cases, as well
as the judiciary's comparative weakness as a finder of facts); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (same); see also id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing "the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone-a
set of comprehensible interpretive rules that courts might use to impose some meaningful
limit, but not too great a limit, upon the scope of the legislative authority that the Commerce
Clause delegates to Congress").
415. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting).
416. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Souter stated:
And here once again history raises its objections that the Court's previous essays
in overriding congressional policy choices under the Commerce Clause were
ultimately seen to suffer two fatal weaknesses: when dealing with Acts of
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These concerns are serious. They do not, in my view, justify total
judicial withdrawal from the field, but they do suggest that the
Frankfurter constraint should have a powerful influence on the
shape of doctrine. My companion piece to this Article is thus
centrally concerned with uncovering the characteristics of federal-
ism doctrine in the pre-1937 period that caused that doctrine to fail
the Frankfurter test.417 That experience in turn suggests directions
that contemporary doctrine might pursue in order to avoid similar
problems in the future.
3. Judicial Competence and Compensating Adjustments
One might accept that courts should decide federalism cases and
still deny that they should undertake to use those cases to make
compensating adjustments in the federal structure. That appears to
be the position of Professor Vermeule, who points out that "the
ubiquity of compensating adjustments does not entail that any
particular constitutional actor should attempt to supply such
adjustments, least of all judges deciding constitutional cases."418 He
suggests that "[tihe legislative process is better suited than the
litigation process to forestall unintended consequences and to
identify compensating adjustments on margins remote from the
questions at hand in particular cases." As a result, "the common-law
judges should focus solely on the local effects of the rules they
adopt."419 "Despite its apparent modesty," Vermeule argues, the
compensating adjustment notion "is a counsel of perfection, one that
Congress ... nothing in the Clause compelled the judicial activism, and nothing
about the judiciary as an institution made it a superior source of policy on the
subject Congress dealt with. There is no reason to expect the lesson would be
different another time.
Id. Academics have been equally quick to cry "Lochner!" For instance, one scholar has noted:
The assumption that Lochner was wrong-that courts should not quash state or
federal legislative judgments about social and economic regulation-was bedrock
in our legal and political culture from 1937 to 1995. Since 1995, the Supreme
Court has rejected that assumption. In effect, a bare majority of the Supreme
Court seeks to reverse six decades of settled federalism jurisprudence.
See Law, In the Name of Federalism, supra note 10, at 369-70 (footnote omitted).
417. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 91-122.
418. Vermeule, Second-Best, supra note 62, at 422.
419. Id. at 435.
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assumes a heroic judicial capacity to identify the global effects of
particular institutional innovations."42 °
Far be it for a Burkean to urge any "counsel of perfection";
421
indeed, Professor Vermeule and I have joined in criticizing holistic
approaches to constitutional interpretation that require judges to
articulate and evaluate broad readings that cut across multiple
provisions.422 Vermeule is certainly right to the extent that courts
should be cautious and aware of their institutional limitations when
undertaking compensating adjustments, and that the system should
rely on a variety of institutions-not just courts-to make such
adjustments. The case for totally excluding judges from this
function, however, is not proven. For one thing, Vermeule at times
seems to romanticize the legislature's own capacities for rational
deliberation and global evaluation of consequences. 423 Furthermore,
courts do have certain institutional advantages in this regard, such
as the ability to evaluate the effects of assertions of federal power
after the fact, rather than abstractly and prospectively as a
legislature must do.424 If no institution has a monopoly of institu-
tional advantages, we may do better with a mix of institutions
engaged in the process of adjustment. I have already suggested that
the most successful judicial interventions are likely to be those
which encourage the political branches to do their own adjusting,
rather than judge-made doctrines imposing substantive limits on
national power of their own force.
Professor Vermeule might respond that any opening for judicial
review may well have perverse effects, 425 and that rather than
420. Id. at 436.
421. See, e.g., Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 68, at 664 (observing that
Burkean constitutionalism is grounded in a critique of excessive faith in reason).
422. See Vermeule & Young, supra note 77, at 739-59 (criticizing Akhil Amar's theory of
"intratextualism" on this ground).
423. In fairness, Professor Vermeule has also done some of the most interesting work on
improving the capacity of legislatures to consider constitutional issues. See Elizabeth Garrett
& Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design ofa Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L. J. 1277 (2001).
424. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 361, at 26 (observing that "courts are concerned with the
flesh and blood of an actual case," which "provides an extremely salutary proving ground for
all abstractions").
425. For an example of a possible perverse effect, compare Adrian Vermeule, Does
Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325, 1333-37 (2001) (noting
that, under Lopez, the Court permits regulation of noncommercial activity where such
regulation is part of a "comprehensive scheme" of federal regulation, and suggesting that
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risking them courts should refrain from compensating adjustments
entirely. At least when courts adjust in the direction of limiting
national power, however, they seem unlikely to overcompensate; as
I have already discussed,426 federal courts are staffed by federal
officials whose bias toward national power has been evident for two
centuries. Moreover, at least some of the Rehnquist Court's
adjustments have respected James Bradley Thayer's admonition to
intervene only in cases of "clear mistake."427 Lopez's restriction of
the Commerce Clause, for instance, was a case in which the courts
could have refused to intervene only by abdicating any enforcement
role.
428
More importantly, it is not clear that courts can refrain from
"adjusting" the federal balance. Federalism doctrine is typically
made in cases where the courts are asked to enforce an extension of
national power. In Lopez, the federal courts were asked to enforce
a federal statute that went further than any statute that the courts
had previously upheld under the Commerce Clause.4 29 In Seminole
Tribe and Printz, the courts were asked to enforce congressional
innovations-abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the
Article I powers and mandatory enforcement of federal law by state
officials, respectively-that had few clear precedents in American
practice. Either of the options available to the Court-enforcing the
extension of federal power, or blocking it-is an adjustment to the
federal scheme.43°
Lopez will therefore encourage Congress to draft broader regulatory schemes to the ultimate
detriment of the states), with Young, Two Cheers, supra note 59, at 1392-95 (arguing that
Professor Vermeule overstates this risk).
426. See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
427. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (defining such a mistake as one "so clear
that it is not open to rational question").
428. At oral argument in Lopez, Solicitor General Drew Days was asked to identify any
form of regulation that would fall outside the Commerce Clause if the Gun Free School Zones
Act were upheld, and he was unable to think of an example. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("When asked at oral argument if there were any
limits to the Commerce Clause, the Government was at a loss for words.").
429. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 13-18, Ashcroft v. Raich, cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 491
(2004) (No. 03-1454) (demonstrating that even Wickard v. Filburn involved commercial
activity as defined in Lopez).
430. Cf BICKEL, supra note 361, at 69-72 (noting that Supreme Court decisions upholding
laws against constitutional challenge tend to validate or legitimize those laws).
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It is open to the courts in such a case, of course, to defer to the
political branches on the question of which adjustment is more
appropriate. But Congress has one particularly salient institutional
drawback in this context: It is acting as the judge of its own power.
That hardly means that the national political process cannot be
trusted to protect federalism in some instances; I have already
argued that federalism doctrine should often rely on and try to
enhance such "political safeguards." But complete deference to any
institution's judgments about the scope of its own powers is rare in
our system. Moreover, when a court imposes a limit on national
power, it will often be deferring to a different set of political
actors-that is, political actors at the state level. The Court in
Printz, for example, chose to defer to a local (and elected) sheriffs
decision about enforcement priorities rather than Congress's.
It is true that when the Court limits Congress, it is also judging
the extent of its own power of judicial review. But at the same time
it is limiting the power of the national government of which it is a
part, and in a more direct way its own power to enforce federal
law." At any given time, in any given doctrinal context, the greater
risk may lie with either congressional or judicial aggrandizement.
This suggests that judge-made doctrine should perhaps be more
deferential in contexts where the Court's powers trade off directly
with those of Congress,"" and that the courts should prefer
collaborative doctrines that do not exclude Congress altogether. But
the basic point is simply that the meaning of judicial restraint in
this context is more complex than is sometimes acknowledged.
The last point is the Burkean one that the courts have been
making compensating adjustments in the realm of federalism for a
very long time. The focus of most constitutional lawyers on the
Commerce Clause cases obscures the many other areas-abstention
doctrines, choice of law, the dormant Commerce Clause, preemption
doctrine-where judicial innovation has been far less controversial.
Although each doctrine has its critics, excluding the courts from
431. See, e.g., Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 146, at 1154-57 (developing the
argument that the state sovereign immunity cases limit the powers of the federal courts to
impose particular remedies).
432. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,516-20,527-29 (1997) (considering the
respective powers of the Court and Congress to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment).
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adjusting federalism would be a radical change, and as such it
should bear a heavy burden ofjustification. My proposal here is that
we be more explicit about making compensating adjustments, but
the principle itself is hardly new.
C. Underlying Values
A final-and somewhat obvious--component of federalism
doctrine is the underlying functional values that federalism has
traditionally been thought to serve. Part II argued that fidelity to
the Constitution requires enforcement of federalism whether or not
we think it is good, useful, or otherwise normatively attractive.433
But the structural notion of federalism embedded in the Constitu-
tion is sufficiently open-ended to allow considerable flexibility in the
development of doctrine, and to the extent that is true it makes
sense to promote the most normatively attractive version of
federalism that we can achieve.' As Ronald Dworkin might say, we
should develop doctrine in such a way as to show federalism in its
"best light."435 That requires attention to federalism's underlying
values.
A substantial literature catalogs the values associated with state
and national action, and I have no intention of replicating it here.436
The virtues associated with state autonomy fall into two primary
groups. The first concerns the policy outputs of federal systems:
Through experimentation and inter-jurisdictional competition,
federal systems are said to produce "better" policies. Where citizens
fail to agree about what "better" means, and where contending
positions are concentrated geographically, federal systems can at
least satisfy a greater proportion of citizen preferences than can a
unitary government. 7 The second set of values focuses instead on
433. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
434. Likewise, we would expect judges convinced that federalism is not normatively
attractive to develop a much less robust set of doctrines to enforce it.
435. RONALD DwORKN, LAWS EMPIRE 226 (1986).
436. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 229; Friedman, supra note 102.
437. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stressing the value of state experimentation); McConnell, Federalism, supra note
102, at 1492-96 (demonstrating how federalism maximizes the satisfaction of diverse citizen
preferences).
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the relation of federalism to the political process itself, emphasizing
opportunities for citizen participation at the state level, the ability
of multiple jurisdictions to foster political competition, and the
function of state governments as intermediary institutions that can,
on occasion, check tyrannical impulses at the center.438
National action may yield benefits that are, in many instances,
mirror images of the virtues of state action. National policies are
obviously better where uniformity is a prime virtue, and the
national government may also enjoy advantages of administrative
efficiency and the concentration of expertise.439 Similarly, national
action may overcome collective action problems, such as externali-
ties, spillover effects, and races to the bottom, that plague action by
individual state governments."0 Finally, ever since Madison's
argument in Federalist 10,4" national action has been thought to
mitigate the problem of faction in smaller political communities
and, in consequence, to provide a good vehicle for the protection of
individual rights.
Federalism's ability to realize each of these virtues-on both sides
of the scale-in practice is vigorously contested," 2 but I want to
bracket those disputes here. The more interesting question for
present purposes is how these values are translated into doctrine.
Some commentators have suggested that they should translate
fairly directly. Rather than draw formal limits to federal legislative
power, for example, courts should simply invalidate national
measures that seem unlikely to capture any of the benefits associ-
ated with centralized action. Donald Regan has thus argued that "in
thinking about whether the federal government has the power to do
something or other, we should ask what special reason there is for
438. See, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 16, at 66 (viewing states as intermediary institutions
checking national authority); Merritt, supra note 346, at 7-8 (citing the value of participation
and accountability); Young, Dark Side, supra note 330, at 1284-91 (identifying different ways
in which federalism protects liberty).
439. See SHAPIRO, supra note 229, at 131-33.
440. See id. at 132-33.
441. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63-69 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
442. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 100, at 908-09 (arguing that virtually all of these
federalist values can be captured by a policy decision to decentralize government, and that
federalism's constitutional entrenchment of decentralization is unnecessary and unwise).
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the federal government to have that power. What reason is there to
think the states are incapable or untrustworthy?" 3
We might call this approach "direct value-application," and I
doubt that it is an appropriate role for courts. As I have discussed,
courts are bound by the "Frankfurter constraint": Doctrine must be
sufficiently determinate to differentiate what judges do from simple
policymaking.4' For all its virtues in conforming doctrine to the
reasons we care about federalism in the first place, I doubt that
direct value-application can pass this test.
This is true for at least two reasons. First, there are a lot of
different values in play here. That makes direct value-application
readily subject to manipulation by judges bent on reaching a
particular result. As in Judge Leventhal's classic criticism of the
resort to legislative history, relying on the values associated with
state and national action may be like "looking over a crowd and
picking out your friends."' 5 Although the values of federalism may
not point in different directions in all cases, in most situations any
lawyer who cannot invoke one or more of the values I have dis-
cussed on either side of a question just is not trying.
Even putting deliberate manipulation aside, it is hard to differen-
tiate the considerations involved in deciding whether national
action is necessary to avoid a collective action problem, for example,
from the policy judgments ordinarily reserved to legislators. Other
questions, like the degree of uniformity required in addressing a
particular problem, or the relative prevalence of factional "special
interest" politics at state and national levels on a given issue,
likewise seem more legislative than judicial in nature. If the expe-
rience of the Lochner era Court teaches anything, it is that these
443. Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 557 (1995); see also Ann Althouse,
Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 817 (1996) (arguing
for a "jurisprudence that looks deeply into why it is good for some matters to be governed by
a uniform federal standard, why it is good for some things to remain under the control of
various states, and what effect these choices will have on the federal courts"); Stephen
Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795,826-27 (1996) (making
a similar suggestion).
444. See supra notes 413-17 and accompanying text.
445. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting a conversation with Harold
Leventhal).
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sorts of judgments will frequently be perceived as political rather
than legal, and that the legitimacy of the courts may suffer as a
result. That dilemma is the essence of the Frankfurter constraint.
My own view is that the values associated with federalism should
be consulted in making broad judgments about the ends of federal-
ism doctrine, but that they are insufficiently determinate to be
much help in fashioning particular doctrines. For example, I argue
in a companion article that the current Court confronts a choice
between doctrines that promote state "sovereignty," defined as the
inviolability of state institutions and their unaccountability for
violations of federal law, and those that emphasize state "auton-
omy," that is, the freedom of states to make their own policy
judgments in meeting the needs of their citizens. One may see this
distinction most starkly in the contrast between state sovereign
immunity cases, in which the Rehnquist Court has aggressively
fashioned doctrine to protect the states,"6 and cases concerning the
preemption of state law by federal statutes and regulations, in
which the current Court has been much less solicitous of state
prerogatives."' All of the values associated with state governance
turn on the retention of significant regulatory responsibilities by
state governments (state autonomy), while the link between those
values and state inviolability or sovereignty is considerably more
difficult to draw."' These underlying values can thus help us make
general choices of direction even where it is difficult to translate
them into specific doctrinal rules.
To say this, of course, is hardly to offer a comprehensive recipe for
how doctrinal elaboration should proceed. Any such recipe, however,
446. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (holding
that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity in suits before federal
administrative agencies); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity with respect to suits in state courts); Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign
immunity when it acts under its Article I powers).
447. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756
(2004) (finding that the Federal Clean Air Act preempted a state air quality control standard);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (holding that federal labeling
requirements for tobacco products preempt state advertising restrictions); Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that federal regulations preempted common law
tort suits regarding the lack of air bags in automobiles).
448. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 13, 51-58.
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would be inconsistent with the basic notion that doctrinal develop-
ment should be incremental, particularistic, and responsive to the
circumstances of individual cases. The answer to the difficulties that
courts and commentators have encountered in producing a single
coherent theory of federalism is not necessarily to keep trying to
come up with a better theory; instead, we may well be better off
developing approaches to judging structural cases that do not
depend on such an overarching theory. More can no doubt be said to
guide these approaches, but that inquiry is probably best pursued
at a less abstract level than my discussion here.
D. Some Examples
Notwithstanding its title, this Article has had little to say about
specific doctrines that courts should construct and employ to enforce
the federal balance. My primary purpose has been to explore and
defend the theoretical presuppositions that have undergirded my
doctrinal work elsewhere. A companion piece to this one lays out an
overview of different doctrinal models of federalism that courts
might pursue." 9 But some examples seem necessary to illustrate the
theoretical arguments that I have pursued here. This last Section
thus explores the implications of my discussion of compensating
adjustments in two areas: the preemption of state law by federal
statutes, and the interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause
as an adjunct to Congress's commerce and spending powers.
1. Preemption
I have argued for some years now that the most important
problem of federalism doctrine is how to limit federal preemption of
state law.45 ° And I have urged that the best way to do that is by
expanding the scope and force of the "presumption against preemp-
tion" as a rule of statutory construction. That rule, however, is a
normative rule of construction, which means it cannot be grounded
in some descriptive judgment about Congress's intent in enacting
449. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13; Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra
note 397, at 39-42.
450. See, e.g., Young, Sky Falling, supra note 292.
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the relevant statute. Even worse, Caleb Nelson has made a strong
argument that any anti-preemption canon is inconsistent with the
original understanding of the Supremacy Clause.451 So how does one
justify a strong anti-preemption canon?
The analysis set forth here, I think, provides a theory that
explains why courts should be able to impose an anti-preemption
canon as a compensating adjustment for failure of the doctrine of
enumerated powers to protect state autonomy.452 Indeed, there is
good evidence that the canon evolved in just this way. Around the
turn of the twentieth century, courts generally construed the
preemptive force of federal statutes broadly. As Stephen Gardbaum
has shown, this broad doctrine of preemption did not threaten state
autonomy so long as the scope of Congress's powers was narrow;
once the courts began to interpret the Commerce Clause more
broadly in the 1930s, however, preservation of state regulatory
autonomy required a correspondingly narrower doctrine of preemp-
tion.453 The seminal cases recognizing the "presumption against
preemption" thus appeared in the 1930s and 1940s.454 A theory of
compensating adjustments thus explains what the Court was doing
during this period, defends the canon against Professor Nelson's
charge of unconstitutionality, and possibly justifies stronger (or at
least more consistent) enforcement of the canon in light of the
continued erosion of state autonomy.455
My discussion may also shed light on other aspects of the
preemption problem. The analysis of interpretive choice in Section
B points to why courts should favor "soft," process-based rules-like
the presumption against preemption-over substantive ones like a
renewed effort to limit the Commerce Clause.456 Rules of statutory
451. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000).
452. I do not propose to refute Professor Nelson's argument in the brief discussion here.
Rather, my purpose is to sketch the outlines of a counterargument as an illustration for which
a theory of compensating adjustments might be good.
453. See Gardbaum, Preemption, supra note 87, at 806-07.
454. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289
U.S. 346 (1933).
455. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 130-34 (arguing for stronger limits on
federal preemption of state law).
456. Critics of the presumption against preemption who nonetheless care about state
autonomy have suggested that federal power should be limited through constrictive
interpretations of the Commerce Clause, rather than statutory construction rules. See, e.g.,
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construction are a form of collaborative enforcement: They employ
judicial doctrine not to limit federal authority in its own right, but
rather to enhance the political and procedural safeguards that
safeguard state regulatory autonomy. 47 Because such rules are
"soft" in the sense of being overridable by a sufficiently determined
Congress, they lower the stakes when the courts move to check
legislative exercises of national authority.4"8 And a focus on
statutory construction may help courts respect the Frankfurter
constraint, because statutory construction tends to be more
constrained than either freewheeling inquiries into whether an
activity is commercial or noncommercial, or the creation of doctrines
wholesale like the anti-commandeering doctrine.
Finally, the preemption example illustrates the ways in which
federalism's underlying values may guide courts in choosing which
kinds of federalism doctrine to emphasize, even if courts are
unwilling to undertake direct value-application of the kind involved
in subsidiarity-type tests. I have argued elsewhere that preemption
doctrine is uniquely significant for values like state-by-state
experimentation, regulatory diversity, and governmental participa-
tion.4" 9 Preemption doctrine, after all, goes to whether state
governments actually have the opportunity to provide beneficial
regulation for their citizens; there can be no experimentation or
policy diversity, and little point to citizen participation, if such
opportunities are supplanted by federal policy. A strengthened
presumption against preemption thus provides an excellent example
of the sort of adjustment that courts ought to undertake in response
to the decline of state autonomy.
2. Necessary and Proper
A second problem, concerning how broadly to interpret Congress's
"necessary and proper" authority in conjunction with the Spending
and Commerce Clauses, illustrates both the potential and the
Nelson, supra note 451, at 303-05.
457. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000) (discussing the role of clear
statement rules).
458. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 13, at 16-17.
459. See id. at 130-31.
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limitations of my approach. Last term, in Sabri v. United States,4 60
the Supreme Court upheld the federal program bribery statute,
which makes it a crime for any employee of any entity accepting
federal money to accept a bribe.461' The Court rested this result on
Congress's "necessary and proper" authority to implement the
Spending Clause; the regulatory thrust of the bribery statute, the
Court said, was necessary and proper to ensure that federal funds
were properly used.46 2 Justice Souter's majority opinion refused,
moreover, to impose any requirement that the prosecution show
that the bribe adversely impacted the federal spending program.4
In other words, the majority was uninterested in requiring anything
approaching a showing of actual necessity for the regulation.
In the present term, the Court must decide Ashcroft v. Raich,464
which asks whether the Commerce Clause permits Congress to
regulate, pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act, the possession
of homegrown marijuana for medical use.4 5 The medical patients in
Raich produced and consumed marijuana under a California law
that permitted such activities where authorized by a physician. 466 It
seems fairly clear that the possession itself is not commercial
activity, and the question will be whether the Government may
reach this activity as part of a comprehensive scheme to regulate
the drug market. 467 The Government has argued, for example, that
the existence of legal uses for marijuana under state law under-
mines the enforcement of federal prohibitions on recreational use;
anyone caught and prosecuted for such use, after all, may argue
460. 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004).
461. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2000). For a comprehensive discussion of the bribery statute,
see Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal
Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2003).
462. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1946.
463. Id. at 1945-46.
464. No. 03-1454, argued Oct. 31, 2004. The decision in Raich had not come down as this
Article went to press in March 2005.
465. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2000). The Ninth Circuit struck down the Act as applied to
home-grown medicinal use. Raich v. Ashcrofi, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 2909 (2004).
466. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1225-26.
467. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (suggesting that Congress may
regulate non-commercial activity that is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity").
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that they possessed the marijuana for medicinal purposes.468 These
sorts of comprehensive scheme arguments are "necessary and
proper" arguments: The claim is that regulating non-commercial
activity is necessary and proper to Congress's regulation of inter-
state commerce in illicit drugs. The problem is that similar argu-
ments may be used wholly to evade even the minimal restrictions
imposed on the Commerce Clause in cases like Lopez and
Morrison.469
Each of these cases raises two problems that illustrate the
usefulness and the limits, respectively, of the approach I have
developed here. The first is the problem of doctrinal change over
time. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall
articulated an extremely broad vision of the "necessary and proper"
authority: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."7 ° Such a
broad "necessary and proper" power made sense in 1819, when the
underlying powers were narrow. In this sense, McCulloch's doctrine
is an example of a compensating adjustment designed to strengthen
a weak central government against the much more well-established
states.
Now that the underlying powers have become very broad,
however, grafting onto those enumerated powers a toothless
necessity requirement for further implied powers removes the limits
entirely. Contemporary doctrine recognizes very few limits on either
the spending or commerce powers. v' Under those circumstances,
tightening up on McCulloch's test would seem to be a legitimate
compensating adjustment. That sort of argument, in Sabri, would
have justified some requirement that the Government show a nexus
between the bribery charged under the federal statute and the
disbursement of federal funds. And the same reasoning, in Raich,
would support some meaningful scrutiny of the Government's
468. See Petitioner's Brief at 25-27, Ashcroft v. Raich, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004) (No. 03-1454).
469. See generally Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 22-26,Ashcroft (No. 03-1454). I was the principal author of this scholars' brief.
470. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
471. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (articulating a very persuasive test
for imposing conditions on grants of federal funds to states).
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argument that regulation of home-grown medicinal marijuana is
necessary to support its valid restrictions on the commercial
market.
When one turns to the problem of doctrinal construction, however,
one can see how difficult it may be to make workable federalism
doctrines. How should the Court tighten up its "necessary and
proper" analysis? One implication of the interpretive choice
discussion in Section B is that the doctrine should encourage
Congress to police itself; the courts might thus rely on the same sort
of process-type rules that I discussed in the context of preemption.
But aside from some sort of "clear statement" rule, the Frankfurter
constraint suggests that judicial review in this area can never go
very far. It seems likely that there will always have to be substan-
tial deference to the political branches on necessity, because the
alternative is to have judges making open-ended policy judgments
that are unlikely to be perceived as "law."
CONCLUSION
Our Constitution has proved remarkably resilient over the course
of our history, adapting to radical changes in circumstances while
other constitutional democracies have continually redrawn their
constitutive documents. One reason for this resilience is that our
Constitution is remarkably unwritten: The text sketches broad
outlines, but leaves the details to be fleshed out in a more evolution-
ary manner over time by the legislative, executive, and judicial
institutions to which the document gives life. Many scholars have
remarked on the open-ended character of particular individual
rights provisions,"' but this is even more true of structure. For all
that may lie at the heart of our institutional arrangements, both
separation of powers and federalism have proven extraordinarily
open to re-interpretation and re-implementation over the past two-
and-a-quarter centuries.
Courts are hardly the only--or even the most important-actors
in this story, but they have nonetheless played an important role.
The common law method that arises out of case-by-case judging is,
472. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
13 (1980).
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in many ways, uniquely well-suited for the evolutionary adaptation
of structural principles in the absence of any agreed-upon global
theory. In any case, I have insisted that structural principles like
federalism are part of the law that courts must apply in cases that
come before them, and that the courts' obligation of constitutional
fidelity accordingly calls them to construct doctrines to protect and
preserve the federal balance.
I have concentrated here on two elements of the judicial task in
developing federalism doctrine. The balance between state and
national authority is dynamic, and it continually diverges from the
constitutional vision in one direction or another. The first element
of the judicial task thus requires an assessment of the direction of
slippage at any given point in our history. At some times, particu-
larly in the early Republic, that divergence required the courts to
shore up national authority; today, it seems more likely that the
courts should focus on protecting the remaining autonomy of the
states. In any event, courts need not develop a full-blown, compre-
hensive theory of federalism to determine a need for compensating
adjustments in one direction or the other.
The second element requires the construction of particular
doctrines to meet that need. Text and history may sometimes play
an important role here, but I have suggested that in most cases
their influence will be limited. More functional considerations,
derived from the values associated with federalism and the
comparative institutional competences of courts and other actors,
will generally play a more salient role. In particular, courts should
seek to reinforce the ability of the federal system to police itself, and
they should try to maximize the determinacy of doctrine so as to
differentiate their judgments from the policy-driven decisions of the
political branches.
Much work remains to be done, of course, before we can arrive at
a specific set of doctrinal solutions to the problems of federalism.
The unusual thing about the federalism debate, however, is that the
very propriety of seeking judicial answers to those problems has
been contested for much of our history. One rarely sees similar
disputes today, for example, over the propriety of doctrinal construc-
tion in First Amendment law. In some sense, then, my work here
has been to try to move federalism up to the point where doctrinal
1854 [Vol. 46:1733
20051 MAKING FEDERALISM DOCTRINE 1855
discussions in constitutional law usually begin. It is high time the
debate moved forward.
